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a-IAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
a) *rhe Riao of Scottish Liberalism:
Historians may dispute tîio importance for England and 
Wales of Parliamentary Reform in 1832s there is less room 
for dispute in the case of Scotland. 'Bioro, it was, in 
CocM>urn*s words "giving us a political constitution for the 
first time"? it was more the creation than ttie reform of a 
system of political representation*
Throughout most of tîie 18th Centuiry, Scotland was 
virtually a blaWs sheet so far as parlimaoatary politics v/as 
concerned* By tiie Act of Union, she had gained the right to 
send 45 I#s and 16 peers to t3ia parlioanont at Westminister*
Even under the beet of cirmmmtances, such email nutd^ ors were 
bound to have had only a limited influence* However, oven this 
representation was debased and rendered worthless to the 
Scottish nation by the cliaraatear of political activity in 
18th Century Scotland.
This was the age of "Management" when single individuals 
or small oligarchies controlled the representation of most of 
the counties and burghs of Scotland in the fashion of private 
fiefdoms* Lord Bute, tho Scot who so dominated the young 
George III, and was so hated by English politicians, drew a 
eonsidaraî^le part of his power from his firm control of Scotland’s 
parliamentary representation* His successor to this rolo 
in Scotland, Henry Dundas, Viscoimt Melville, exerted an oven 
wider and tighter grip on his nation’s representation.
In 1784, Dmdas was said to hold 22 of the 45 Scottish
M.P.s in his pocket and after the election of 1790, as 
many as 34 were subject, to some degree, to his control.^
At the heart of this system was a spreading web of cor­
ruption, gerry-mandering and burgh-mongering, so complete
and so venal as to reduce Scotland, politically, to "a
2string of rotten and pocket burghs". Obviously, Scotland 
had long ceased to have any capacity for a national expres­
sion in parliament* On the other hand, by remaining isolated 
as a block of controlled votes, Scottish representation was 
kept outside of a "British” political system until "Reform". 
Hence, paradoxically, the corruption and control may well 
have preserved an opportunity for the growth of separate 
Scottish political institutions when popular representation 
came. Nevertheless, the greatest legacy of the management 
system was the enduring discredit attached to the party of 
the managers'* the Tory party. By identifying themselves so 
closely with a cynical self-interested disregard of law and 
morality, the Scottish Tories effectively threw away their 
most essential image* the party of order and rectitude.
The dominant feature of the unreformed system of Scotland 
was its exclusiveness. If politics were corrupt, it was a 
corruption shared by very few. In 1023, there were fewer than 
4,500 electors in the entire country, ignoring multiple
3
voting. The most unrepresentative conditions existed in the
1. W. Ferguson Scotland - 1689 to Present Edinburgh 1968
pp. 241, 247
2. H. J. Hanhara Elections and Party Management in the Time
of Disraeli and Gladstone London 1959 p. 155
3. M, Brock The Great Reform Act London 1973 p. 312
15 burgh constituencies consisting of Edinburgh and 14 
grotçïings of the 66 royal burghs. These burgh groupings 
bore little resemblance to the reality of population in an 
industrializing Scotland: Glasgow had one-quarter of a
member within the Clyde group while non-royal burghs like 
Greenock and Paisley had no representation at all. More 
importantly, there was no direct franchise in the burghs; by 
the Act of Union the choice of member rested exclusively 
with the members of the corporations. These bodies were the 
shame of Scotland; closed oligarchies beyond control who 
plundered the public purse at will and openly marketed 
parliamentary franchises.^ The corporation of Edinburgh 
formed a constituency of 33 in a city with a population 
of 162,000. All told the entire burgh franchise of Scotland 
amounted to no more than 1,500.^ The situation in the 
counties was different yet hardly an improvement. Whereas
the size of English county electorates drove local magnates
to avoid contests and their costs, Scottish counties were 
noted for their closed nature. Electorates ranged from 21 
in Bute to 240 in Fife and Perthshire^ and totalled for the 
country no more than 3,000, Unlike England, the franchise 
was not tied directly to land oimership but rather to 
"superiorities", rights originally tied to property but 
no longer so. Half of the county votes, including 20 of
Bute’s 21, were tied only to pieces of parchment which were
4. Ferguson op. cit. p. 243
5. Brock op. cit, p. 31
evenly brokered to the advantage of the managers. In this 
fashion, the Duke of Montrose controlled Dmnbartonshire 
without holding any property there. Legal chicanery and 
mal-praotice flourished with parchment votes : Inventing
fictitious ones and dividing others. Few counties were the 
"nomination" seats of a single magnate, though on one 
occasion, a candidate for Bute nominated, seconded and,
6
because he was the sole voter present, elected himself.
The cement which held the system together was patronage:
India was populated with the well-educated younger sons of
7Scots who could aid the managers.
The "economical" reforms of the 1820*s dried up much 
of this patronage and, as a result, as the 1830*s approached, 
the old system in Scotland was falling into rapid decay. 
Agitation for reform in Scotland, especially in the Burghs, 
was less only than that in Birmingham.^ The Reforms which 
eventually emerged in 1832 were far more revolutionary than 
those accorded to the other parts of the United Kingdom,
The English borough electorate had been expanded 
from 247,000 to 370,000, an increase of about 50% with the 
increase in the county franchise, 188,000 to 282,000, about 
the same? the Scottish burgh electorate swelled to 31,000, 
twenty times its former size while the county roll grew by 
a factor of eleven to 35,000.^ These figures speak for 
themselves as to the impact of reform on Scotland.
6. ibid. p. 31
7. ibid. p. 32
8. ibid. p. 168
9. ibid. p. 312
Hovyever, simple political reform was not the only 
revolutionary force at vrork in Scotland prior to 1832. 
Profound social changes wore rapidly overtalcing the old 
system. A middle class was not new to Scotland but:
never before .... could merchants, lawjyers,
professors and doctors preen themselves as 
"men in the middle ranks of life who gener­
ally constitute the majority of every free 
community, 3-Û
Yet this new "revolutionary" group found itself utterly 
denied a public voice at both the local and the national 
level. In England, the equivalent "new men" had found a 
system which allowed some expression and acceptance? in 
Scotland the only outlet was ingratiation with a manager.
The feelings of such men were fueled by the impact of 
the French Revolution on the mind of Scotland, Scotland, 
which had long possessed, in company with feudal institutions, 
an ancient tradition of equalitarian values, provided parti­
cularly rich soil for the doctrines of the revolutions
"A man's a man for a* tliat" embodied not only 
the age old unpolitical democracy of peasant 
Scotland but also the Rights of Man.^&
No less potent was the fundamental democracy of the Calvinism 
so deeply imbued in Scotsmen,
No less important was the fact that Scotland was a
10. Ferguson op, cit, p. 244 quoting Caledonian Mercury 
Deo. 28, 1782
11. ibid p. 249
nation, not meacoly a region. The 18th Century ié sometimes 
seen as tlie Golden Age of Scotland and, witliout doubt, names 
such as Adam, Smith, Hume and Watt all bear testimony to 
the explosion of creativity and learning that sprang from 
Scotland at this time, HcK^ ever, in the wake of the Act of 
Union in 1707, the lure of wealthy England was proving irre­
sistible to arbitious young Scots like James Boswell, who 
tried to shed their tongue, culture and origins witli almost 
indecent haste as they rii^ hed south. The very name "Scotland" 
vanished as tlie intelligensià . eagerly embraced "Worth Britain" 
These trends began to ease only in the last years of the 
century as the social changes mentioned above created a 
growing middle class reading pjjblic in Scotland. The romances 
of Sir Walter Scott and the matchless evocations of the 
Scottish spirit created by Robert Bums had a profound effect 
and did much to popularize a new pride in nationhood.
Thus as the most articulate sections of the Scottish 
people were being roused to a state of self-confidence and 
national Identity, political forces were providing them witli 
a means of expressions parliamentary representation. The 
agents of reform, the Whig-Liberal party, were thus adopted 
by Scotland as national liberatorss
the evil memory of the unreformed burgh cor­
porations, the genuine national aspiration 
for a "Christian Democracy", the dissenters' 
distrust of authority and repression, the general 
adherence to free trade doctrines and the in­
fluential Support of leading newspapers ....
continued to maJce Scottish Liberalism irresis- 
table*
Hie triumph of Liberalism was not, as in England, a phenomenon 
of the 1830's; it grew into a swelling tide as the years 
passed such that by the 1860's one party hegemony was almost 
complete. The opponents of the Liberal party were to win 
a majority in Scotland only once betx-zeen 1832 and 1914.
The bond between Scotland and Liberalism clearly went 
much deeper than ideology, John Vincent has suggested 
that, in England, the man who voted Liberal was a man who 
belonged to a section of society that allowed him to 
identify with the great Victorian concept of "progress"; 
his vote was a declaration of his ambitions and his confi­
dence in the future. Vincent, dealing with tlie social 
origins of Victorian Liberals, points out that those who 
saw themselves as having the most to gain from an advan­
cing, unfettered society were those most inclined to irote 
13Liberal. This was undoubtedly equally true of many
Scottish Liberals as well but, as Vincent notes, it is not
adequate as an explanation for the particular strength of
Liberalism north of the border:
Socially, Irish and Scottish Liberals wore 
rather more aristocratic and territorial than 
the English .... of the 71 Liberal M.P.s sitting 
for Scotland between 1359 and 1874, twenty-one 
had military connections, three were the patrons 
of livings, fifteen were related to the peerage 
and forty-three were large land owners or tlieir
12. G. S. Pry do Scotland from 1603 to the Present Day 
Benn London 1954 p. 209
13. j. Vincent The Formation of the Liberal Party 1857-1868 
Penguin London 1972 p. 93-161
sons, kîhat was involved at the Parliamentary 
level, in Scotland, was not any kind of revolt 
(radical) but a cultural and intellectual, 
phenomenon, the devastating inroads made upon 
the traditional holders of wealth and power 
and land, the natural conservatives, by 
Liberal ideas
Scotland's political liberation of 1832 had taken a turn 
different from, yet not unrelated to, the liberation of 
Vincent's English social classes; Liberalism was Scotland's 
national declaration of reborn nationhood. Social factors 
were involved but national forces were the essential element. 
Toryism, the only alternative, stood irredeemably for the 
"Bad Old Days", hence unacceptable and unable to re-establish 
its appeal as it did in England, The Liberalism that the 
Soots brought to the British Liberal Party was unique: 
national without being nationalist, rigorous in its commit­
ment to Liberal principles yet appealing to a very wide 
spectrum of the social order* Much of the source of that 
appeal could be found within the character and heritage of 
the Scots themselves s
a passion for the ideal and a sense of the 
obligation of men who deal with public! affairs 
to build upon nothing less than principles of 
right .... I am a Liberal because I am a
Scotchman.
(fo) Institutions in Victorian Scotland
To a large extent, the distinctive character of
14, iÎ3id p. 85
15. A. T. Innes R. Roid (ed.) Tfhy I am a Liberal 
London n.d. p. 64
Scottish politics in the 19th Century stemmed from the
separate character of independent Scottish institutions.
Hiough the Act of Union had eliminated a Scottish parliament,
the church, education and legal system of Scotland had all
been left xiritii an autonomous existence. Given that so much
of the political controversy of tlie 19th Century centred
on institutions, the fact that Scotland's wore specifically
Scottish helped create an independent Scottish political world.
Hie Scottish radical A, Taylor Innes' description of
16Liberalism as "the praise of free institutions" uncon­
sciously touched the heart of the distinctiveness of his 
nation's Liberalism,
Presbyterianism
' Presbyterianism was the single greatest driving force
of 19th Century Scottish Liberalism, playing little direct
role in political life, but providing "a silent and powerful
17impulse towards democracy," Hie established church of 
Scotland, unlike that of England, was presbyter!an in char­
acter, the episcopal church of Scotland representing only 
an insignificant minority. Scottish presbyterianism is 
Calvinist in origin, a stern faith brought and established 
by John Knox to root out the Catholicism of Scotland's popu­
lation, monarchs and allies. While the Church of Scotland
16, A. T. Innes Chapters of Reminiscence Hodder and 
Stoughton London 1913 p. 81
17, D. W. Unwin "Conservative Party Organization in 
Scotland" SHR 1965 p. 91 quoting Westminster 
Review 1888 p. 589
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evolved tlirough periods of near episcopalianism, unlike 
tho Church of England, that classic masterpiece of English 
Gcanpromise, the Scottish church was b o m  of a revolution - 
a faith imposed on di© elite from below. Hiis legacy of 
revolutionary fervor it never lost. The greater reluctance 
of the Scots to accommodate and adjust their principles was 
to foe a continuing theme of Scottish political and ecclesias­
tical life in the 19th Century.
Presbyterianism was a creed that demanded much from 
the individual, no matter how high or low born. It dele­
gated a strong role to the laity of the church through the 
kirk session and while it was never as democratic in prac­
tice as in theory, the implications were unmistakable. In 
the belief that it was wrong for a priest to interfere between 
a man and his God, the individual Scot was given a clear 
sense of his own responsibilities, self-reliance and inde­
pendence from birth. In all ranks of Scottish society there 
existed a pride in the spirit which had moved Knox to refuse 
to recognise inside his church "ladies and gentlemen, only 
men and women".
In an age when religious dispute has almost faded as 
a subject of serious controversy, it is difficult to appreciate 
the seriousness, thei passion and the crucial nature of the 
ecclesiastical controversies of 19th Century Scotland. It is 
^ven more difficult to appreciate them when it is remembered 
that the great mass of Scots were united in their commitment 
to the principles of Presbyterianism and agreed on most 
pointo of doctrine. Over 80% of the Scottish population
11
belonged to one of tlie three Presbyterian chu r c h e s . Y e t  
from the 1840*s until the turn of the century, the st&tna 
and condition of the Scottish churches were a recurring 
source of controversy, division and political debate.
At the time of the Scottish rebirth of 1832, 
Presbyterianism was divided into two general groupings: 
one, by far the larger belonged to the established Cliurch 
of Scotland, the other comprised a number of small dissenting 
sects. As in England, the Evangelical movement swept through 
Scotland causing great soul-searching and upheaval within 
the leadership and the membership of the Kirk. The most 
serious dispute centred on the institution of lay patronage, 
sanctioned by the United Parliament of 1712, To the new 
movement, it represented a deviation from the ideals of 
Presbyterianism and a blot on the purity of the Scottish 
faith. Pressures built up in the 1830's and lines began 
to harden. The eventual result was the Great Disruption of 
1843 when over 450 ministers, representing 40% of the 
Kirk membership withdrew from the General Assembly of
the Church of Scotland to establish the Free Church of 
Scotland under the leadership of Dr. Thomas dialmers.
Given the religious character of 19th Century Scottish 
society, the importance of the Disruption cannot foe over- 
enphasised.
18. H. Polling Social Geography of British Elections 
MacMllan London 1967 p. 375
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In 1843, the Free Churchmen did not see tliemselvea 
as dissenters in the sense of opposing the principle of 
an established national church, Chalmers wrote:
though we quit the Establishment, we go out 
on the Establishment principle? we quit a Viti­
ated Establishment, but would rejoice in return­
ing to a pure one ... we are not voluntaries,^^
However, the secession eventually institutionalized itself 
and drifted tabards tlie advocacy of disestablishment. This 
could only be accomplished-by political action in the 
temporal authority of Parliament? tlius the Disruption,
by rending the very heart of Scottish society, may
have been tlie greatest single event in the history of 19th
Century Scotland,
Law
Tlie second institution which gave meaning to tlie natio­
nality of Scotland was her legal system, Scotland retained 
her o\m civil and criminal law after 1707 and, while some 
measure of assimilation took place, especially in criminal 
law, a fundamental sense of Independence was retained, Scots 
law, in keeping with the rest of Western Europe but unlike 
English law which is based on tradition and precedent, is 
founded on Roman law, Scots Law is at once more logical, 
sterner and less humanistic in its approach to the ordering 
of society.
19, Ferguson op. cit. p. 312
13
The most politically significant legal issue of 
Victorian Scotland was the problem of land law. Land, 
the rights of property versus the rights of tlie tenant, 
became a particular issue when the Highland Crofters, in­
fluenced by the Irish example, refused to submit to any 
further clearances in the 1880's, Scottish land law was 
almost feudal in character and exhibited a particularly 
stiff support of property rights, offering little or no 
security to tenants.
The pattern of land ownership in Scotland with all its 
social and political ramifications was a direct result of 
the Scottish law of entail which was much stricter than its 
English equivalent. In a measure designed to strengthen 
the power of the landowning classes, the Scottish Parliament 
of 1685 passed a statute that made primogeniture a first 
principle and tlie division of property difficult. The 
eventual result xvas a massive concentration of land owner­
ship in the hands of a very few. In 1878, 68 persons owned
2050% of the land in Scotland; 580 owned 75% . A small
group of great noblos, the Dukes of Argyll, Atholl,
Buccleuch and Sutherland all possessed enormous holdings. 
Such highly visible power and privilege led to a strength­
ening of the sense of injustice and radicalism in Victorian 
Scotland.
Finally, because Scotland had her o\m system of
20. Pelling op. cit. p. 373
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justice based in Edinburgh, she had a highly influential
organised body of professionals with a Scottish base. The
legal profession, always a vital group in any society, was
both Scottish in composition and Scottish in orientation.
This was in contrast to Wales where the common legal system
of Wales and England took the aid^itious young lavzyers of 
21Wales to London. While the profession* as a whole had an
22old reputation for Tor^ rism, " individual Scottish lawyers 
came to be tlie dominant element in the Scottish Liberal 
caucus after 1886. With the drift away .of' the old sources, 
military men, business men and the land, post-Home Rule 
Liberalism in Scotland became increasingly dependent on men 
of the law; and because they were nationally based, they 
may have taken a greater interest in and been more responsive 
to Scottish perceptions of issues.
Education
Until the educational reforms of the late 19th Century, 
the system of education in Scotland was both markedly dif­
ferent from and generally superior to its English equivalent. 
The origins of Scottish education lie partly in Scotland's 
ancient equalitarian values but owe most to the force of 
the Presbyterian revolution. Knox and his followers consid­
ered education to be one of the fundamental duties of a godly
21, K. 0, Morgan Wales in British Politics University 
of Wales Press Cardiff 1963 p. 7
22. Unwin op. cit. p. 106
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people. Children were "born ignorant of godliness" and 
needed teaching in the duties of life and eternity. The 
key to that goal lay in opening the scriptures, via lit­
eracy, to the common man; this would also have the result 
of securing the permanency of the revolution. It was not, 
however until 1696 that the state made a serious effort to 
transform Knox's dream of a school in every parish into a 
reality by placing a support tax on landowners.
While the true worth of the resulting system has been
questioned, it is generally accepted that by the 18th
century only Prussia, parts of Switzerland and America
23
could rival the breadth of education in Scotland. Most
significantly, Scottish standards were far in advance of
those of England. Even in 1850, over 30% of the English
population was still illiterate compared to less than 10%
24
in Scotland. The key to the Scottish system was its 
philosophy of cherishing education in all and attempting to 
provide for the poor "lad o' pairts". In the rural lowland 
parishes, these ideals were close to realized; resulting 
in:
the construction of a literate peasant society 
.... that was not only able to read but appar­
ently loved reading .... opening their intel­
lectual horizons and thus breaking the mental 
cake of irrational custom.25
23. T. c, Smout A History of the Scottish people 1560- 
1830 Collins 1969 p. 427
24. R. Shannon The Crisis of Imperalism 1865-1915 
Hart - Davis Macgibbon, 1974 London p. 222
25. Smout op. cit. p. 432
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However, the realities of the democratizing effects of 
the system should not be overemphasised:
The Scottish system of ear:ction mace it 
possible for a few exceptionally gifted 
ploughboys to live in palaces and for an 
appreciable nuïiûjer to occupy manses, bank ; 
parlours and captain's cabins and to become 
menbers of clubs in India but it did little 
for the ordinary farmhand,
The er’ucational system was very much less successful in 
contcudinc>' C'ith the difficulties of remoteness (in the 
Ilicrhlands) and most importantly, with the swelling in­
dustrial burghs where conditions were little better than 
71
'those in : jydla:'. . "onet riess, the tin
C ’-’u a l i t a r i a n i - e  -hi t h e  ""-nrccn ' \;e re ""oun i n  .1 ' - o c i e f
o" '-^ rea't ine'-'ualiti''''s , it 1'^ h ‘e;i' - i'n i Tie ant that all 
icots seemot ':c ta. ' a patriotic " .ri in t-'e virtues o':
'the S’;.'3ten.
The iirnortancc of the dcotti 'I', universities if -.ould net 
be overlooked. They provided, not onlv hin-her education o'^ 
the highest international standards but also a vrct Igiou". 
focus for the social and intellectual elite o" Scotland.
As such, they formed a barrier against the forces of 
assimilation as well as strengthening the national feelings 
of the Scots,
It should be pointed out that while educational re­
form in England was all too often reduced to petty sectarian
26. Hahham op. cit. p. 162
27. Smout op, cit, p. 450
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squabbles, Scotland was free of this plague. United in
the principles of Presbyterianism, Scots could turn their
attention to genuine problems of education. Moreover, the
traditional dedication to learning caused education to be
a constant subject of interest, discussion and action
28amongst the political leadership of the country.
Buttressed by these institutions Scottish society 
managed to retain its own character. Curiously, it combined 
social and economic disparities that were greater than those 
of England with a spirit of openness and recognition of 
merit that allowed these divisions to be more easily sur­
mounted. Most of the aristocracy had absorbed some degree 
of Anglicisation and a few had alienated themselves into absen­
teeism on the Irish pattern. However, even here the 
Scottish identity flourished:
The Scottish aristocrat may be and generally 
is especially tenacious of his rights and 
privileges and so far is the natural ally of 
the English aristocrat; but something in the 
vary air of his country gives him a reverence for 
intellect, a sense of fundamental human equality 
and an admiration for those qualities \diich make gg 
men wise rather than those which make them stagnate.
On the other hand the degree of Anglicisation in the upper 
ranks bred a distrust amongst the middle and lower classes 
that was based not merely on social differences but, much 
more po-bantly, on nationalism. Class conflict in Scotland 
has always derived a special tinge of bitterness from the
28, see especially Rosebery MSS; Bryce MSS passim
29. B. T. Raymond The Man of Promise Fisher Unwin 
London 1923 p.39
18
merging of social and patriotic identities.
Scottish institutions directed the course of Scottish 
Liberalism in the 19th Century so long as Liberalism stayed 
true to its fundamental Mid-Victorian commitment to in­
stitutional reform. So long as that remained so, the 
pblitics of Scotland would remain distinctly Scottish. 
Disestablishment was a Scottish issue in the way that 'the 
8-hour day' could never be.
c) The Victorian Scottish Liberal Party:
National Dominance?
Hie outstanding feature of the Liberal Party in Scotland 
was its position of extraordinary dominance between 1632 and 
1914, In the first reformed election the VThigs won 43 of 
Scotland's new total of 53 seats, setting a pattern of vic­
tory that would last over 60 years. Later in the century, 
Jolin Buchan was not unjustified in considering his choice of 
Toryism as one of rebellion against tlie 'Establishment*.^^
In 1841, a limited Tory recovery reduced the Liberals 
to 30 seats. However, Peel's failure to understand the 
prickly state of Scottish church politics on^the eve of Dis­
ruption and his consequent rejection of the desire to loosen
30. J. A. Smith John Buchan Hubert Hart Davis, London, 
1965 p. 181
19
the bonds of the national church from the state led 
both to the church breaktg) and to the end of any hope of 
extending Conservative strength in Scotland.
8i%)port for the Liberals grew steadily over the next 
two decades until by 1865 they held 41 seats. Tlie formal 
creation of the Liberal Party under Gladstone’s leadership 
in 1368 ensured that Scotland would turn towards Liberalism 
with an even greater devotion than before. In 1869, after 
redistribution had awarded Scotland an additional 7 seats, 
the Liberals were rewarded with 53 of 60 Scottish members.
1874 brought the first favourable turn for Toryism
since 1841. Scotland, like the rest of the Uhited Kingdom,
turned sharply against the Liberals, reducing their numbers
to 40, The Conservatives were utterly taJcen aback by their
victories, having bothered to contest only on© half of the
Scottish constituencies. As a result, even in this election,
31the popular vote for the Liberals remained over 70%,
Despite an improved organization instigated by Disraeli, the
Tory gains of 1874 were wiped out by the tide of Gladstone’s
Midlothian crusade which returned the Liberals to their
strength of 1869, The Liberals maintained this position
in 1885, taking 62 seats (the redistribution of 1884 gave
Scotland 72 seats), despite severe internal division.
Ominously, however, the Liberal share of the popular vote
32fell almost 7% from the 1880 level of 72,8%,
31. Unwin pp. cit. p. 94
32. ibid. p. 94
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As in the rest of the United Kingdom, 1886 marked a 
great turning point. The Gladstonian Liberals won only
43 Scottish seats and 55% of the popular vote, the Liberal
33Unionists winning 17 seats and the Conservatives 12.
The Liberals recovered only mildly in 1892 to 50 seats and
56%.^^ Ihough badly reduced from the heyday of 1885, the
Liberals still retained a sizeable majority of seats in
Scotland. Even this was threatened, however, in 1895, when
the Liberals, without Gladstone, were reduced to 39 seats
conqpared with the Unionists. Bottom was touched in 1900
when the Khaki election deprived Scottish Liberalism of
its majority of seats (34 of 72) and reduced its popular 
35share to 51,2% * The Liberal recovery of 1906 was par­
ticularly spectacular in Scotland; 58 (plus 2 Labour)
3S
of 72 seats and 57,6% (3*7% Labour). Most signifi­
cantly, Scotland did not return to the Unionists in 1910; 
in fact, in January 1910 the Liberal representation was
increased to 59 (2 Labour) and the Tories regained only 
371.4% of the popular vote. The only change in December 
1910 wais the shift of one Liberal seat to Labour.
Ohe chief result of the overwhelming Liberal strength 
before 1886 was the virtual elimination of inter-party 
politics. PoHtioal activity and struggle was kept within
33. ibid. p. 94
34. ibid. p. 94
35. ibid. p. 94
36. ibid. p, 94
37. ibid. p. 94
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the national party. Aiding this practice was the oli­
garchical nature of party structure that, by putting a 
premium on social position, kept the party from becoming 
ideological, Ifhile rank counted, the party stayed very 
open to general participation? thus problems were absorbed 
and dealt with. In those places where Tories never stood, 
and this included a great number of tlia burgh seats, the 
solo political arena the local Lilaeral Association.
Tlie Liberalism of Scotland was so secure that it "had a
38
unique air of permanence". Thus the battle over Dis­
establishment was not so much between Tory and Liberal as 
between differing strains of Liberalism.
Issues : Religion, Society and Nationalism
By far the most important issim for Victorian 
Scottish politics was the Scottish church. The Disruption 
and the eventual division of religious Scotland made it 
inevitable that the state and secular politics would soon 
be deeply involved* In the English context, Cobden had 
said: "Dissent is the soul of Liberalism". The foremost
leader of Liberal Scotland in the mid-century was Duncan 
McLaren vdio, as a leading menSsar of the United Presbyterian 
Church ( as the pro-1843 dissenters became after an amal­
gamation in 1847),. organized his brand of Liberalism with 
the overriding object of forcing tlie disestablishment of 
the church of Scotland. However, while the dissent -
38. Hanham qp. cit. p. 156
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establishment split in Scotland tended to follow Liberal- 
Conservative lines in politics, these were mucli less 
certain than in England,
The preferences of tlie religious leadership were, by
contrast, very clear. In the university voting of 1868,
the mj.nisters of religion voted as follows s
' , Liberal Conservative
Church of Scotland 67 1,221
Free Church 607 33
Ü, P. Church 474 1
Episcopalians 4 78
Others 360 35
1,512 1,368
Yet given the fact that the Liberals won 82% of the total 
vote in Scotland in 1869,^^ it is obvious that this hardly 
reflected the loyalties of the laity. As the front line 
troops of a threatened institution, the Establishment clergy 
sought the security of the Conservative Party with its un­
failing support of the e%j.sting order on either side of the 
Tweed. While the Liberal Party was not to support Dis­
establishment officially until 1892, the ties between the 
Liberals and Dissent were too obvious not to have had an 
effect. Nevertheless, without doubt, a very large bodj' of 
churchmen continued to vote Liberal until the 1880's.
While it is difficult to be certain on the point, it seems
39. Vincent op. cit. p. 86
40. J, Morley Life of Gladstone MacMillan London 1903 vol. ii 
. p251
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probable tliat there existed qualities within the general 
philosophy of Presbyterianism that went beyond disestablish­
ment quarrels and promoted Liberalism in Scotland, As a 
Presbyterian, the Scottish churchman was much closer to the 
faith and principles of the English dissenters, the bulwark 
of English Liberalism, than to Anglicasiism,
The laÊit quarter of the century sav? the climax of 
politico-religious disputes. Theoretically, the major points 
of controversy between the Free Church and the kirk should 
have been eliminated by Disraeli's Patronage Act'-of 1874 
vAiich erased the hated Act of 1712, Yet, partly out of its 
ingrained nature, the conflict continued and, indeed, grew, 
English politicians were always baffled by Scottish church 
controversyt Peel's ignorance had touched off the Disrup- 
tlcai; Joseph Chamberlain, the great English Dissenter, could 
not understand the source of the Scottish dj.spute;^^
Gladstone, though he appreciated it better, could see no 
solution.Perhaps it was the deep devotion to high 
principle that Scottish Liberals spoke of so warmly that 
forced the issue on when it might have been resolved. The result 
was that in the early 1880 ' s a swelling movement for the 
disestablishment of the kirk, allied to secular radicalism, 
began to overshadow the growing problem of Ireland and to 
tear the Scottish Liberal Party apart.
It is just as important to note what did not interest
41. Innes Chapters ... op. cit. p. 151
42. Morley op, cit., Vol. 1, p. 471
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the Sœttiah Liberal as what did. The most striking gap
throughout the 19th Century and well into the 20th was a
marked Indifference to ideas or programmes of social reform.
In 1894, R. B. Haldane was under no illusions as to the
attractiveness of his own Fabian ideas to his own countrymen:
"I have not a high opinion of my Scot as a social reformer.
The record well supports Haldane's judgement. The social
conditions of Scotland had always been worse than in the
wealthier society of England, In 1861, One third of the
44population lived in one room dwellings. In tlie 1840's, 
Glasgoif had been described as: "possibly the filthiest and
unhealthiest of all British towns" Yet, there was little 
in the way of a Scottish equivalent of Edward Chadwick's 
"drain-pipe mania". It is significant that the ^thor of the 
immensely influential 'Self-Help*, Samuel Smiles, was a Scot. 
Those who did concern themselves with poverty in Scotland 
tended to downgrade hygiene and material conditions in favour 
Of the 'moral' aspect of inç>ovorishment. It was regarded as 
both a sin and a crime to be poor, a philosophy vrihich in­
fected the Scottish Poor Law even more than the English 
counterpart. No really sustained efforts to attack matters 
of pub Lie health were initiated in Scotland until tîio 1860* s. 
As a result, Scotland retained the worst living conditions 
in the United Kingdom throughout the 19th Century.
43. Haldane to A. J. Balfour Dec. 23/1894, Haldane 
MSS 5904
44. Ferguson op. cit. p. 300
45. ibid. p. 300
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TIîq attitudes of Scottish Liberals well reflected 
the national prejudices;
On the whole the Liberals were devotees of Man­
chester and esqDonents of that remorseless 
economic creed. They tended to be instit­
utional reformers with scant regard for social 
legislation and such badly needed reforms as 
factory legislation were chaiï^ioned by Tories 
rather than Liberals *46
This tendency of Liberalism was to be increasingly high­
lighted as social and working class interests came into 
the forefront of politics in the last years of the century. 
Scottish Liberalism was notoriously slow to encourage 
working class candidates; in 1906, the Scottish Liberal 
Party refused to acknowledge tiie Gladstone-MacDonaid com­
pact and by open opposition to Labour kept its Scottish 
representation to two or three until World War I. In 1918, 
Scottish Liberals overwhelmingly sided with Lloyd George.
The heart of the ancient Liberal creed of fierce individ­
ualism came to rest in Scotland,
While the Scottish Liberals belonged to the so-called 
'Celtic Fringe' of the late Victorian party, they did not 
behave as a 'national front' in the fashion of the Irish and, 
to a lesser degree, the Welsh. Rising nationalism in the 
latter half of the 19th Century led to the eventual adoption 
of the idea of Scottish Home Rule but outright separatism 
was never a significant force. Rosebery's entry into 
politics in 1880 was directly connected to what he and many 
others perceived as the inexcusable neglect of Scotland by
46. Ferguson op. oit. p. 303
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the Westminster Parliament. His efforts resulted In the 
not wholly satisfactory establishment of a Secretary of 
State for Scotland as a member of the Cabinet. His 
attitude reflected a widely shared sentiments
X confess I think Scotland is as usual treated 
abominably. Justice for Ireland means every­
thing done for her even to the payment of the 
natives' debts. Justice to Scotland means 
insulting neglect. I leave for Scotland next 
week with a view to blowing up a prison or 
shooting a policeman ,.,.^ (May 1882)
Despite these feelings, and for all the Scottish group;'s 
expanded influence in a shrunken Liberal Party there was 
little effort made to use it to push through national 
legislation.
The Scots did not have the nationalism of the sort 
that bound the Irish and Welsh together; they did not 
see themselves as "a people rightfully struggling to be 
free", Scotland did not regard herself as an oppressed 
minority; on the contrary, she firmly regarded herself 
as a full-fledged, if unappreciated, partner of
England in a larger whole. No alien church or institution 
served as a focus for national discontent. However, 
though the conditions required for a genuine national 
liberation movement were lacking, the Scots nursed strong 
grievances over the way they felt that their particular 
interests were repeatedly passed over.
47, R, R, Jams Rosebery Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
London, 1963 p. 130
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Wlîile many Scottish Liberals pushed hard for Scottish 
Hems Rule, the existing fact of 'Home Rule' within the 
party organization served to weolcen Scotland's influence, 
not strengthen it. The Welsh, who were fully integrated 
into English Liberal bodies such as the NLF, sent well- 
drilled phalanxes of delegates to party conventions ready 
to swing their weight to secure a top position for Wales 
on the Liberal programme, Scotland, with its independent 
Scottish Liberal Association, sent only observers to these 
gatherings which effectively set the priorities for the 
entire British party whether tlie Scots liked it^  or not.
So long as a single British legislature was the source of 
all measures for Scotland, it was a weakness for the Scots 
to stand aloof.
Organization
Scottish Liberalism was characterized by an almost 
family atmosphere. Scotland is a small country with the 
bulk of her population packed together in a central belt.
In the 19th Century, her society was closely knit together
amongst its leading groups by the universities, the church,
48the bar, the press and kinship, National identity allowed 
for a feeling of unity and sympathy for fellov; Scots.
Liberal burgh associations had a wide base and included most 
of the loading mon of the community. A strong spirit of pub­
lic duty permeated through the local officialdom of Scotland
48. Hanham op. cit, p. 165
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49and corruption was almost unheard of. The remarkable
degree of closeness of personal relations within the
Scottish Liberal leadership meant that it was possible
for MPs to shift from constituency to constituency if not
at first successful, T, R. Buchanan sat successively for
Haddingtonshire# Edinburgh West, Aberdeenshire East and
East Perthshire, However# in spite of this, the local
associations were extremely jealous of their rights to
select their awn candidates. Local men usually carried an
advantage for selection over outsiders, partly for personal
reasons and partly because attention to and understanding
of local matters counted for a great deal at the polls,
Buchanan loot ?berdeenshine East in 1900 partly because he
50had been so remiss in oaring for local interests.
Given this qualification# it remains true that the essential 
requirement for consideration remained either meinbership 
in the 'national family' or sponsorship by a family 'elder*. 
A hint of the intimate feelings existing between family 
members, even those at odds with each other, can be 
gleaned from the warning that Lord Rosebery sent to his 
ally and friend Ronald Munro-Ferguson, who had written 
attacking the leadership of Campbell-Bannermans
Remember that he is thoroughly straight, a 
friend of yours, a Scot and do not be hasty 
to despair of him or even criticise him.^^
49, Vincent op, cit. p, 85n
50, J. V7, Crcmble to Bryce, Oct. 1900, Bryce MSS Box 21
51, Rosebery to Ferguson, March 14, 1999, Rosebery 
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Most of the leading Liberals were close personal friends
and Scottish î#s in London tended to draw their friend-
52ships from within the caucus. This kind of atmosphere 
meant that quarrels between different groups of Liberals 
could usually be 'kept in the family'.
Built on this family atmosphere, the structure of 
the Mid-Victorian Scottish Liberal Party was autonomous, 
well-connected and yet nationally unorganized in any 
formal sense. The basic units were the county and burgh 
associations which, though more broadly baaed than the 
English counterparts, usually consented to domination by a 
local oligarchy* In the counties, this could mean the 
influence of a single landowning family such as the Sinclairs 
in Caithness and tlie Elliots in Roxburghshire. Tlie burgh 
associations,while more open,also tended to leave leader­
ship to a select few. This partiality for oligarchy 
facilitated the development of a network of personal ties 
across Scotland that substituted for organization.
Radicalism was absorbed into this system and as a result 
Scotland had none of the extra-party campaigns such as 
the National Education League that grew up in England. The 
one real national power in pre-1880 Scotland was the chief 
Liberal Ifhip, W. P. Adorn. A Scot, Adam came to control 
most of the party funds and consequently was able to exert 
an influence on local associations tliat was unlieard of in 
England.
52. R. Parqüharson In and Out of Parliament Hoddar 
and Stoughton 1911 London
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The unexpected Tory revival of 1874 shodced the
Liberals? Adam concluded tliat the situation required the
establishment of the bones of national organization. In
1876, he opened a first office In Edinburgh, Soon after,
a separate office was estaÏDllshed in Glasgow to deal with
the more Tory West, The Edinburgh eastern association was
professedly non-mi.litant, existing only to
giving Information and advice at elections .... 
not in any way to interfere with the inde­
pendent actions of the various Liberal 
associations from which it is forraed,^^
One Liberal M.P, was happy that it did not seek "to inter­
fere with internal constituencies nor in any way attempting
54
to raise agitation in the country". In contrast, tlie
Western Association took on a radical and activist complexion,
thus establishing a division betar/oen East and West in
Liberalism that was to become permanent. A. L. Brown, a
prominent radical, saw the purpose of the new organizations
very differently from the 'moderates* quoted above: they
were to "let the people's representatives know what the
country really wanted, for tlieir members sometimes needed
55education quite as much as the electors."
However, all such differences were overwhelmed by 
the tide of enthusiasm and unity touched off by Gladstone's
53, quoted in: J, G. Relias "Tlie Liberal Party in Scotland",
Scottish Historical Review, 1965 p, 3
54, D. C. Savage "Scottish Politics 1885-86" S.H.R.
1961 p. 119
55, Relias op. cit. p. 7
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crusade in Midlothian. Significantly, the Midlothian 
campaign was kept tightly in the hands of Adam, Rosebery 
and A. Craig-Sellar, pillars of tlie Eastern group. Taking 
advantage of the situation, Rosebery helped engineer a 
merger of East and West, over the suspicions of tlie Western 
radicals, into a single Scottish Liberal Association. The 
Western doubts were justified? though greater in populationj 
the West obtained only parity on tlie SLA Council and found 
the Executive Council, which was the real source of power, 
top-heavy with T'Thiggish Liberals, Resentful, the radicals 
organised across Scotland to pass resolutions in favour of 
disestablishment, land reform, temperance and other radical 
causes but these were all ignored by the SLA leadership. 
Lord Elgin, the chairman of the Association repeatedly 
emphasized that the SLA was not to deal with policy matters 
and in 1884, in response to rising disorder, was forced to 
rule out virtually all topical debate.
Leadership
For all its importance to the British Liberal cause, 
Scotland failed to produce any notable leaders until the 
last two decades of the 19th Century, Indeed, during the 
Mid-Century, the Scottish caucus was notorious for the low 
quality of its members. From 1833 until 1880, when 
Gladstone won Midlothian, not a single Scottish M.P. 
served in any British Cabinet. Scotland’s voice fell by 
default to Scottish peers such as the Earl of Aberdeen
32
and the Dulce of Argyll,
As well aa failing to prodtwe British po3.itical 
figures, Scotland was also notably short of any 'national' 
leadership* The only figure to emerge who used his 
nationality and advocacy of Scotland's interest to rise 
to political significance was Rosebery. Hov?ever, Rosebery's 
success was much more a personal achievement rather than 
the result of the marshalling of any particular Scottish 
force. Significantly, Rosebery's advocacy of Scottish 
interests fell rapidly away once he had risen to the fore­
front of the British Cabinet.
A Rosebery in the part of a Scottish Liberal 
was different from a Rosebery as Prime Minister 
and it has been the re- occurring misfortune 
for the advancement of purely Scottish questions 
that Scotsmen have turned their attention to 
non-Scottish politics on entering government 
office.
The late 19th Century saw a shift from this bleak 
image as there came a rush of Soots into the leading ranks 
of the Liberal Party, In 1884, Campbell-Bannerman was 
the first full-blooded Scottish M.P, to reach high 
ministerial rank. He was joined by Bryce in 1892 along 
witli English imports Asquith and Trevelyan, Marjoribanks 
was elevated by Rosebery in 1894. Wot surprisingly, it 
was Campbell-Bannerman who gave the Scottish Liberals 
their greatest taste of pcwfer, Haldane, Sinclair,
56, ibid. p. 14
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R. T, Reid and Lord Elgin were all brought into the 
government of 1905, So obvious was the Caledonian in­
vasion of the ministries of 1905 that a disgruntled
English office-seeker wrote of "the wiles of the lowland
57
clans and vary 3.ow indeed". Between 1880 and 1905, 
Scotland could claim three Prime Ministers: Rosebery,
Balfour and Campbell-Bannerman; and many Scots would have 
claimed a fourth : Gladstone »
While this pattern of Scottish individual success 
is undoubted, its impact on Scottish interests is 
questionable. The Scots never regarded their successes 
as signalling tlie triuitç»h of any particular Scottish 
question. They took successes as personal not national 
triumphs since they always assumed tliat tliey were acting 
in an essentially British arena in which their opportunities 
were on the same footing as anyone else*s.
Tihlle Liberal Scotland did not adopt nationalist 
leaders, she certainly did adopt leaders. One figure 
stood out aîjove all otiiera in the moulding of the Scottish 
political mind in the latter half of the 19tîi Century: 
William Gladstone, Wliile held in reverence by Liberals 
throughout the United Kingdom, he held a special appeal 
for the Scots. Tie spectacular triumph of Midlothian 
seemed to confirm an emotional tide that had been building 
in Scotland since t3ie 1860*e. That triumph served to 
inspire an entire generation of young Scottish Liberals and
57, J. Wilson C-B Constable, London 1973 p. 461
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in particular, to lay the foundations of the Liberal
58bastion of East Scotland.
In many Scottish homes, the Grand Old Man adiieved
ths status of a household God. This was particularly so
on the East Coast where a cult of the G.O.M. grew tqp to
59be invested with near religious significance. Mary 
Gladstone provided a portrait of the extraordinary passion 
that Mr. Gladstone aroused in Edinburgh even in the ebb 
year of 1885;
As we drove to EdinÎDurgh you would think it 
was the first time it ever happened, the seven 
miles of road with its frantic little groups, 
the decorated cottages, the carriages, 
bicycles, traps of all descriptions lining 
the way, the gradual increase of people as you 
get nearer Edinburgh, the crowds in the streets, 
the eager faces cramming every window, high and 
low? it is all exactly the same as before.
This passionate devotion is made nil the more remarkable 
by Gladstone's indisputable bade ground: upper class
English, High Anglican, Oxford. One of the most remark- 
£üs>le aspects of a remarkaJile man was that his personal 
character seemed quite distinct from tliese influences. To 
rephrase tlie famous description, he was English in all but 
tlie essentials. As a spealcer, a politician and as a man 
he was the reincarnation of his Scottish ancestors. The 
impassioned rhetoric, the blazing eyes and the moral
58. T. Shaw Letters to Isobel Cassell, London 1921 
p. 78-79
59. James, op. cit, p. 32S? Unwin, op. cit., p. 95
60. James op. oit, p. 174
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fervour that transfixed all who came to hear him were 
drawn straight from the Sœttish Reformation, His personal 
appeal, strong to English non-conformity, went straight to 
the heart of the Scottish character. His genius was in 
seizing ihe Presbyterian conscience of Scotland and ex­
horting it to stand by its highest principles of morality 
and right.
In the words of one of his Scottish contemporaries, 
his was:
a pilgrimage to men drilled in Christian doctrine 
(who) were moved not to admiration alone and a 
swaying of the mind but to a deeper sense of the 
responsibility of the individual citizen as a 
sharer, however humble, in his country's destiny.
Moreover, his omi vision of the purpose of liberalism, the 
reform and freeing of society's institutions, matched the 
emphasis of Scottish Lilierals. Gladstone's influence in 
Scotland was founded on an insistence on treating his 
audience as rational individuals whose moral judgement could 
and should be trusted, a fundamental equalitarianiem that 
touched a deep chord in Scotland. Perhaps most importantly, 
he mai-ntained the twin qualities of romanticism and hard- 
headed rationality, a union which baffled and angered many 
in England but which displayed a remarkably accurate re­
flection of the Scottish genius,
Therefore it is not surprising tiiat Scottish Liberalism
61, Shaw op. cit, p. 78
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became a particular source of support for Gladstone 
and retained bis imprint long after it had begun to fade 
in the rest of Britain* A thoughtful Scottish Tory, Jolin 
Buchan, could write of the appeal of Gladstonian Liberal­
ism to Scotland;
it came as naturally as Toryism to a Highland 
laird. Tliere was something of the ancient Scots 
jealousy of England, the rich and by repute, con­
servative neigîibour? a wholesane di.s like of 
snobbery? a partiality for plain folJc .... some 
suspicion of denationalized lairds with Episcopal 
proclivities? a distrust of exotic cleverness 
(Mr. Disraeli); a traditional love of oratory 
especially when it smacked of the pulpit (Mr. 
Gladstone)
Hotmver, as Buchan rightly pointed out, the example of 
Gladstone was too often taken by Scottish Liberals into:
self-righteousness, the constant assertion 
that you are better and more tender-hearted 
than your neiglibours, the cultivation of 
emotions at high tension,^3
Thus Scottish Liberalism could and did become stale, be­
coming its own worst eneiry, denying entry to new men, 
new ideas in the face of a changing world? and eventually 
falling away to irrelevance.
Opposition to Liberalism
The history of Conservatism in Scotland in tlie 
19th Century after reform falls naturally into two periods.
62, Smith op. cit, p. 181
63. ibid. p. 181
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dividing on the Home Rule split of 1886, Prior to tliat 
date Toryism was we ale if not pathetic in character, fata­
listically accepting a total Liberal hegemony in Scotland 
witli little heart to dispute it. At best, Scottish Tories 
could be sure of only half a dozen safe county seats con­
trolled by the influence of Tor\: lairds. In this way, 
Cameron of Locheil held Xnvernessshire, Lord Elcho held 
Haddingtonshire and tlie Earl of Galloway, Wigtownshire.
Tlie most obvious example was Bute where the Duke of 
Hamilton's grip was assured by 450 certain tenant votes on 
Arran.Besides tliese isolated Old Tory Lairds, the party 
had influence only within a small upper class urban minority 
and the official and legal classes of Edinburgh, The ad­
herence of the latter group, so disliked in Scotland, was 
only a further debit for the Conservatives. Even the 
strength in the counties was underutilized: from a com­
bination of extreme snobbery and defeatism sympathetic 
lairds often refused to stir to the activity of securing 
votes. In 1874 in Elgin, the sitting Tory M.P,, a Col,
Grant, refused to lower himself to campaign or even to 
66speak. "[[he Tory victories of that year came by default 
v-Thon the lowland tenantry rebelled against the Liberal 
Establishment after a series of bad harvests. In 1868 
only 21 of 56 seats were contested.
64. Hanham op, cit. p. 160
65. Unwin op. cit. p. 106
66. B. Crapster "Scotland and the Conservative Party in 
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Native Scottish leadership was non-existent. The 
nominal leaders, the Dukes of Buccleuch and Richmond, 
Lennox and Gordon were discredited figureheads. The only 
real leader was Lord Salisbury through his family connec­
tions with the Ba If ours, the Earl of Galloway and Carapbell 
of Blythwood, An investigation sent out in 1876 by an 
dissatisfied Disraeli could find no lever to act on other
than increased stimulation of the lairds; hardly a prom- 
67ising idea.
67, ibid. p, 360
CHARTER 2
Impending Crises : 1880-85
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Impending Crises: 1880-85
a) Loss of Tlie \'‘7hlqs;
The years of the second Gladstone government proved 
an anticlimajc to the exoitment of Midlothian. The 
essentially negative character of the victory of 1880, 
the rejection of *Beaconsfieldism', had left the Liberal 
victors with little clear idea of a programme to follow. 
Given this climate of vulnerable aimlessness, exemplified 
by the Bradlaugh affair, the new government stood utterly 
unprepared for the sudden onslaught of events from Ireland, 
The Kllmainliam crisis of 1882 was follovmd by the tragic 
catastrophe of Phoenix Park, Elsewhere, the ignominy of 
Majuba in South Africa and the Gordon affair assaulted the 
Liberals on other flanks. The government’s reaction to 
these events, added to idie nature of its one notable 
achievement, tlie Reform Bill of 1884, made it increasingly 
difficult for the traditional ’right’ of the Liberal Party 
to maintain its allegiance.
Tlie breadth of tlie party in Scotland, wi'th its 
traditional hold on much of the social elite of the country, 
made Ihe effect of this growing ideological dissatisfaction 
pairticularly acute. Tlie resignation of the Duke of Argyll 
in 1881 over the Irish Land Bill was only tlie best- 
publicized instance of a much more general movement. Long 
before 1886, Scottish Liberalism had lost much of the 
wealth, social power and influence that had supported the 
old Victorian 'national* party.
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Disaffection, in earnest, can probably be dated from 
the Bulgarian Agitations of the late 1870’s, Gladstone's 
rhetoric had struck many of the remaining I'Thigs as unseemly, 
dangerous and, even, unpatriotic. Ttxe Earl of Min to was 
probably typical in his reactions as a powerful but douJoting 
Scottish 1/7hig:
I am quite out of humour with the factious 
conduct of the opposition. I am little in­
clined to make efforts or sacrifice for their 
comfort.^
Min to's family, the Elliots, who dominated the Liberal 
interest in Roxburghshire were, on the whole, also increas­
ingly disenchanted with the party of their traditional
loyalties :
Sir Walter Elliot's hesitation to pledge 
(for Minto's son, Arthur) is natural enough 
in a man who approves of Beaeonsfield's Eastern 
policy and disapproves of disestablishment.
In fact, he wants the opposition to maïce up 
their minds as to what their policy is to be 
.... to show their hand - which is precisely 
what the Liberals under the inspiration of 
the expediency men of the party are determined 
not to do.^
Another Roxburghshire Miig had more tangible reasons to be 
wary of Gladstone's crusade;
William Scott .... would require to know what
Arthur Elliot's views on Eastern Affairs are -
because, he added very characteristically: "I
have a good deal of money in Turkish securities",^
1. Minto to A. Elliot Feb. 4, 1878 Elliot MSS 
Box 5 no. 32
2. Minto to A. Elliot Oct. 12, 1878 Elliot MSS
Box 5 no. 32
3. Minto to A. Elliot Oct. 16, 1878 Elliot MSS
Box 5 no, 32
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Minto’s own disaffection was such that he was very re­
luctant to give any support even to his ovm son as a 
Liberal candidate:
.... if the elections were made to depend 
on tlie approval of G lads tonian foreign
policies.'^
The attitude of the Roxburghshire VThigs was a re­
flection of a general pattern throughout Scotland: unease,
doubts, reassessments. James Bryce wrote to Gladstone in 
disparaging terms of:
.... the so-called Gentry, tlie military? and 
the new rich men of places like Glasgow whose 
opinion is no better than "West End Society"
Those who were not put off by ’Bulgaria’ were soon af­
fronted by Gladstone's Irish land measures. Sir Alexander 
Gordon, the second son of the 4th Earl of Aberdeen, vrho had, 
ill fact, joined the Liberals over ’Bulgaria’, followed the 
Dulce of Arg^ fll out of Liberalism in the first year of the 
new government. By 1882 he had abandoned all his political 
responsibilities as the M.P, for Aberdeenshire East:
Sir A. Gordon will talce no part in organization 
or in assisting tlie local association .... tliere 
is a danger of the association falling to pieces 
as the members are disheartened by the apathy of 
their leaders.^
4. Minto to A. Elliot Nov. 10, 1878 Elliot MSS 
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It is a measure of the continuing importance of the Miig 
element in the counties tliat the situation had to be 
saved by appealing to the Earl of Aberdeen, a Rosebery- 
like young Whig, to take charge of the local situation.
b) The Crofter Revolt:
Revolt within the Liberal monolith of Scotland was 
also building up from the other wing of the party, most 
seriously from the Crofters of the Highland counties.
More til an a century of continul.ng injustice at the hands 
of the lairds and a compliant kirk had finally pushed the 
remaining Highland population to the brink of open rebel­
lion by the early 1880‘s. The shock of the ’Battle of the 
Braes* on Skye in 1882 suddenly focused national attention 
on tlie Highlanders' grievances. A royal commission reported 
in 1883 strongly in favour of the crofters but an unhearing 
Liberal government in London took no notice, allowing 
tensions to mount still higher, 1882 had seen the foundation 
of the Highland Land League led by Angus Sutherland Who 
commended to tlie League the'example of tlie Irish league. 
Important support came from the Clasgow-based radical 
newspaper, Tlie North British Daily Mail, then under the 
editorship of the radical Liberal M.P., Sir Charles Camercxi,
A tour of Skye by the American radical Henr^  ^George 
added further fuel to an already threatening situation.
Until this time, the Highland seats had been held
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as the pocket fiefdoms of the lairds : Cameron of Lochiel
in Invernessshire, Sir Alexander Matheson in Ross and 
Cromarty and tîie Dukes of Argyll and Sutiierland in those 
counties. Until Idie Act of 1884, few crofters h’ad had 
the vote, thus preserving tlie security of the old order; 
but even before reform the ground had begun to stir* 
James Patten McDougall, Rosebery's chief political op­
erative in Scotland, reported as early as 1882:
I have word that a large section of the party 
in Arg^ ï'llshire are determined not to have 
Lord Colin (M*P* and son of the Dulce) again * ^
Argyll's resignation over the Irish land measures had 
done little to brighten his already tarnished reputation 
as a landlord. Lord Colin's voting record was not 
illiberal but his vexr^  patchy attendence did not say 
raudi for his political dedication* Tliough McDougall's 
sympatliy was naturally with the Establishment, he was 
clearsighted enough to grasp the significance of the 
dispute and to keep Roseber^r in touch with both sides.
He fonfarded a passionately worded letter from an 
Inverness solicitor and Liberal agent whom McDougall 
described as : "the best knovm solicitor of the North
of Scotland",
7. J. P* McDougall to Rosebery April 7, 1882 Rosebery
MSS 10042
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Tlie Skye business (Battle of the Braes) means a 
great deal. The crofters must be protected 
against eviction and arbitrary increase of 
rant The people of the north won’t stand
it ..., Tlie rapacity of the lairds ,, ,, a man 
has a right to live in his native land,^
Nevertheless, McDougall, as a conservatively-minded Biberal, 
could not but take the Land League at its word and sea 
the dark shadow of Ireland passing into Scotland:
it seems as if from what one is hearing from 
the Highlands as if the scenes of agitation 
and excess might be shifted there from across 
the channel from Ireland.^
However, despite the fever of opinion, the absence of 
electoral reform in August, 1884, meant tliat a laird, 
albeit, a young and liberally-minded one, Ronald Munro- 
Ferguson, could win a by-election in Ross and Cromarty 
in a virtual wal3tover. However, since the expected 
Reform Bill was to increase tlie Ross and Cromarty elec­
torate ten-fold, change was inevitable and imminent,
T}.ie franchise reform of 1884 was indeed to have its 
greatest effect in the Highlands. In the Lowland rural 
counties the electorate was expanded by a factor of 
roughly two or three. This was not without effect: 
Haddington was turned from a Tory seat into a very safe 
Liberal one and Berwickshire, which had voted Tory in 
1874 and only 59% Liberal in 1880, was turned into an
S, W, Burns to McDougall May 10, 1882 Rosebery MSS 
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imprégna)!le Liberal fortress: 75% Liberal in 1885 and
Liberal until 1918. Tlie increase was somewhat higher in 
the industrial areas: usually more than trebled. However,
none of these compared with tlie revolution effected in the 
Highlands. Argyll was only trebled but Invernessshire had 
a five-fold increase? Sutherland, eight-fold? and Ross, 
ten-fold.
Just as imnortant for Scotland was the accompanying 
redistribution. As a nation, Scotland's representation 
was increased by 12 seats to 72, Tlie new seats were con­
centrated in the industrial West and while Liberal head­
quarters viewed this reapportionment as a certain boost for 
the Liberals it was to have less favour at) le repercussions 
in the long run given the basic wealcness of Liberalism in 
the West and idie concentration of the radical section of 
the party along the Clyde. McDougall was well aware of 
the probable outcome of electoral reform and feared the
creation of an uniiiistakably crofter-dominated Western
11Isles constituency. The redistribution ended the night­
mare of tlie triple seat of Glasgow and, in the eyes of theEstablis 
hment, created the blessing cf the end of the need for a 
caucus-like organization in the city? but the urban redis­
tribution in Glasgow and Edinburgh was to create new and 
no less difficult problems.
10. McDougall to Rosebery Jan. 12, 1885 Rosebery MSS
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Rosebery was kept in close touch with the develop­
ing situation in the Highlands not only tlirough McDougall* s re-
ports but also through his new friend, Ferguson, now running
for re-election. Ferguson was a particularly valuable
observer being a young and genuinely progressive-minded
Highland laird. If such a candidate were to go doivn, the
Highland results would be devastating indeed. As early as
Mardi 1085, Ferguson was sounding warnings of the gravity
O'- tu: cituation. Ke was finding tliat even his forthright
stand in favour of peasant proprietorship was making little
12
impact on his constituents.' " By July, a note of real 
desperation ’'-a-; ore '/ate tu/-. report/„ Pcs' ite a
/les ire 'to td.e u;> r.n ailvaace*'! i 'osition o/i the hæid 
' 'UGstion", it seoned a 'ut.Llc' , r '.ercL/e la the ''hice o" the 
v/ave o'" radical agrar.Lanis:i /-/ee'-'ina ti- counties
his %/orries increasrr: i;i late 7lurri.rP: ■ ,hoa it ''ccajie '[aio-yn 
that tie Lj-'îcral /Vssociation Iji Invcrne :s /arehs ha‘l sent 
an invitation to Joseph Chamberlain, then at the îieight 
of his reputation as the 'enfant terrible' of radicalism 
to address a meeting in Inverness; an invitation which 
Chamiierlain had accepted. True, as verguson realised, 
the Burgh Association wanted Clicunberlain's backing diiefly 
for their disestablishment campaign against the sitting 
Wliiggish M.P., R. D. Findlay, as much as for the crofters' 
cause. Nevertheless, Ferguson could well realize the
18
12, Ferguson to Rosoberi' March 9, 1085 Rosebery MSS 
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13, Ferguson to Rosebery Muly 20, 1885 Rosebery MSS 
10017
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effect of such an event on the already es^losivo political 
condition of the Highlands He made contact with 
Chaniberlain to urge restrainti
It entirely depends on the class of speech 
Chaniberlain makes whether he will do good or 
h a m  .... I heard from him a couple of days 
ago - he asked for my last speech - so I took 
the opportunity of letting him know that what we 
now really needed was guidance from the leaders 
of the party.
Ferguson’s efforts were futile. Chamberlain’s Inverness 
address of Sept. 18, 1885, which his biographer has des­
cribed as "his most passionate speech of the campaign" 
struck out strongly for the crofter's cause, throwing the 
weight of English radicalism behind an Irish settlement for 
the Highlands. The very appearance of Chamberlain, who, 
at that time threatened to overshadow Gladstone, as the 
dominant star of the Liberal oar#aign, was sufficient to 
raise the Highland cause into a national issue. Although, 
it has been suggested that the crofter legislation was the 
direct zesult of the election of the crofter M.P. ’s and
Gladstone’s desperate need to secure their votes for the 
17Home Rule Bill , the effect of Chaniberlain’s ’blessing* 
on the crofters’ public image should not be minimized.
14. Ferguson to Rosebery Aug. 22, 1885 Rosebery MSS
10017
15. Ferguson to Rosebery Aug. 31, 1885 Rosebery MSS
10017
16. J. L. Garvin Life of Joseph Chamberlain MacMillan,
London 1933 Vol. 2 p. 68
17. M. BarJcer Gladstone and Radicalism Harvester, 
Brighton 1975 p. 48
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Ross and Cromarty was not the only seat where a laird 
found himself in difficulty. Lord Colin Campbell had re­
tired from tlie Argyll seat but his father had found another 
candidate. Sir William Macklnnon, to represent the family 
interests
the party is awkwardly placed in Argyll at tlie 
moment .... Macklnnon professes to be a Liberal 
.... but stands as an ’independent* to please 
Liberals and Tories alike and to beat the crofter 
candidates .... the Tories will not oppose him,
Despite evident uneasiness, the Liberal Establishment members 
like McDougall faced with the unpalatable alternative of 
crofter insurgency, continued to back Mackinnon, but this 
position became increasingly untenable*
Maokinnon is alarming the general run of Liberals 
by his ill-disguised Toryism .... it is very dif­
ficult to believe in his Liberalism .... more of a 
Tory than anything else.
In the final month of the canpaign, a desperate 'moderate* 
Liberal from Argyll wrote to Rosebery begging for an 
opinion on the impossible choice between:
1. Mr, Macklnnon : who calling himself an inde­
pendent is admittedly the nominee of the Dutke of 
Argyll and Col, Malcolm.
2. Mr. McParlane M.P.: an ex-Parnellite (sat
for Irish seat 1880-85) with advanced Liberal 
views, a Roman Catholic, the* that does not 
bother me ....
IB. McDougall to Rosebery Sept. 12, 1885 Rosebery
MSS 10042
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3. Mr, McCalgt a banker from Oban with advanced 
Liberal views on some questions: do\ft»tless a worthy 
man but having a very questionable knowledge of 
Her Majesty’s English.^®
It is a measure of the natural conservatism of the Liberal 
Establishment of Edinburgh in 1885, that even in these cir­
cumstances, McDougall could not bring himself to disown 
Maokinnon: indeed, he want so far as to ask Rosebery to 
speak on behalf of the Duke’s man so visibly in trouble.
By polling day, the only hope left for Madkinnon was an
Atlantic storm to prevent the crofters of Tyree and Coll
21from travelling to the poll in Oban.
In Sutherland, the Marquess of Stafford, son of the 
Duke of Sutherland, the owner of virtually the entire 
county, was also struggling for his political life, in 
this case against the head of the land league, Angus Sutherland. 
Rosebery received a letter from another ’moderate* Liberal 
begging his aid for Stafford against the radical ’horror* s
(Lord Stafford) has been fighting splendidly all 
summer .... however, he is closely beset and his 
opponent is a man whose return would be so serious 
a matter that the success of Lord Stafford is of 
the greatest consequence to the party. This man, 
Angus Sutherland, is an Intimate of Henry George, 
an associate of the Irish Nationalists and an 
advocate of the adoption of Irish methods by 
crofters.22
In spite of the communications, the Liberal Establishment
20. Dennistoun to Rosebery Nov. 2, 1885 Rosebery 
MSS 10084
21. McDougall to Rosebery Nov. 28, 1885 Rosebery 
I4SS 10042
22. Macdonald to Rosebery Nov, 9, 1885 Rosebery 
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was slow to realise the Highland dangers at the August
SLA executive meeting, the crofter issue failed even to
23appear on tlie agenda,
c) Pises tall llahment :
The crofters remained, however, essentially a very 
localized issue. Much more widespread and, hence, more 
critical, to the Liberal Party was the church dispute. No single 
event, in itself, touched it off. The 1870*s and 1880*s 
had seen a gradual but steady development in disestablishment 
spirit in the Scottish dissenting churches. Until 1885, 
the Liberal Party, drawing support from both the dissenters 
and the churchmen, had been able to accommodate and bind 
both sides into a single political group. However, an in­
creasing level of intolerance, chiefly on the part of tlie 
leaders of the dissenting churches, was jeopardizing this.
Allied to Scottish radical politicians like Sir Charles 
Cameron and John Dick Peddle, the church leaders were in­
creasingly looking towards a political showdown at the 
polls. The first stage of the challenge was to be a demand 
for pledges from all Scottish Liberal candidates to support 
disestablishment backed by the threat of intervention by 
alternative disestàblishment Liberals. As those Liberals 
least inclined towards disestablishment tended to belong 
to the traditional 'right* of the party, in some cases the 
dispute soon widened to a more general struggle:
23, D, W, Crawley "The Crofters* Party 1885-92" 
Scottish Historical Review" Vol. 35 p. 116
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The Church Question is producing a great deal 
of disturbance (in Aberdeen) but it will not 
affect the elections. There is more troial^ le 
from Radical as opposed to moderate Liberals tham 
frcan the Church q u e s t i o n .
Battles for association and nomination control went 
on in all parts of Scotland but with particular force in 
the new urban seats or in those constituencies where sitting 
M.P.8 were strongly identified with one side or the other. 
Those, who, like Campbell-Bannerman, had successfully main­
tained a neutral position on the issue could face the 
election without fear of subversion. However, R. B. Finlay 
in Inverness Burghs, who was eiqpressly opposed to disestab­
lishment, found himself facing a disestablishment Liberal 
and disowned by his own association:
Committee and Council of the Association are not 
adequately representative of the Liberal party in 
the burghs. They are too much U.P. church and 
disestablishment .... now substantially Mr,
McLaren'a committee,
Though contests did tend to have a broad ideological 
character, the Disestablishment party did not content them­
selves with opposing only '^ îhigs', Peter McLagan, a long 
time radical leader of the temperance faction of the party,. 
found himself under threat for his doubts over disestab­
lishment :
24, Sir James Donaldson to Rosebery Nov. 8, 1885 
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Mr, McLagan issued his manifesto refusing to vote 
for Disestablishment, a strong opposition to 
his return is being organized .... I have great 
respect for Mr. McLagan ... but unless he retracts 
I must join with other dissenters in opposing him.26
McLagan saw himself caught in a squeeze as the Disestablish- 
ers pushed forward their plan:
It seems I am to be opposed at two extremes, 
the Tories at one end and the diaestafolishers 
at the other .... The disestablishars are de­
termined to make West Lothian a battle ground 
.... they are trying to get as many Liberal 
members as possible to promise tliat they will 
support a disestablishment bill introduced by 
a responsible government (and claim a majority 
to Gladstone 1)
The Disestablishera had the bit between their teetli and tliey 
were no longer prepared to be deflected by the lack of interest 
of the Liberal leadership;
Some very decided steps must be taken at once 
to prevent the breakup of the Liberal party 
in Scotland cm the question of Disestablishment 
.... The disinclination of loaders to a l l o w  
it to be brought forward (is an) Injustice 
.., our claims ignored ... give the electors 
the opportunity to decide this question.
By September, there was still considerable dispute over 
the ultimate impact of the religious controversy, 
McDougall felt that with luck all might be well;
26, James Steel to Rosebery July 31, 1885 Rosebery 
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The Diestablishers are looking foward to
Chamberlain's visit and if they do not get 
much encouragement from him the question might 
not give much trouble in the meantime.29
But Sir JcAin Leng, editor of the Dundee Advertiser was 
not so hopeful:
It is a pity that the d-iurch question has been 
forced so much .... The new electors are much 
more interested in the land, Drink, Taxation, 
questions and moat of them are only concerned 
^out Disestablishment so far as it involves 
voluntary assessments. At the same time, the 
agitation for Disestablishment is so irrecon­
cilable that there will be no peace for the 
Liberal Party until tliis question is settled.'
% e  controversy however, exploded at the October 
16 meeting of the Scottish Liberal Association in Perth, 
G. W. T. Qmond, an SLA member, offered this description 
of that event:
Taylor Innes took great pains to get as many 
of his own people made delegates as possible 
the church Liberals refused to come (re­
sulting) in an overwhelming majority of strong 
disestablishment men .... Cait^ibell-Bannerman 
and Mr. Duff saw (Innes) and argued for nearly 
an hour .... to no use .... Sir Joîin Balfour 
and Lord Elgin called in .... to no p u r p o s e . 2 1
The disestablishers seized their chance and passed, by an 
overrzhelming majority (415-7) , a resolution calling for tlie 
Disestablishment of Idie diurch of Scotland.
29. McDougall to Rosebery Sept. 12, 1885 Rosebery 
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As a direct result. Lord Fife resigned as Vice-
President of the SLA and his action was mirrored in the
gross dismay of the Liberals' Church supporters. It was
a measure of Gladstone's authority in Scotland that all
Liberals instinctively turned towards him to mfait his
judgement of the Perth decision. Brought to the brink of
open rebellion, the churchmen began to unite with Tories
in the formation of Church Defence Associations throughout 
32Scotland. Their demand of Gladstone was simple; to de­
clare that:
He won't support Dr. Cameron's resolution and 
that he will not regard the Perth resolution as
representative of the Liberal Party throughout 
Scotland,23
A Liberal Churchman wrote to Rosebery t
(I hope that) the leaders of the Liberal Party 
(will not take) the opinions or votes of the 
Scotch members as indicating the qpinicm of the 
people of Scotland .... (if so there will be) 
no difficulty in supporting candidates like 
Mr. Buchanan who are pledged to vote for Dr. 
Cameron's resolution or candidates like Mr. 
Haldane .... who declare themselves in favour
of Disestablishment.24
Douglas Crawford reported from Lamarkshire North 
Bast:
32, ibid.
33, McDougall to Rosebery Oct, 27, 1885 Rosebery 
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The Disestablishment question has recently 
becemie very dangerous in N, E. Lanark. The 
Churchmen who are numerous and first rate 
LiJDerals are in a discouraged and threatening 
humour .... bring the matter under W. G.'s 
notice .... a considerable number of strong 
disestablishment men who with difficulty 
accepted a candidate who did not go straight for 
disestablishment .... the attitude of the 
Liberal Churchman will be mainly decided by 
William Gladstone's utterances in this question.25
The Scottish leadership was of the opinion that idie best 
course for Gladstone in this situation was to declare the 
question unsettled and therefore 'unripe' for any action's
Tlie truth is that a majority of Liberals in 
Scotland are in favour of Disestablishment but 
of that majority, a majority are quite willing 
to wait until our leaders toJce it up.
If Mr, Gladstone agreed to hold that a majority 
of Scottish Liberals voting for Cameron's re­
solution did not - ipso facto - declare the voice 
of Scotland on the question, they could vote for 
any Liberal candidate even the strongest Dis-
establisher,27
The spectre of electoral disaster was facing the Party as 
Omond made clear:
The danger is that if Mr, Gladstone says one 
word more than he has said we shall run the 
risk of losing some seats: e.g. the West
Division of Edinburgh.28
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Taylor Innes and his party are doing all they 
can to press the matter at any cost to the party.3^
On NoveKdDor 11, with all of Scotland expectant,
Gladstone addressed a padced meeting in the Free Church 
Hall of Edinburgh. His judgement was unequivocal: Dis­
establishment had divided Scotland bitterly and hence had 
no claim as a 'national' demand. In view of the potential 
and real harm that it was doing to the party it would have 
to be postponed indefinitely. With tlie carpet so completely 
pulled out from beneath them, tlie radicals were livid with 
frustration and the church party was just as equally delighted 
and "completely satisfied"Nonetheless, much of the 
damage was irreparable. Many traditionally Liberal church­
men had already deserted to Toryism and many more had re­
treated into abstentionism. The Church Defense Associations 
lived on and with them lay much of the root structure of 
Liberal Unionism.
d) The Irish Vote:
There was a very considerable second 'religious' 
factor in tlie election of 1885 in Scotland: the impact
of the Parnell directive on the large Irish Catholic 
community. Until Parnell delivered his orders to his 
folloi'jers on November 21, it had remained uncertain which 
line he would talce. The uncertainty left the traditionally
39. Omond to Rosebery Oct. 28, 1885 Rosebery MSS 10084
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Liberal Irish voters of Scotland in a state of limbo, 
though, even by October, the movement towards support:!ng 
the Tories was evident at the grassroots;
the Irish vote is still free .,., a good 
number of Irishmen have expressed themselves 
willing to vote for me but I cannot depend 
upon them or the priest may exert his in­
fluence on them .... there are 2000 (Irish) 
voters (in Linlithga^shire) .... a goodly 
number for my opponent to begin with if 
they all go for him as the Irish are doing 
in some other places for the Conservative 
candidate.41
In the aftermath of the election, Donald Crawford in Lanark
North East, had little doubt as to the effect the directive
had had in his, one of the most heavily Catholic constit-
42ttencies in Scotland;
Out of 10,814 electors, about 3,000 are 
Irish of whom 800-900 are Orange, the 
remainder Roman Catholic. Tliese went solid 
against me except a mere sprinkling of 
Roman Catholics .... The iron screw was 
applied mercilessly.43
It can be said with some confidence that three Scottish 
seats, Lanark North-West (25% Catholic) , Kilmarnock Burghs 
(18% Catholic) and Dumbartonshire (13% Catholic)were 
lost to tlie Liberals because of tlie Irish vote altliough in 
Kilmarnock Burghs this was only made possible by a divided
41. Mclagan to Rosebery Oct. 14, 1885 Rosebery MSS 
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Liberal vote. Viscount Dairymple, one of the Kilmarnodc 
Liberals, feared the effect of the Irish vote there as 
soon as the directive was announced.It  is also possible 
that the narrow victory of the Tories in Wigtovmshire 
(50,5% to 49,5%) could have been caused by the 6,5%
Catholic population. Similar conditions may have had the 
same effect in neighbouring Kirkcudbrightshire.
e) Mew Blood; Rise of Rosebery and Campbe 11-Bannerman;
The events of 1880-1885 had had a notable effect on 
the leadership of the Scottish party. The structure and 
organization of the party was in one way, simple and strong. 
It gave great weight to an inner circle, a kind of Scottish 
Liberal Establishment comprising tlie social and political 
elite# though of considerable ideological breadth. The 
role of the central leadership had been enhanced in 1881, 
when, under the particular pressure of Rosebery, the party 
machines of East and West had been merged into a single 
SLA, The more radical West lost its autonony witliin the 
new organization whose general direction was dominated 
by the 'moderate' forces of the East. The weight of the 
elite was increased by tlie growing personal achievements 
of its members, principally Rosebery and Campbell- 
Bannerman .
Prior to 1880, the preeminent Liberal Scotsmen had
45, Dalrymple to Rosebery Nov. 25, 1885 Rosebery MSS 
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been the Duke of Argyll and W. P. Adam. Argyll's elo­
quence and stature had given him an unrivaled position 
in Scotland of the 1860's and 70's but by 1880, he, like 
the other l#iigs, had been diminished to the status of an 
awkward anachronism. Adam's influence, as diief Liberal 
Wîiip, had been immense but concerned for the most part 
with organization from witliin. The rise of Rosebery and 
Campbell-Bannerman was of a ver^ r different character.
Rosebery had first come to prominence in 1380 when 
he served as Gladstone's host and chief stage-mcinager for 
the Midlothian campaigns. It was Rosebery's good fortune 
that the unrivaled excitement emd glamour of the crusade 
should have come to be linîced with a county in which he 
was the predominant Liberal territorial influence in 
opposition to the verir powerful Tory interest of Buooleuch. 
His meteoric rise was triggered by the events of Midlothian 
and sustained by his personal abilities especially an 
almost unrivaled eloquence; but it gained most from his 
personal campaign to establish himself as Scotland's 
champion. There exists an enormous body of evidence test­
ifying to Rosebery's extraordinary appeal in Scotland,
J. M. Barrie's is perhaps the most graphic:
Mr. Gladstone is the only other man who can 
make so many Scotsmen take to politics as if 
it were the Highland Fling .... Once when Lord 
Roeebery was firing an Edinburgh audience to 
the delirious point, an old man in the hall 
shouted out, "I dinna hear a word he says but
its grand, its g r a n d ! "^6
46. James, op. cit. p. 161
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By 1885, visiting English Liberals were stunned by the 
reception that Scotland gave him. An astonished Eddie 
Hamilton wrote in his diary after his first day in a 
Rosebery-besotted Edinburgh:
One realized for the first time tlie immensity 
of the position which ho holds in Scotland,
I doubt if there is any parallel for it.
The passionate devotion accorded to Rosebery cannot be 
divorced from the rising nationalist feelings abroad in 
Scotland in the 1880!s. While Gladstone regarded him in 
the same light as Derby, a welcome recruit to aristocratic 
Liberalism, Rosebery made it clear that his interest in enter­
ing the government'^'^^ had been linlced to the securing of 
Scotland's interests.
Though I do not in any sense pretend to represent 
Scotland or to assert that Scotland will be 
seriously outraged if you do not appoint a 
Scottish Lord of the Treasury, yet I would venture 
to remind you that 'many a little makes a mickle*, 
that Scotland is the backbone of tlie Liberal 
party and that if I am rightly Informed there is 
some discontent as to her treatment,
Revising Disraeli's famous phrase, he had expanded on this 
discontent to the House of Lords:
47. ibid. p. 161
47a. He took office in 1081 as a junior minister in the 
Home Office with special responsibility for Scotland,
48, Marquess Crewe Life of Lord Rosebery Murray, London 
1931 p. 142 Rosebery to Gladstcffie May 18, 1882
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The words 'Horae Rule' have begun to be dis­
tinctly and loudly mentioned in Scotland .... 
I believe the people of Scotland at the 
present moment aire mumbling the dzr^f bones of 
political neglect and munching the remainder 
biscuit of Irish legislation.
Exasperated by Gladstone's lack of interest in the es­
tablishment of a Scottish secretary/ of state, Rosebery 
resigned in early June, 1882, Scotland did not fail to 
Identify Rosebery's frustration with his country's ,thus 
elevating him into the position of a unique national symbol. 
Therefore when Gladstone finally saw his way to opening up 
a cabinet position for Rosebery as Lord Privy Seal in March 
1885, all Scotland identified Rosebery's progress as a 
national victory, Douglas Crawford's comment on the event
was probably typical: "For Scotland, we surely need a
50
friend at court,"
Generating much less public attention but perhaps 
more Important with the party caucus was the promotion of 
Campbell-Bannerman to the difficult post of Chief Secretary 
for Ireland (not in the Cabinet) . Caitpbell-Bannerman was 
the first Scottish commoner to reach a significant minis­
terial post since the Great Reform Bill, Moreover, he was, 
quintes senti ally, a man of the Liberal caucus, undramatic, 
relatively unheralded, unquestionably a Scot but perhaps 
the most highly respected Liberal M.P, from Scotland.
49, ibid. p, 142
50, Crawford to Rosebery Feb. 12, 1885 Rosebery MSS 
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In later years, these two leaders would provide poles 
of division with the Scottish party but even then as in 1885, 
the most significant fact was that both were secure and well- 
estfxblished members of the Liberal elite. Scottish 
Liberalism was never to see a thrust for leadership from any 
individual who stood outside of that inner circle,
f) Gaining a Nomination: Local Autonomy versus the Elite:
This is not to suggest that the centre was omnipotent. 
Wliile the party did present a general image of concentric 
rings of influence, other factors, especially the traditional 
and jealously guarded autonomous strength of local associ­
ations considerably complicated this structure. The caucus. 
Whips and party officers tended to look to the central focus 
for guidance but individual M.P,s were very careful not to 
taJîe their local supporters for granted. PTliile this local 
strength was largely a carry-over from the hey-day of 'un­
organized' Mid Victorian Scottish Liberalism, the Scotland 
of the 1880's still placed deep store in local communities, 
local issues and local relationships. Tlie intra-party tension 
generated by tlie undefined boundaries of power between the 
elite and the associations added further complications to 
the problems of the Scottish Liberals in 1885,
in candidate selection, the final authority lay in­
disputably with the local associations and much of the en­
during strength of Scottish Liberalism rested on tlie
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autonomous strength of these bodies. Nonetheless, central 
figures retained a powerful influence in the recommendations 
and encouragement of particular individuals. In a very 
rough sense, Scottish M.P.'s fell into two groups, the local 
men and the 'carpetbaggers'. Not unnaturally, the constit­
uency associations tended to be biased toward local nominees 
over outsiders but a word from W. P. Adam, Rosebery or Elgin 
in support of one of the latter could work wonders. To gain 
such respected sponsorship, a contender had to be a notable 
member of the Scottish social elite or of very evident 
political capabilities? or, best of all, both. The result 
was that the 'carpetbaggers' in Scotland tended also to re­
present the cream of the caucus membership.
Prior to 1886, the securing of a Scottish Liberal 
nomination was often equivalent to actual election. Therefore 
the task of gaining 'influence' or of proving a local in­
terest was the chief task of any hopeful. In 1872, James 
Bryce had been forced to al^ andon all Interest in a by- 
election for Wick Burghs when W. P. Adam declined to make
any representation on his behalf to the association, de-
51Glaring the decision to be the association's alone. In 
1880, Bryce was again thwarted by the force of local in­
fluence when the chairman of the Aberdeen Liîjeral Association,
Dr. John Webster, decided to stand for the Aberdeen nomi-
52
nation which Bryce had coveted.
51, W. P. Adam to Bryce Jan. 1872 Bryce MSS Box 27
52, Bryce to Gladstone March 12, 1880 Bryce MSS 11
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In 1881, a by-election for the safe Liberal seat of 
Elgin Burghs (in 1880 the first Tory to stand in forty 
years had received only 30% of the vote), produced another 
example of the forces at work for Liberal nominations.
Three main contenders were considered; Alexander Asher, an 
unflaml!oyant but highly respected local lawyer; T. R, 
Buchanan, a peripatetic Liberal candidate, well placed in 
the higher echelons of the party; and A, Craig-Seliar, a 
young Anglo-Scottish scion who was a favorite of the SLA 
establishment. From Edinburgh, McDougall offered an 
assessment to Rosebery:
I can't thinic Buchanan has any claim or 
chance .... Asher's chance is thought best 
here .... leading men in the burghs had been 
writing to (Craig-Sellar) privately encour­
aging him ... I thinlc Asher the likely man 
.... but it should be very hard on Sellar 
if he should have to give way.
Buchanan evidently had a number of irons in the fire but 
McDougall was less than enthusiastic about his actions:
He has been invited by some Elgin shop­
keepers who wish a commercial man ! I .... 
Tlie- fact of his having gone north will not 
improve his chances in Haddington.54
With a glut of Liberals on hand, and little likelihood of 
a Tory standing at the poll, the Elgin Association con­
templated throwing the choice to the voters by making
53, McDougall to Rosebery July 2, 1881 Rosebery MSS 
10042
54, McDougall to Roseber\^ July 2, 1881 Rosebery MSS 
10042
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no official nomination, a suggestion which horrified SLA 
55headquarters. It was a sacred Liberal tradition that 
disputes were to be kept 'within the family’. A compromise 
solution, a private ballot of local Liberals, was hit 
upon and from it Asher emerged victorious, probal^ly largely 
on the basis of his local connections. It is evident that, 
in this case, little pressure was exerted from the national 
leadership and, in such circumstances, the natural advan­
tages of the local man told.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that, if moved,
tlie Liberal establishment could go a considerable distance
in smoothing the way for a favoured protege^ . In exceptional
cases, central blessing was only a formality as when Adam
suggested Arthur Elliot to his father, Lord Minto, as the
Liberal candidate for the Elliot family-controlled seat of
Roxburghshire. Mien the sons of prestigious Liberals had no*
family seat to turn to, the 'magic circle' was prepared to
find an opening. Extraordinary effects were engaged to
find a seat for Rosebery's particular protege. Sir Thomas
Gj±>son™Carmichael. It had been expected that he would
inherit Rosebery's ballwick of Midlothian from Gladstone,
but as 1885 drew closer it was increasingly evident that
the GOM had no intentions of stepping down. Inquiries
wore made in Peebles and Selkirk where Sir Cliarles Tennant's
56future was uncertain but these were rebuffed. By mid
55. McDougall to Rosebery July 2, 1881 Rosebery MSS 
10042
56. McDougall to Rosebery March 15, 1884 Rosebery 
MSS 10042
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summer further interest in Peebles and Selkirk produced
reports that Tennant would step down and that Gibson-
57Carmichael had been accepted. This proved erroneous
and Gibson-Carmichael was forced to remain on the sideline.
Evidently in Midlothian he had proved to be a somewhat
58complacent contender and tliis may have affected his for­
tunes in Peebles as well. Even Arthur Elliot had to be 
upbraided by his father when his reluctance to leave 
London, even to visit his prospective constituency, provoked
serious mumblings of discontent within the normally docile 
59local Liberals.
Key seats received a constant flow of top candidates 
directly from the SLA. Dumbartonshire, one of the most 
marginal seats in the west, produced consistently hair­
line results in the 19th Century culminating in a Tory 
victory by 9 votes in 1880. Only a first class Liberal 
candidate could hope to overcome the considerable local 
influence of Orr-Ewing> the sitting Tory M.P. McDougall 
had first canvassed tlie idea that Campbell-Bannerman might
shift from his safe position in Stirling Burghs to fight
60the seat but the risk had seemed too great to take. 
Eventually, R. T. Reid, a solid lowland Scot of great 
ability with a brilliant academic career behind him, and
57. McDougall to Rosebery July 18, 1884 Rosebery MSS
10042? McDougall to Rosebery July 30, 1884 Rosebery 
MSS 10042
58. Rosebery to McDougall Feb. 27, 1884 Rosebery MSS 10042
59. Minto to Elliot Oct. 28, 1884 Elliot MSS Box 5 No. 32
60. McDougall to Rosebery July 5, 1883 Rosebery MSS
10083
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already the sitting M.P. for an English riding, agreed 
to take on the risk. Reid lost and was succeeded as 
candidate in 1886 by Munro-Ferguson who also lost and was 
in turn followed by Capt. John Sinclair who finally won 
the county in 1892. None of these men were local but all 
but Ferguson were to be members of the Liberal Cabinet of 
1905.
The willingness of the SIjA establishment to promote 
their own was again demonstrated in August, 1885, Cliarles 
Laoaita, Edinburgh-born, but English-trained, wrote to 
Rosebery asking for help in gaining a vacancy in Scotland. 
Gibson-Carmichaël came to Lacaita's side as a guide to the 
corridors of Scottish influence:
Lacaita and I have been seeing various people 
about his standing for Leith. Cooper of the Scots­
man seems anxious that he should and is willing 
to do what he can for him. Other people, 
however, object to him on account of his foreign 
sounding name and his not being well known in 
Scotland,
Lei til, however, came to nothing for Lacaita and he had 
to turn to the existing alternatives: Kirkcaldy: "no
merit except cheapness and already swarming with more or 
less ineligible candidates besides Sir G« Campbell (the 
discredited sitting M.P.)V> Dundee, and Orkney and Shetland: 
"Tom tells me a Liberal candidate would have a very good 
chance .... not expensive but would require a certain
61. C. Lacaita to Rosebery Aug. 14, 1885 Rosebery MSS 
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amount of keeping up". Cost of campaigning was a veiry 
important factor and tlie individual candidate usually had 
to have some personal financial resources? Minto had put 
up a minimum of £1,000 towards Elliot's election in 1880. 
Consequently, when Lacaita discovered the costs Involved in 
transporting votes in an inland constituency he had to 
abandon Orkney and Shetland,Gibson-Carmichael's next
suggestion was extraordinary:
Hutcheson Division of Glasgow might suit him. 
Cooper thinks it might do very well. Perhaps 
you could introduce him to some Glasgow men. 
Tennant says he has no influence in that division.
How it was considered that Black friars and Hutcheson,
an entirely working class area, including tlie notorious slums
of the Gorbals, in a Glasgow political situation boiling
with Liberal civil war was a "suitable" place for Lacaita
is difficult to imagine. The idea never went far and on
September 11, Sir John Leng came to the rescue by putting
Lacaita's name before the Dundee Association. Lacaita was
uneasy at facing such a difficult urban constituency:
I don't think I shall satisfy the radicals 
of Dundee and I am absolutely ignorant of 
the local subjects which interest them.
t'Jhile he continued to feel the stigma of being an outsider, 
his optimism grew :
63,Lacaita to Rosebery Sept. 3, 1885 Rosebery MSS 10083
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I have a ve%y good chance in Dundee if the 
feeling for having at least one local man is 
not too strong
The 'family’ was called upon again when it seemed as if
the intervention of a church candidate might jeopardise
Lacaita * s fortunes.
Tlie church people scorn to be persuadina 
Iiionel Ashlv to como fomvcird as a churcli 
candidate « . ». Leng is ve^ ry anxious that 
I should write you to see (if you can dis­
suade him),
Evidently, Ashly was prevailed upon to withdrew and 
Lacaita went on to win his seat.
Summary
Thus the year’s 1830-85 were marked by a steady deter­
ioration in the strength and unity of Lr^eralism in Scotland. 
Tlie integrity and breadth of that par-t'.' had bean based on a 
pattern of alliances and accomodations that permitted and 
maintained the coexistence of potentially conflicting 
interest groups. Toleration and comproraise for the seal 
of mutually held higher ideals and goals were the cement 
that had held Scottish Liberalism together throughout 
the Mid-century. Those practices and tacit understand­
ings began to disintegrate to be replaced by truculence
67, Lacaita to Rosebery Oct. 9, 1885 Rosebery MSS 
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and an avidity for open combat.
The chancing nature of political issues in the latter 
part of the 19th century was the leadinc force behind 
this shift of attitude. Detached and non-national 
overseas issues such as Italy or Turkish atrocities 
were being replaced bv the questions of Erneire and 
of Ireland. The loss of Britain’s position of over­
whelming preeminence in the world at mid-century, as 
other European nations began to crowd into the field, 
affected the national outlook, making generosity and a 
Liberal spirit weaken in the face of patriotic demands* 
Domestically, the ver^ '' success of British Liberalism and 
its reforms deprived it of the causes unon which its dis­
parate elements had como together. \-Jith the middle prop­
ertied classes enfranchised and institutions freed, the 
logical advance of reform was towards questions that did 
not involve the self-interest of the propertied? a 
working class franchise, land reform, urbajn social problems,
Nonetheless, while this aeneral trend was particularly 
visible in Scotland, with the sources of Liberal support 
in the propertied classes rapidly melting awav retained 
only by habit or tradition, the actual pattern of events 
was considerably more confusing and comnlex, While the 
crofter’s revolt provided the leading issue of radical 
challenge, its real significance is open to douJ^ t*
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Essentially a peasants' revolt in a remote comer of the 
country, it stood well apart from the mainstream of new 
political questions. Appealing to public sentiment it 
flashed briefly and brightly across the oolitical skies 
only to vanish with equal rapidity. The demand for a 
showdown over the church issue seemed to arise out of a 
curious combination of an issue whose day was rapidly 
passing and a new spirit of politics that was in the 
process of emerging. Glastone's skilful handling of the 
challenge difused much of the immediate threat to the 
party but it could do little to stem the drift of loyalties 
of many Liberal supporters into an uneasv state of uncer­
tainty, ripe for nickinc in tlie Unionist harvest of the 
future. However, even if the bulk of Scottish wealth and 
property were movino awav from supnort of the 3j:Ujeral 
party, it was an elite drawn from these groups >7hich re­
tained and, indeed, strengthened its control over the 
Lilseral Party itself. The success of tit is LiJDeral elite 
in neutralizing the power of radical and caucus organi­
zations in Scotland was partly fortuitous , witli rise of 
outstanding figures of popular appeal such as Rosebery, 
partly due to the traditional role of tlie Scottish elite 
in the party reinforced by Gladstone's influence and partly 
due to a shrev/d understanding of the need to respect
and flatter jealously guarded autonomy in local associ­
ations which retained very significant perogatives for 
themselves.
CHAPTER 3
Storm Before the Teirpest: 
The General Election of 1885
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Storm Before the Tempest:
The General Election of 1885:
"The election of 1805 is the most difficult to 
associate with one dominant issue,
The pattern of political controversy in Scotland in 
1885 was diverse, conflicting, almost chaotic. As ever, 
at tiie base of all political life lay the ancient tribal” 
political loyalties roused by Liberal evocations of the holy 
name of "Gladstone I" and by Tory appeals to "patriotism". 
Indisputably, the greatest issue of the campaign was Dis­
establishment, a disruptive force which, to some degree, 
tended to cut across these old party loyalties. Radical 
Liberals usually tacked proposals for temperance legis­
lation, electoral and parliamentary reform, free education, 
land and tax reform on to the church themes. More tradi­
tional Liberals tended to confine themselves to the time- 
honoured points of foreign affairs and finance either 
ignoring disestablishment or declaring their open opposi­
tion. Tories tended to be less divided in the composition 
of their appeals, focusing on the defence of the church 
establishment and reinforcing with 'patriotic' foreign 
policy, military strengtli and sometimes a hint of 'im­
perialism' , Tory opposition to free education also meant 
opposition to secular education and as such gained support 
from tîie Catholic community, a support which was to aid the 
digestion of the Parnell directive. However, the frequency
1- Felling, op. cit, p. 15
73
with which Tory candidates, especially in the Clyde region, 
resorted to tlie most blatant appeals to religions prejudice 
must have greatly increased the task of Parnell's lieutenants, 
Besides these general characteristics, local questions con­
tinued to be of the first importance in Scotland. Tliis was 
especially true of the mining areas, the fishing burghs of 
the North and East and the agricultural counties of the 
lowlands,
a) Intra-Liberal Conflict:
Glasgow and Edinl^urgh, the chief cities of Scotland, 
were both cockpits of the political battles of 1885. The 
shift from single multimembered burgh seats to a system of 
several single member seats had a deep effect in both cities, 
causing not just organizational difficulties but provoking 
ideological struggle within the dominant Liberal structure. 
No longer could 'right' and 'left' be teamed into a single 
compromise 'ticket'; each division was left with an all 
or nothing struggle between opposing factions. However, 
by polling day, each city presented a very different 
political situation. In Glasgow, after long and bitter 
nomination struggles in each of Glasgow's seven divisions, 
a solid phalanx of radicals stood as the Liberal standard 
bearers. In Edinburgh, it was the 'moderates' who triumphed 
in the four seats of the city, securing the Liberal nomi­
nations. In the former city, aside from some minor
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"Labour* candidates, each division saw a straight Liberal- 
Tory struggle taut, in Edinburgh, only one division had 
a strong Conservative entry and three had more than one 
Liberal standing.
The powerful religious divisions that ran through 
Glaswegian society dominated the political struggles in 
that city. The high visibility of a large Catholic popu­
lation fueled a mood of fierce Pretayterlanism that was 
bolstered by strong ties with Ulster and Orangeism,
Prestayterlanism, itself, was deeply driven by the strength 
of the Dissenting churches, their membership outnumbering 
that of the Establishment. Feeling permeated through all 
sections of society, Sabbatarianism being strong even
p
amongst the working classes and on the Trades Council. "
In this atmosphere, the Church issue made the struggle 
for control of the new divisional associations particularly 
fierce. The breadth of view of traditional Scottish Lib­
eralism was vanishing as a new spirit of intolerance became 
more and more dominant. Thw whip hand in the city was held 
by the middle class radicals who had dominated the old West 
of Scotland Liberal Association and were now determined to 
require future Lifcarax Candidates to be pledged to their
2, John X* McCaffrey "Liberals in Glasgow 1885-86" 
Ph.D. thesis Univ. of Glasgow 1970 p, 112
75
association's view. As a result, the leading candidate for
the St. Rollox division was cast aside when he refused to
3
pledge for Disestablishment. The College Division associ­
ation, the only one with significant churchmen membership 
turned the tables when they forced the arch-Disestablisher, 
Dr. Cameron, to trim his sails.^ Elsewhere, however, the 
almost fanatical zeal of the radicals drove 'moderate' 
Liberals out of the party into Church Defence Associations 
pledged to oppose Disestablishment Liberals and eventually 
into Liberal» Unionism,
As late as three weeks before the poll, up to 17 
Liberal .candidates were prepared to stand in the 7 divisions. 
With the significant Tory strength in Glasgow, tlie result 
could have been disastrous. In the event, all but one of the 
extra Liberals were induced to witlidraw. While tliis preserved 
the nominal solidarity of Glasgow Liijeralism, it also ef­
fectively denied 'moderate' Liberals a Liberal option and 
steered them a good way closer to open union with the 
Conservatives.
The drift of moderate Liberals was aided by the 
strength of general radicalism on the Clyde. It was not 
by chance that Joseph Chamberlain opened his unauthorized 
campaign in Glasgow,
3. ibid. p. 87
4. ibid. p. 103-4
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Scottish radicalism, especially in Glasgow 
and its region (had been) profoundly stirred 
by Henry George and by Irish Agrarian Movement 
and was ready for democratic pronouncement,^
Chamberlain’s speech did not disappoint the radicals and 
many in Scotland soon followed Russell in Bridgeton who 
identified himself as "an advanced radical and a follower 
of Mr. CSiaraberlain,
Conversely, when Goschen .came to Glasgow in October 
to address the disaffected Liberals of the Church Defence 
Association he concentrated not so much on Disestablishment 
as on the evil influence of Diamfoerlain,
Considerable attention was paid to tlie crofters issue 
by the radical Liberals. It had the attraction of appealing 
to the radical instincts of the second rank merchants who 
formed the bulk of the group while being remote enough not 
to threaten their own immediate interests. However, this 
changed in the later stages of the campaign when social 
radicals like Shaw Max^mll, who was soon to join Keir Hardie 
in founding a Scottish Labour Party, tried to commit the 
party by resolution not only to rural land reform but to
7
urban reform as well.
Shaw-Maxwell and three others in Glasgow divisions 
made up one of the most significant novelties of the 
campaigns the entry of the first truly independent Labour
5. Garvin op. cit. p. 66 (Vol. II)
6. McCaffrey op. cit. p. 96
7. ibid. p. 125
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candidates in British political history, Tlie intellectual 
revival of 'socialism* of the 1880's was partly responsible 
but more important was the serious depression then gripping 
the Clyde. Between 1883 and 1885, shipping launched on the 
Clyde had fallen from 419,000 tons to 183,000 tons. Seven 
out of ton of the men of Whiteindh and Partick, shipbuilding 
areas, were reported to be out of work. Falling wages with 
resulting strikes in the coal and textile industries aggra­
vated the situation,^ Socialism was not the only beneficiary 
of the depression. Tariff Reform also began to emerge as
an issue. The Glasgow Trades Council went as far as to say
9that: "no trade unionist could be a free trader,""
Nevertheless, the determining factors in Glasgow were 
probably still religious. Within the Liberal party, the 
'religious question' was Disestablishment and was conducted 
on a high intellectual plane. To the Tories, however, 
'religion' meant an appeal to tiie bigotry of popular 
Protestantism. They easily combined a "defence of the 
church" appeal with "defence of Protestantism", a combination 
which neatly lin3ted Irish and LDierals together in unholy 
alliance. Maughan, the Conservative candidate for Black- 
friars and Hutchesontown and a leading Orangeman spoke of 
"our common diristianity, opposing and exposing Romanism 
or any other form of e r r o r . L i b e r a l  and Labour candi­
dates often found themselves heckled by the rawest forms of
8. iJDid. p. 148
9. ibid. p. 133
10. ibid. p. Ill
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prejudice.
In spite of this, Parnell's directive and education
question had put the Tories and Irish together. Not
surprisingly, the Nationalists had to work very hard to
induce Irish voters to support the Tory candidates but
Irish journals found it possible to find praise even for 
11Maughan. Hi is was important, for Black friars along with
Bridgeton were probably the two ridings most heavily in­
fluenced by the Irish vote. In 1885, Irish Home Rule emerged 
in only these two divisions.
The result in Glasgow was a clear sweep for the 
Liberals but tlieir success was deceptive. Tlie strength of 
Liberal dominance was at an end. Five divisions gave the 
Conservatives better tlian 40% of the vote, and in two, 
Bridgeton and St. Rollox, the Liberal margin was less than 
2%. City-wide, the Liberals received 53%, the Tories 43% 
and Labour 4%, In 1880, the Liberals had taken 75.5%. No 
doubt special circumstances of 1885 told in the Tories' 
favour: the Labour intervention, the internal Liberal
split on the church and Parnell's directive but, nonetheless, 
for a party that had all but been shut out of politics for 
over half a century, the Conservatives had done remarkably 
well*
11. ibid. p. 168
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Edinburgh :
In contrast to the brawling turmoil on the Clyde, 
politics in EdihÎDurgh were almost decorous. Furthermore, 
after the Liberal association struggles, the upper hand In 
Edinburgh was held by the antidisestablishment Liberals, 
the 'moderates'. The weakness of Eastern Scottish Toryism 
meant that only two divisions would have Conservative can­
didates and only one strong enough, in Edinliurgh West, to 
force the Liberals to forego tlie luxury of multiple candi­
dacies. In the other three city seats, the 'official* 
Liberals were unmistakalale 'moderates' and as such provoked 
radical disestablisher intervention. The 'official' Liberal 
in Edinburgh East, G. J. Goschen, was a Liberal in name 
only* he left the party long before the Home Rule Bill, 
voting against Jesse Ceilings* motion and he later joined 
Salisbury * 3 ministry in 1887 as Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
In Edinburgh South, Sir George Harrison, an old municipal 
official, exemplified a Liberalism some twenty years out of 
date. John Wilson, in Edinburgh Central, a merchant and 
municipal politician, was an outspoken opponent of dis­
establishment . The independent Liberals were a motley 
crev7 throvm up either by ad hoc committees or by their own 
initiative with little sign of a common stance between 
them, B. P. Costello, Goschen's only opponent, was an 
English radical who had failed to secure a seat in Glasgow 
largely because he was a Roman Catholic. J, H. Renton, 
who stood against Wilson, seems to have been an ill-
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supported, self-appointed disestablisher of little 
talent. A second radical opposing Wilson in Central,
A, W. Black, though pxo-disestablisiiment, made most of 
his running on working class social issues. Sir Tliomas 
Raleigh, in Edinburgh South, was the most impressive of 
the 'independents' and hence, the most successful.
Hie moderates' general line was to say as little of
substance as possible, Goschen's opening address was a
masterpiece of bland non-committal cliches: a plea for an
end to doctrinaire politics, a pledge of support for
Gladstone and an offer of his experience to the service of 
12
the community. Harrison said much the same sort of 
thing: stressing his record as Lord Provost, the need for
"broad-minded men", his business credentials, tlie need for 
a business sense in government, and his support for
1 3
Garibaldi and European Liberalism in years past.*"
In these two divisions, the radicals, as the sole 
opposition, threw up a wide range of direct attacks and 
specific points. Costello characterized Goschen as tlie 
candidate of "the Kirk and Beer”, his essential defect 
being, according to Costello, "He distrusts the people".
In contrast, Costello made a point of identifying himself 
with the proposals of Joseph Clianiberlain,
12, Scotsman Oct. 6, 1885
13, ibid. Oct. 7, 1885
14, Scotsman Oct. 5, 1885
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Raleigh, taking aim at the benign but bewildered Harrison,
demanded a new robust Liberalism in the place of empty
words and ageing individuals and stated the need for "men
coiTomitted to religious equality to overcome the forces of 
15Toryism," As even the sympathetic Scotsman acknowledged, 
Harrison’s age and suitability did not inspire confidence
Central Division provided tlie most interesting contest
in Edinburgh, Wilson was .strongly attacked not only for
his attitude to disestablishment but also for his reluctance
to pledge himself on the temperance issue. The constituency
contained a number of breweries and he was accused of fishing
for the employees' votes. Wilson retorted by disparaging
political enthusiasts in general and by adopting a moderate
line accepting the need for some control of liquor and ig-
17noring tlie church question as much as possible, Wilson’s 
opponents, Renton and Black, provided a interesting contrast 
in Liberal Radicalism: Renton took an orthodox drink and
disestablishment line while Black focused on the new social 
questions. A strong Irish community which resulted in fre­
quently reported heckling at meetings, elicited commitments
18to 'justice for Ireland' from both Radicals. Wilson, who 
would not go beyond 'local government for Ireland', de­
claring that tlie Irish should obey the laws as Scotsmen did,
15. ibid. Oct. 9, 1885
16. ibid. Nov. 12, 1885
17. Scotsman Oct, 16, 1885
18. ibid, Oct, 16, 1885? Nov. 13, 1885
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19suffered particular al:)use. Renton began to fade once 
Gladstone's pronouncement on the church had removed his 
prime reason for standing and tliis allowed Black to im­
prove his position. Speaking for the most part at factory 
gates Blade emphasized the need for new housing, sanitary 
reforms, employer's liability acts and an improving of the
conditions of working people, "The crofters are unfortunate
20but townsmen more so. " (Nov, 11)
All tliree repeatedly spoke of the "Grand Old Man" 
and this underlined his larger influence in Edinburgh 
tlian in Glasgow, In part this was due to his physical 
presence in Midlothian but equally to his more natural af­
finity to tie Liberalism of the East of Scotland, Signifi­
cantly, none of the Edinburgh radicals followed the line of 
the Glasgow-dominated National Liberal Federation of 
Scotland which had repudiated Gladstone in the wake of the 
Free Cliurch Hall speech, though, admittedly, none withdrew 
either.
The radical challenge was soundly defeated at tlie 
polls in Edinburgh, Goschen and Harrison, though hardly 
inspiring Liberal candidates, both coasted in with 70% and 
60% respectively, Wilson's 41% becomes comparable when the 
Tory vote of 23% is considered, Buchanan's low total of 
59% in Edinliurgh West over only Tory opposition was a
19. Ibid, Nov, 13, 1885
20. ibid, Nov, 11, 1885; Nov. 12, 1885; Nov, 13, 1885
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reflection of the strengiii of Toryism in the urban middle 
classes. In spite of an open party split at the polls 
Edinburgh Liberalism managed to remain considerably less 
embittered than its Glasgow equivalent. The 1885 results 
confirmed botJi the strength of the Liberal vote in 
Edinburgh and its essentially conservative sympathies,
St. Andrews :
One of tlie key contests in the disestalolisliment dis­
pute occurred in St, Andrews Burghs, It attracted major 
attention in the press and was regarded as a sort of 
plebiscite on tlie issue, Tlie sitting M,P., Stephen 
Williamson, though Fife-born, was a Liverpool ship-owner; 
and a l.eadzing radical disestablisher. In 1885, he found 
himself opposed, in what should have been a very safe seat, 
by an alternative Liberal pledged to 'the defense of the 
diurch: Sir Robesrt Anstruther, an influential local land­
owner and tlie Lord Lieutenant of Fife. Anstruther was 
typical of the Scottish tJhigs and, not surprisingly, he was 
to join the Lilieral Unionist group in 1886, The Anstruther 
influence can be measured by tlie fact that Sir Robert’s 
son took over the seat in 1886 eind held it for the Unionists 
until a by-election in 1903, ano'ther Anstruther winning 
back the seat for the Conservatives against the tide of 
1906,
Williamson was initially uninhibited in proclaiming 
his allegiance to the cause of dises tali lishment. Speaking
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at Cupar on Sept. 19, he condemned all state churches,
supported "religious equality" and demanded "disestablish- 
21ment now". " However, the entry of Anstruther caused 
Williamson to begin to temper his remarks though he des­
cribed the intervention as a Tory plot: "ardent Tories
22are at the bottom of the conflict." Anstruther's plan
was to cast himself in the role of the reluctant "safe"
local man come to save the community from the. wild outsider*
"It is impossible to accept these opinions (Williamson's)
23as typical of the majority of this constituency". ' Regar­
ding his own credentials as a Liberal, Anstruther described
himself as "an old and loyal Liberal who had fought for and
24rejoiced in reform,""
It is evident that the latter stages of the campaign
became quite nasty. Like many of the East Coast seats,
St, Andrews had a large interest in fishing questions, the
chief of these being tlie damage done by trawlers to the
25equipment of the inshoremen. Anstruther*s supporters 
planted a story that Williamson's shipping interests in­
cluded a fleet of the hated trawlers. As a result, 
Williamson had to take considerable time to denounce these
21. Scotsman Sept, 20, 1885
22. ibid, Nov, 10, 1885
23. ibid. Nov. 11, 1885
24. ibid. Nov. 11, 1835
25. ibid, Nov. 11, 1885 (see also Nov. 7, 1885 for similar 
issue in Montrose Burghs; Nov. 18, 1885 for Elgin and 
Naim)
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atoriea as fabrications,^^ He retaliated by making a great 
deal of Anstruther*s personal health forcing Anstruther 
to adroit that he was not in the best of shape but it is 
unlikely that Williamson's tactics did him much good.
After Gladstone’s attempt to defuse the church
question, the Scotsman took Anstruther to task for not
27withdrawing in deference to the G,0,M. Hiis call was
to balance the Scotsman's demand for the withdrawal of
radical Interventions. Anstruther, however, believed he
was gaining the i:pper hand and chose to force matters on.
Although Williamson may have agreed with the NLFS decision
to reject Gladstone's advice, he found it necessary to bow
28to his leader's authority and drop the church question.
The final result of the poll on December 7 was an 
extraordinary tie of 1256 votes each. Months later, 
Anstruther was declared the winner, just in time to join 
the Home Rule revolt* The course of the campaign in St. 
Andrews and the results were clear evidence of the weakness 
of the disestablishment cause on the East Coast.
Kilmamock Burghs i
Hie leadership of the Disestablishment party was put
26. ibid. Nov, 11, 1885
27. ibid. Nov, 12, 1885
20, ibid. Nov. 20, 1885
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under serious pressure in 1885, Cameron in Glasgow 
College was forced to retreat in the face of Church 
strength in the local association. Peddle in Kilmarnock 
Burghs was placed in even more difficult straits. The 
constituency's history was in itself disturbing with a long 
record of multiple Liberal candidacies and a Tory vote in 
1080 just short ôf 30%, A large Irish community was a 
further unsettling factor. Therefore the entry of Viscount 
Dalrymple, son of the Earl of St^ir, as a Liberal Church 
candidate was a threat not only to Peddle but to the Liberal 
grip on the Burghs. After Gladstone's speech of Nov. 11,
the Scotsman, reflecting Liberal headquarter's opinion, de-
29
manded tliat Dalrymple withdraw but he declined, as he 
explained somewhat petulantly to Rosebery:
"Hie Scotsman has been very hard on my cand­
idature. The fact is that Mr. Dick Peddle 
has made so many enemies among his constituents 
that there was a danger of their allying them­
selves with the Tories to get him out. Under 
the circumstances I come forward and we have 
succeeded in getting the Tory to retire âo 
that in any case the seat I trust will not be 
lost to the party,30
However, at the last moment a strong Tory re-entered
causing the distressed Dalrymple to write pathetically
to Rosebery of "the mean trick of the Tories in running
31a man at the 11th hour". Grudgingly he acknowledged
29. ibid. Nov. 12, 1885
30. Dalrymple to Rosebery Nov. 12, 1885 Rosebery MSS 
10084
31. Dalrynqple to Rosebery Nov. 25, 1885 Rosebery MSS 
10084
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the grw/ing possibility of a Tory victory through the 
Liberal split*
I shall succeed; but if any influence is 
brought to bear in Dick Peddle’s favour (a 
reference to Trevelyan's intention to speak 
for Peddle) which may more nearly equalize tlie 
Liberal vote between him and myself there is 
juat a chance that with the Irish vote the 
strongest of the Tories may s u c c e e d , 32
Rosebery's reply was scathing*
I can see no reason for (your candidature 
after Gladstone's speech) I have always been 
anxious that you should enter Parliament but 
you must not disguise from yourself that if 
a Tory gets in for Kilmamock, it will be you 
who are to b l a m e , 3 3
On December 1, the worst duly occurred when the Torj»' 
with 41% was able to slip by Peddle (39%) and Dalrymple 
(20%) .
Perth*
It was even more common for Liberal M.P.'s who 
opposed disestablishment to find themselves facing op­
posing candidates of their own party. The most notable 
of those challenged was C, S. Parker, English-born, who 
had become the particular target of attacks by Disestab­
lishment leaders like Peddle and Cameron, Parker
32, Dalrymple to Rosebery Nov. 25, 1885 Rosebery 
MSB 10084
33, Rosebery to Dalrynqale Nov, 27, 1885 Rosebery 
MSB 10084
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belonged to the 'moderate* wing but much of his past
voting record had been progressive. His 'sin' was his
open contempt for the radical nostrums of ten^erance and
disestablishmont. The onslaught in Perth prior to
Gladstone's intervention was such that Parker was forced
to adopt a vary low profile. The Edinburgh statement was
greeted with open relief by Par Iter who eagerly joined hia
leader in dismissing the issue as now irrelevant. Instead,
he suggested that it be put off until an open debate in
34Parliament could help educate the country. Eventually 
he went some distance towards the radicals on the issue 
but his radical opponent, McDougall, stayed in the lists. 
Parker retained the seat with 44,5% of the vote with his 
opponents, the radical and the Tory, dividing the remainder.
Elgin and Nairn
A contest with a somewhat different character was 
that of Elgin and Nairn. Here, there seemed to be a con­
vergence of the church issue with the land agitation of 
the Highlands. The sitting M.P., Sir George Grant, was 
a leading local laird of markedly Whiggish views. Grant 
found himself opposed not only by a Tory, but also by a 
strong radical, John Anderson, The three way nature of 
the race was particularly cxninous*
34. Scotsman Nov. 10, 1385
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Elgin and Naim has always been a difficult 
one for Liberals to win ending to tlie influence 
the Dulse of Richmond and the curious fact that 
the farmers there are Conservatives and many of 
the Liberals will support their cliurch regard­
less of party,3®
Anderson campaigned aggressively on the claim that he
"had been brought forth by the Advanced Liberals" of Elgin
to represent "true Liberalism". Me attacked Grant not
only over tlie church issue but also on the need for
"sweeping land law reform", "drastic crofter legislaticai"
36and "free education". This onslaught was very worrying 
to Grants
I am very apprehensive as to tlie result - 
the Tories are very confident here; and we have 
not tlie time to breal: dovm tlie first impression 
whl<âi Anderson has made among the new voters
and fishermen.37
Grant's fears were well founded for he barely survived a 
close three way division of the vote talcing 35% of the 
vote to the Tory's 34% and Anderson's 31%, Grant joined 
the Liberal Unionists in 1886 but was later defeated at 
the polls by Anderson standing as a Gladstonian.
The Highlands:
Grant's near defeat was a part of the general agrarian 
revolt that swept the lairds out of the representation of
35. Lord Fife to Rosebery Oct, 25, 1805 Rosebery 
MSS 10084
36. Scotsman Nov. 19, 1885
37. G. Grant to Rosebery Nov. 27, 1885 Rosebery 
MSS 10084
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the northern counties in 1885, The first Highland de­
claration, Sutherland on Nov, 28, was deceptive. Lord 
Stafford, despite his family's poor record as land-owners, 
was pulled through by his genuine popularity and 
"leaguish” views on land reform and defeated Angus 
Sutherland by 1701 votes to 1058 However, the axe began to 
fall on December 2 when the crofter candidate, Macdonald, 
trounced Ferguson in Rossshire 4942-2925, Ferguson 
remarked bitterly to Rosebery of "nearly 1900 illiterates 
(who) polled against us", predicting accurately the loss 
of the remainder of the Highlands to the crofters, 
Invernessshire, WicOt Burghs soon followed suit and 
Macfarlane obtained a modest majority over Mackinnon in 
Argyll. Caithness turned to Dr. G. B, Clark, a socialist 
and associate of Hyndman and Keir Hardio.
Defeat of Diaestabllshmont*
Apart from the crofter candidates, there were sixteen 
constituencies in Scotland where Liberals opposed each 
other or where Labour candidates entered from the left. 
The Liberals were fortunate that most of these conflicts 
occurred in areas where the Liberal strength was great 
enough to permit the luxury. Only Kj-lmarnock Burghs, not 
surprisingly, being a western seat, was lost idirough a 
Liberal split although Elgin almost followed suit. Tlie
38. Ferguson to Rosebery Deo. 3, 1885 Rosebery MSS 
10017
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chief result of these contests was a clear victory for the 
antidisestablishment Liberals, DisestabUshers won only 
three seats in head-onr clashes : Montrose Burghs, Mid Lanark 
and Aberdeenshire West. Of the three sitting Disestablish­
ment M.P.'s to be opposed. Peddle, Williamson and Par- 
quharson, only the latter in Aberdeenshire West survived. 
None ox the challenged M.P.'s opposed to Disestablishment 
was defeated. Though the relative strength of the radicals 
was to increase within a truncated Liberal Party after 
1886, the results of 1885 convincingly denied them any 
claim to national popular support for their cait^ aign.
That was precisely the opposite of the result obtained by 
the crofters.
b) Tory-Liberal Conflict
Even in those seats with straight Tory-Liberal battles, 
there existed differences of emphasis between various 
shades of Liberals, In the countryside, the clash of 
conten^orary politics often seemed very far away with 
elections resembling ancient ritual combats between Tory 
and Whig lairds.
Berwickshire
In Berwickshire, Edward Marjoribanks, the son of
Lord Tweedmouth faced the Tory candidate, Colonel 0, M,
Home, Home's programme, classically Tory, called for
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"conservative principles" believing that "they are tliose
of true Liberalism". By them, there would be "no
wrecking of great institutions, foremost the Established
churches of England and Scotland”. Home mocked Liberal
disarray, promised aid to fisherman, a strengthened military.
Imperial Federation and an end to "tlie neglect of British
39interests in foreign affairs".' Marjoribanîîs countered 
in equally orthodox fashion vigorously waving the banner 
of 'Gladstone', calling upon Liberals to unite and following 
Gladstone's lead in dismissing tlie Church i s s u e . P r o m  
beginning to end, the contest was marked by a tone of com­
plete civility consistent with a game between gentlemen.
The results, however, due to the new county franchise were 
not of a traditional pattern and gave tlie Liberals 75% of 
tlie poll transforming a vulnerable seat into a rook solid 
bastion.
Perthshire West
In anotlier county constituency, Perthshire West, where 
Sir Donald Currie, faced another Tory colonel. Col. H. E. 
Moray, the son of a local laird, the contest was somewhat 
more uproarious. Although Currie was to cross the aisle 
in 1886, he was not a 'Goschen'. He vigorously defended 
Liberal policies in foreign affairs, free trade, and
39. Scotsman Nov. 11, 1885
40. Ibid. Nov. 18, 1885
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parliaiT^ ienbary refom and advocated disestaJ^lishment,
temperance reform and crofter legislation. Currie's
defection in 1886 was influenced by his parents' Ulster
origins, his age, 61, and his position as tlie head of P.
and O. Lines of Greenock. Moray took the standard Tory
position of Church and patriotism and bitterly condemned
42the idea of free education. Currie did not fail to point 
out Moray's record as M.P. between 1878 and 1880 whic3i 
included a regular series of votes against parliamentary 
reform. Moray suffered regular harassment from hecklers 
who charged his family with extortionate rents. Currie 
tried hard in the days after Gladstone ' s Edinburgh speech 
to dismiss the church issue as a 'rod herring' of the
43
Tories. Pertîishire's strong Tory tradition was reflected
in Currie's moderate victory; 53% to 47%, By contrast, 
in the Eastern division of the county where tiie influence 
of the Tory lairds was less, the Liberals won 65%,
;o) General Election Results
The British result of the election was a half­
victory for the Liberals. % e y  fell from the overall 
majority gained in 1880 to precisely one half of the 
representation of the House of Commons in 1885, exactly
41. ibid. Nov. 9, 1885
42. ibid. Nov. 9, 1885; Nov. 13, 1885
43. ibid. Nov. 18, 1885
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balancing the Conservative and Irish groupings.
Scotland, however, remained true to her tradition 
as a rodc-solid Liberal bastion: once again, Liberals
represented almost 90% of the constituencies? and due to 
redistribution, this meant an increase in actual numbers. 
Though the Liberal share of the popular vote did fall con­
siderably from 72.8% to 63,7% (+2,4%croftor)it must be 
noted that cmly 5 Liberals were acclaimed in 1885 compared 
to 12 in 1880, The Tory gains in Glasgow were notable 
but were easily balanced by Liberal gains in thé counties.
Taken overall, the outstanding conclusion emerging 
from the results of 1885 was the continuing weakness of 
the Scottish Conservatives. In on3.y 19 of 70 seats (not 
counting university seats) did the Tory vote exceed 45%,
Even of the 9 seats in fact won by the Tories, only four 
produced more than a marginal win. The Kilmarnock win came 
only by a fortunate split, Wigtown and Kirkcudbrightshire 
wore both won by margins of 1% and Dumbarton by only 2%, 
Without the good fortune of open Liberal conflicts and 
the gift of the Parnell directive, the Scottish Tories 
could well have found themselves reduced to a single first 
class con^artmsnt by 1885.
1885 also reinforced the old traditional division of 
Scotland into politically distinct East end West regions. in
44. Unwin op. cit. p. 94
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1880, 5 of 7 Tory seats had been in (die South-West 
(laird-held Invemessshire and Haddingtonshire being the 
exceptions). However, in 1885, all 8 Tory seats were in 
the South west region as were 10 of tlie 11 seats where 
defeated Conservatives received over 45% of the vote and 
6 of the 7 who got over 40%. Even the two exceptions to 
this uniformity, Perthshire West and Argyll lay on the 
fringes of the region.
Leaving aside the Highland counties as a special case. 
Liberal atrongtli was greatest in the Eastern Burghs and 
the urban working-class and mining seats. Hawick Burghs, 
Elgin Burghs, Stirling Burghs, Fife West emd Clackmannan 
and Kinross all returned unopposed Liberals, Liberals 
divided the entire vote in St, Andrews Burghs, Edinburgh 
East and Edinburgh South, Individually, or collectively, 
Liberals took over 75% of the vote in Montrose Burghs (89%), 
Aberdeen North (85%), Kirkcaldy Burghs (83%), Dundee (81%), 
Forfarshire (77%), Edinburgh Central (77%), Aberdeen South 
(76%), and Berwickshire (75%), All sixteen constituencies 
listed above were in tlie East, Only 3 Western seats gave 
Liberals more than 60% of the vote; Glasgow Camlachie 
(69%), Glasgow Blackfrlars (61%), and Midlanark (65%) where­
as only one Eastern seat, the Tory middle class Edinburgh 
West, produced less than 60%.
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Summaryt
The election of 1885 did not have any single dominant 
focus, but in Scotland the disestablishment question and 
its ramifications tended to predominate* The redistri­
bution of 1885 had a particular effect in the major cities 
of Glasgow and Edinlourgh. introduction of single
member seats forced an end to traditional ideological com­
promise slates in multi-member seats and led to bitter 
struggles for control of the new divisional nominations 
between party factions. This bitterness was particularly 
strong in Glasgow; where the radical disestafolishers 
emerged triumphant. Moderates were successful in holding 
EdinlDurgh but were all but completely alienated in Glasgow, 
laying the groundwork for the future strength of Liberal 
Unionism in the West of Scotland.
In those seats where radical and moderate Liberals 
confronted each other at the polls over the church issue, 
two things were made cleart firstly, that intervention 
could play into the hands of the Tories by allowing them 
to go 1%) the middle between a split vote and secondly, 
that Scottish voters had little enthusiasm on the whole 
for the disestablishment cause.
The polling results of 1885 on the surface seemed only 
to reinforce Scotland's position as an oven<?helming bastion 
of Liberal strength. However, hidden beneath the figures,
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laythe beginning of the future breakup of the party due 
to the increasing factionalism and alienation of traditional 
sources of support. TIio emergence of the Irish Home Rule 
issue would only servo to complete a process begun long 
before 1886,
CHAPTER 4
The Irish Home Rule Crisis: 1886
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The Irish Home Rule Crisis: 1886
It is curious that an election so little concerned 
witli Ireland should have had its result so rapidly and 
overv/helmingly superseded by the Home Rule Crisis, From 
the moïîient of the Hawarden Kite, December 17, 1885, the 
Irish question was to supersede all otiier concerns of 
British politics. The result of tlie 1885 elections had 
given Parnell the position that he had worked for: the
holding of the balance of power. Of course, the Irish 
were only in a position to influence the political 
balance, not to dictate toms to an unwilling House of 
Commons, Consequently, the shoo]: of events that followed 
would not have been so great had it not been for the 
progress of one mind, that of Mr. Gladstone,
a) Scottish Attitudes Towards Ireland
l'ïlii3.e the Irish question was not a 'Scottish issue' 
like Church disestablishment, it clearly had a distinctive 
impact north of the border. A peculiar relationship had 
always existed between Scotland and Ireland, Both the 
Soots and the Irish were minority nations within the United 
Kingdom yet there was never any great sense of kinship in 
the face of the 'predominant partner*. As Campbell- 
Banneman adcnovjledgedi
My countrymen have no interest in the (Irish) 
question beyond a wish to see the disloyal 
people put down •«•• there is no love lost 
between the -bvo peoples, ^
1. J. A. Spender Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman 
Hodder and Stou^rb^rT"''~T%[idorr'Ti32?^'"l^lTlL p." *64
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Of all tiie factors underlying this lack of synpathy, 
the most serious was religion, A Scotland reared in the 
tradition of Calvin could sea only tlie worst in a nation 
dominated by an intense Roman Catholicism, Nonetheless, 
this ill-feeling might well have remained dormant had it 
not been for the demon of Ulster, Historically, the Irish 
protestants of Ulster were the descendants of Presbyterian 
Scots and,like fossils, they had preserved all the in­
tolerance and bigotry of centuries long past, Vïliile many 
Scots found the Ulstermen distasteful at bast (Rosebery 
said: "I do not believe in tlie blood-thirsty theologians
wlio are found with the Shorter Catedliism in one hand and a
2revolver in the other,") , the strength of tlie Orange bond
across tlie North Channel could not be denied. Munro-
Ferguson, an eminently liberal-minded Scot had this brought
home to him when on a journey through Ulster, A Belfast
editor, who, tliough congenial, impressed Ferguson as being
"as violent as any Orangeman", said "There will be fighting ,,
there will be no amalgamation, Belfast is Scotch and will
remain so." Ferguson himself observed': "I can understand
the West of Scotland going more Unionist than the East.
Yosterday we could see Wigtown, Ayr and the Clyde much as
we see the Lothians from Raith. Tlia people are certainly 
3
very Scotch." For their part, Scots, especially in the
2, Crewe op. cit. p. 280, June 17, 1886
3. Ferguson to Rosebery Aug. 17, 1891 Rosebery MSS 
10018
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West, were often closely related by blood to Ulstermen 
e.g. Ulster-born Lord Kelvin. A further complication for 
the Liberals arose from the close links between their ally, 
the Free Kirk, and Ulster Presbyterianism."^
More subtly divisive was the gap of understanding 
between the Scottish and Irish tempéraments. In many ways, 
it resembled the equally ancient mutual distrust in 
Scotland between the Highlander and the Lov;lander. Most 
Scots can appreciate the beauty of the Gaelic culture but 
few can identify vjith or taka it seriously. John Buchan, 
a radical driven to Toryism by the Irish question was a 
case in points
As a practical politician and a public man 
Buchan could not do with the wayx-^ ardness and 
whirnsey of the Celt, nor with his argumenta­
tiveness .... he was out of patience with a 
people who seemed to be forever harping on past 
wrongs.^
Besides these emotional considerations which included 
the gap between a people proud of being part rulers of an 
empire and a people who saw themselves as victims of tliat 
Empire, there were more material obstacles to any Scottish 
sympathy for Irish aspirations, Scottish commercial and 
financial interests had large stakes in the Irish economy 
and the prospect of even a semi-autonomous Dublin regime.
4. McCaffery op. cit. p. 245
5. Smith op. cit. p. 183
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given an assumed legao^ y of hostility, was a source of 
great anxiety. A high proportion of Scottish overseas 
investment, higher than England's, was placed in Ireland? 
there were large branch business operations and the 
cultural tie to Ulster was reinforced by tiie close com­
mercial ties between Glasgow and Belfast, Oft-cited 
examples were the three sugar refineries at Greenock which 
were wholly dependent on Irish markets. Hence, any dis­
ruption of Irish affairs leading to threats such as tariff 
restrictions would strike hard at Scotland's economic 
vitals. Scottish business men were necessarily essentially 
Imperial in outlook and feared for "the destruction of a 
great field for the employment of British Capital",^
Moreover, the economic throat of industrial Scotland 
lay at tlie approaches to tlie Clyde estuary, approaches 
totally dominated by the coast of Ireland, It did not 
take much imagination to visualize the dangers tliat an 
independent and hostile Ireland might pose to Scotland 
in the future. The strong military tradition of 
Scotland which was particularly strong in the South-west, 
aided the rise of fears for the safety of the country 
if in time of war Ireland wag to be used by a hostile 
foreign power.
'Hie Clyde, like Liverpool, was tlie destination for tlie 
thousands of immigrant Irish who sought to escape the
6, McCaffSy op. cit. p. 231 McGrigor to Glasgow 
Chamber of Commerce April 19, 1886
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hard times in Ireland, This created immigrant communities 
of both Orange and Green with the importation of all the 
feuds and hatreds so endemic to them. It also established 
a large mass of unskilled, poorly educated, cheap labour 
which seemed to threaten the livelihood of Scottish workmen. 
In tlie eyes of many Scots, an Ireland run from Dublin under 
the thumb of Parnellites and priests supported by a popu­
lation like that resident in the Clyde region could only 
result in disastrous economic failure, a failure which 
would ruin Scottish investments and flood Scotland with 
new waves of indigent Irish, Tlius tlie spectre of Irish 
Home Rule could raise (for all levels of Scottish society) 
fears going beyond simple prejudice.
b) Waiting: Anxiety after Hawarden
The Hawarden kite was neither a policy statement nor 
even a declaration of intent. It was designed to breach a 
conspiracy of silence and raise an idea for public inspec­
tion, Its effect was indeed to focus public attention on 
the future of Ireland, with the indication that Gladstone 
had decided to place that future at the top of the Liberal 
agenda, but tlie country was forced to wait for any indi­
cation of what those plans might be. The G.O.M. had 
determined upon the necessity for Hcane Rule well before 
the election results had succeeded so spectacularly for 
the nationalists. His conversion to the idea had been
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well under way in 1884 and was finally confirmed on a 
trip to Nonvay in August 1885, Ireland, not the Liberal 
Party, Wcis to be his future, his last great 'call'.
Unlike Unionists who raised appeals to prejudice and self- 
interest in opposition to Home Rule, the Gladstonian theme 
was to be a great moral commitment to a people? to do 
right for its own sake. The appeal issued by the National 
Liberal Federation of Scotland in 1886 epitomises this 
spirit :
(Follow) our great and trusted leader whose 
appeal is to the British people, to their 
humanity, to their sense of justice, to 
ttieir faith in Liberal principles (in
opposition to) fear, prejudice and religious 
Intolerance let not the people of Scotland
be led astray . .. tlie question is one of 
natural and civil right.^
The affinity between Gladstone and the Scottish pulpit 
is fully evident. But Gladstone was not the only impor­
tant Liberal to have to come to the conclusion tiiat Home 
Rule was the only alternative left for Ireland, Campbell” 
Bannennan had become Secretar^ ;^  for Ireland in February, 
1885 and in 1886 he wrote of his conversion to Home Rule:
I have passed myself through all tlie steps 
of hope and fear, doubt, misgiving, confi­
dence, di.smay and al)horiunce it took
me from June to Ciiristmaa 1885 with the 
assistance of the opinion and advice of the 
most competent men in Ireland and in the 
Irish Government to reach solid ground in 
the matter. Lord Spencer and the rest of us 
have gone through the same process .,.. and
7, North British Daily Mail June 12, 1886
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it is in unison witli him I come to the 
conclusion that we must support what is
the main policy of the Bill.^
However, Campbell-Bannerman, liîce Rosebery and the major­
ity of the Scottish leadership founded his support for 
Home Rule on something less than the evangelical fervour 
of Gladstone, Morley and the radJ.oal Scots of Glasgow and 
the N.L.F.S. VJhile Campbell-Bannerman described the 
Gladatonians' varying motives as "enthusiasm ... history 
... philosophy ... sentiment and 'Irishophily', he agreed 
with Rosebery that they tliemselves were moved mainly by 
"necessity - black unpleasant n e c e s s i t y T h e  vast 
majority of the nation, hovrever, at the end of 1885 were 
utterly unprepared for the impact of such revolutionary 
proposals.
Much of the trauma that was to engulf the Liberal 
Party resulted from Gladstone's habit of Olympian leader­
ship, While rumour had been rife as Gladstone tried to 
urge Salisbury to take on the role of Peel, the Liberal 
rank and file were given no hint of direction from tlie 
top. Bewilderment was near universal. Even Chcutiberlain 
could not elicit any guidance during a personal visit 
to Hawarden. Hie building storm broke on January 26 when 
Hicks Beach gave notice of new coercion policies. That 
night Gladstone led tlie Liberals into tlie lobbies behind
8. C. B. to John Ross April 28, 1886 C© MSS 41232
9. C. B, to Rosebery Sept. 8, 1392 Rosebery MSS 10002
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Jesse Ceilings' motion for tnral labourers and defeated 
the Government, Many Liberals, however, realised the true 
meaning of the division and eighteen Liberal M,P,s crossed 
over to vote with the Tories.
These eighteen, who included Hartington, Goschen and 
Sir Henry James, can be regarded as the hard core of 
Liberal Unionism. Of the sixty Scottish Liberal M.P.s (two 
vacancies), two, Goschen, who was English, and A. R, D, 
Elliot, joined Hartington. Not surprisingly they were 
generally considered to be among the most extreme right 
wingers of the Scottish Party and only questionably Liberal. 
Of those absent. Sir John Jardine, LeonardLyell, John 
Ramsay and A. Craig-Sellar, only Lyell eventually voted for 
Home Rule. Fifty-four Scottish Liberals voted for Codlings' 
motion including seventeen who would eventually oppose the 
Home Rule scheme. 25% (76) of the entire Liberal repre- 
senation were absent. Interestingly, the equivalent 
figure for the Scots was only 7% (4). Yet a higher pro­
portion of Scottish Liberals than the English were to 
defect on the Home Rule Bill, Could it have been that 
there ran in tlie Scottish representation a deeper vein of 
loyalty which, had Gladstone been more astute and less 
remote, could have been exploited to retain a large section 
of Scottish Liberalism?
The early months of 1886 had the oulet air of 
expectancy. It was general loiowledge that Gladstone was
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preparing new Irish measures to deal with administration 
and land but the su3:>stantive details were still a mystery 
which Gladstone kept even from his cabinet colleagues until 
March, The mood in Scotland was one of patience and faith, 
well reflected by the Scotsman whose editorials repeatedly 
advised Liberals to keep their heads and trust the wisdom 
of Gladstone. However, the unyielding tone of boldi the 
Scotsman and the Glasgow Herald, the premier newspapers of 
Scotland, to any countenance of Home Rule boded ill for 
the future. On March 26, the same day that ChamJ^erlain 
and Trevelyan, having heard for the first time the full 
provisions of the Home Rule Bill, had walked out of the 
Cabinet Room, J, J. Reid, Rosebery's chief agent in 
Midlothian wrote of Scottish pulDlic opinion :
Scotland is somewhat shaky upon liie present 
phase of the Irish question, The opinion of 
the great bulk of the Lilaeral Party regarding 
the land question is that of open minded ex­
pectation but always with an unabated reliance 
and confidence in the Prime Minister both per­
sonally and politically .,,, while tiiey trust 
Mr. Gladstone, they do not trust Irishmen .... 
were it made clear that (financial security) 
had been sufficiently guaranteed, I feel con­
fident (there will be) no objections and no 
defections worth spea)cing of.^O
These sentiments were not strange even to members of 
the Scottish caucus. C. S. Parker, M.P. for Perth, 
expressed grave doubts.
10. Reid to Rosebery March 26, 1886 Rosebery MSS 
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X feel much anxiety about Ireland. I have 
known for months that Mr. Gladstone cared 
more for this than any otlier question. I 
only hope he will not let himself be deceived 
by Parnell or by his generous aspiration to 
settle the Irish difficulty before he retires. 
For my part I profoundly distrust Parnell 
and the Land League whether they succeed or 
fail to secure large majorities under the new 
Irish franchise. Of course. It:. Gladstone 
cannot in the teeth of all his promises con­
sciously hand over the loyal minority in Ire­
land to their deadliest foes. But I do not 
feel equally sure that he might not in his 
endeavour to reconcile Ireland be made a 
fool of by worthless 'securities' on paper 
for the interests of those whom it is de­
sired to plunder and expel .... ^1
Tlie Storm Breaks; April 8, 1386 and After
Gladstone presented his Home Rule proposals to 
Parliament on April 8 and the Land Bill on the 16th, The 
effect was devastating, not only in Westminster but 
throughout the country. Tlie attention of the nation was 
captured as it had not been in recent history. Robert 
Yellowlees, the Provost of Stirling, and a leading 
Ldheral in that burgh wrote to his M.P., C-B, in sub­
sequent days of the atmosphere that had existed in tlie 
city. An immense meeting had been organised on the 8th:
telegrams had been arranged from the House of 
Commons giving an éiccount of Mr. Gladstone's 
Great Speech - the first of those came at 
8s30 and by 9:30 I had read to the meeting a 
series of messages giving what proved to be a 
very accurate outline of the government pro­
posals as to the first bill. These proposals 
were listened to witli intense interest and at
11. Parker to R, B. Bruce Dec, 17, 1885 Elgin MSS
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the close tliere were some exultant shouts 
from the Irishmen present but by the 
meeting as a whole the news was received 
with a silence that was almost painful and 
bewildering .... the feeling in Stirling 
was very strong against tlie bill .... the 
LiÎDerals were all despondent for they feared 
Mr, Gladstone had made a great mistake and 
the Tories were all exultant because they 
were sure he had .
For many Liberals it was the confirmation of all 
their worst fears. This was particularly true in the East 
of Scotland where the control of tlie party had been 
carefully kept in the hands of those who tended towards 
conservative Liberalism. Devoted by tradition and jper- 
sonal feeling towards Mr. Gladstone and the party, they 
felt their world coming apart:
Friends (in Stirling) here are greatly 
perplexed and personally I must say I must 
oppose Mr, Gladstone when tlie time comes 
and I fear the Liberal Party will be found 
broken up and rent asunder in Scotland 
generally,
John Ross, CB*s agent in Dunfermline and the Elgin family 
solicitor, had to write an abject and despairing letter 
of resignation to 'Œ Such old and trusted relationships 
were being brutally torn apart by the demands of conscience. 
Sir EA'/ard Colebrooke, a forraer Liberal and Lanarkshire 
industrialist spoke of the unhappy decision faced by the 
anti-Home Rule Liberals:
12. Yellowlees to CB April 22, 1806 CB MSS 41232
13. R. Smith to CB April 20, 1886 CB MSS 41232
14. Ross to CB April 24, 1886 CB MSS 41232
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They had at once to sever ties which had 
bound all of them during tlieir lives - they 
had to separate themselves from an honoured 
leader, to whom they were bound by every 
attachment on account of his past services 
and the personal feeling they entertained 
for him.
The press reaction was immediate and vicious. Pre­
viously loyal Liberal organs like the Scotsman were over­
night converted to rabid anti-Gladstonianism. The violence 
of this volte-face was such that Gladstone was transmuted
from "the preacher of righteousness to the prophet of 
16evil." Vîhareas in the heyday of Victorian Scotland, the 
press had stood united as a bastion and tribune of 
Liberalism, in the new era, it was to stand in bitter and 
unrelenting oppos ition.
Previously united communities where the creed of 
Liberalism had been a bond that had transcended class 
and social divisions now broke along those lines for 
and against Gladstone, Yellowlees reported on this 
evolution in Stirling:
Tlie community is divided now into ttvo sec­
tions .... local Tories, still jubilaiit, 
thinJî tliat the Gladstonian period is at an 
end and are certain that the Stirling Burghs 
will no longer be peacefully retained by the 
Liberals .... Local Liberals : a) the
respectalale 'old stager' class like Graham 
(a banker) Gow (bootmaker) Drummond (seedsman) 
Grieve (farmer) still decidedly against the
15. McCaff&y op. cit, p. 54
16. Shaw op. cit. p. 74
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bills ..,„ the Free Oiurch section of 
this class is speedily deserting ..,.
Biany will abstain (from voting) .... 
b) Liberals of a somewhat lower social 
order are Yery divided in opinions but 
gradually coming to tîiink that Mr. 
Gladstone Icnov/s more aJ^ out the matter 
than they ,... they will follow their 
leader, c) working class Liberals ,,,, 
are prepared to vote straight for the 
Government measures not so much because 
they have thought the matters out .,.. 
as out of affection for the Grand Old 
Man ... faith in him is kindly and blind 
as the Tory emnity is bitter and odious ,,, 
I met two Falkirk working weavers and one 
reraarJced, "This is auful news Provost have 
ye heard that Lord Salisbury (ho mistook 
him for Shaftesbury) has shot himself in 
a cab? My neebour Jock Marshall was jes' 
saying' that one of Auld T'TUllie's enemies 
was awa' and he wished twa' or three mair 
of them would jus', gang and dae 1he same 
thing",
In spite of the havoc being played by division over 
Home Rule, it was the devout wish of many on botli sides 
to prevent any kind of permanent split destroying the 
Scottish Liberal Party, Toryism remained the fundamental 
evil for many even though they disliked Home Rule;
Doth Stair and Graham though it would be 
a bad thing for the Liberal Party if you 
were to resign (Elgin the chairman of the 
SLA) ” this is quite my view - it will 
take all we can do to hold the party to­
gether. I have only heard one man say a 
good Idling about Gladstone's Irish Bill and 
I have tallied to a good many ,..
I an afraid that Gladstone is going to break 
up the Liberal Party as he did in '74 ™ the 
outcome of which was six years of Tory rule ....
17, Yellowlees to Campbe11-Bannerman April 22, 1886
Campbell‘”^ 3annerman MSS 41232
18, R. Gathcart to Elgin April 20, 1886 Elgin î^S
19, Gathcart to Elgin April 24, 1886 Elgin MSS
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A month after the Bill had been unveiled, local Liberal 
associations were still going Üirough contortions in 
efforts to keep both sides under the same roof:
The Liberal Association had anotiier night 
of it last night and again adjourned. There 
were ai^ out 200 present and I should say that 
opinion was pretty well divided .... all the 
speaJiing was good natured .... whether a 
speaJcer was for or against if he made a good 
point it brought dovm the h o u s e . 20
Opinions and personal loyalties were, of course, ir­
retrievably confused:
Opinion as to the bill is somewhat chaotic 
but on the whole adverse ,... as far as you 
are personally concerned the feeling is 
almost universally sympathetic,^^
For many, the situation was a tragedy and, what was worse, 
an unnecessary tragedy caused by the actions of the great 
man to whom they had devoted tliemselves for so many 
years:
I cannot help devoutly wishing that the 
fertile brain of our great chief had never 
conceived tiiese Bills and if as seems, they 
are doomed to an untimely death may they 
have a decent burial and no resurrection!^^
Prof, Blackie wrote in succinct despair to Roseberyi
IVhat a mess Gladstone has thrown us intol23
20. Ross to CB May 4, 1886 CB MSS 41232
21. Ross to CB May 4, 1886 CB MSS 41232
Yellowlees to CB May 18, 1886 CB MSS 4123222
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The breakup of the Liberal Party in Scotland passed 
through several stages* Because Liberalism had always in­
cluded in Scotland a strong body of the natural conservatives 
of society, a body whose social equivalents in England 
were Tories, one part of this movement was towards a party 
system more clearly divided by ideology and social factors, 
The party transition in Scotland in 1806 was complicated 
by the nature of the conflicts of 1885 which had so badly 
divided the party over the church question. The alliances 
that began to grow in 1885 for and against the Church 
Establishment provided, in many parts of Scotland, the 
framework of future politics. This was most notable 
in the West of Sootland.which was to join with the West 
Midlands as the two genuine centres of Liberal Unionist 
strength in Britain.
The fratricidal battle of 1885 had left the middle 
class radicals who were to form the backbone of Gladstonian 
support, in control of all seven divisions of Glasgow.
As a result, the effect of the Home Rule Bill was merely 
to confirm an alienation of the 'moderates* that had been 
in existence for months. There was little scope for the 
sort of accommodatiohand struggle to preserve a facade of 
unity such as occurred in other parts of Scotland. Opinion 
in the West was uncompromising and, after violent scenes, 
the Unionists walked out of the Liberal associations to 
stage a Unionist rally three days after the Bill had been 
published.
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Glasgow Liberal Unionism had a definite social 
character. Almost all the leaders belonged to bodies 
such as the Chamber of Commerce, the University Court, 
and the Board of Management of the Royal Infirmary* and 
most were lawyers and businessmen who had offices close to 
each other in Central Glasgow. The presence of those like 
Lord Kelvin with Ulster ties ensured that sectarian feeling 
would be harnessed. On April 23, a great Orange rally in 
Glasgow degenerated into a mob which attacked a Catholic 
church. By May, representatives of Ulster Presbyterianlom 
along with Ulster working men were appearing on Unionist 
platforms to help transcend the social limits of tlie origi­
nal Liberal Unionists. By the 1st of June a formal pact 
with the Tories was near. While Scottish Toryism had 
always been strongest in Glasgow and the South West, it 
willingly allowed its new allies to take the Unionist 
leadership.Thus (in Western Scotland) unlike most parts 
of Britain, Liberal Unionism became the dominant half of 
the partnership. This was confirmed by the complete re­
surgence of the Liberal Party in the West in 1906 once 
the Irish issue had faded away.
While it is true that the disestablishment question 
laid the groundwork for Liberal Unionism in some areas 
and particularly in the Clyde region, it would be wrong 
to suggest that the two issues became interchangeable.
It is probable that a majority of those Liberals who had
24. McCaffrey op. cit, p. 263
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fought disestablishment completed their drift away from 
the Liberal Party in the following year but not all 
Cliurchmen beoame Unionists and not all disestablishors 
became Home Rulers,
On March 30, Sir Charles Cameron presented his annual 
Disestablishment resolution to parliament. 33 Scottish 
Liberals voted, dividing 26 in favour and 7 against with 
29 absent. Of the 26 who voted with Cameron, 19 were to 
vote for the Home Rule Bill but seven were to vote against. 
Of the 7 who voted against Cameron, 2 were to vote for 
HcMïie Rule, 4 against and one to be absent. Of those who 
abstained from the church vote 17 voted for Home Rule and 
12 against. The clear divisions within each block are 
evident. Liberal Churchmen became rarer after 1886 but 
a considerable number did stay loyal. Significantly, the 
most fervent advocate of Disestablishment in the Mid- 
Victorian era, Duncan McLaren, virtually from his deathbed,
declared his passionate opposition to Gladstone's Irish
25plan. Campbell-Bannerman wondered how Unionism would be 
able to embrace such alliances;
One thing appears to me is that it would 
be difficult to get a 'thoroughgoing Liberal* 
whom the Tories wo hid support because he op­
poses Home Rule. Would the Tories vote for a 
Disestablisheri and would the Disestablishers 
in the constituency vote for a "Liberal 
Churchman.26
25. J, Mackie Life of Duncan McLaren Nelson Edinburgh 
1888 Vol. 11 p. 253
26. CB to Yellowlees May 19, 1886 CB MSS 41232
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Hov/ever unlikely some of the new alliances may have 
appeared, Gladstone's décision to go Immediately to the 
cotmtry once his bill had been defeated sealed tlie fate of 
anykhope of reconciliation. Many Lil^ erals had hoped and 
continued to hope that Home Rule would prove to be a one- 
off division, with the party swiftly re-uniting once the 
source of disruption had been buried. For many, Ireland 
was an alien issue, with little relevance to the great 
struggles of the past that had bound Liberals together 
into a party. Liberalism continued to live on both sides 
of the Irish issue, by this account, and any continuing 
division was unnatural. Gladstone's decision to defer 
retirement until his last crusade was won wrecked these 
hopes? for his identification with Home Rule coupled with 
the irreparable effects of an election campaign made any 
reunification, so long as he chose to remain, impossible.
Tlie spectre of the election depressed those Liberals 
who, like Yellowlees in Stirling, wished so dearly to 
keep the old party together*
whatever the merits or demerits of the Irish 
Government bill, it is deplorable that a 
General Election should take place on a 
question regarding which all conservatives 
are agreed while amongst Liberals there is 
the utmost diversity of o p i n i o n . 27
Now the prospect was one of unrestricted fratricidal war 
to be unleashed on the hustings,but Yellowlees naively 
continued to hope against hope that conflict between
27. Yellowlees to CB June 10, 1886 CB MSS 41232
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Liberals could be avoided.
I do not know if it is intended to put up
a Gladstonian Liberal against each of the 
23 Scottish Liberals who voted against ....
I fervently hope that the split in the Liberal 
party la not going to develop into a fraternal 
strife of that kind .... any attack on those 
who voted for the bill simply because they did 
so is equally to be d e p l o r e d . 28
However, since the election was called by Gladstone to 
settle that very issue, and tliat issue alone divided 
Liberals, such hopes ware clearly doomed. The sense of 
rage and despair amongst Liberals viewing the impending 
oonfliot must have been even stronger In Scotland than in 
England. The Scottish party and its leadership had just 
emerged from a year's desperate struggle to avoid this 
very situation over the church issue. In 1885, moreover, 
the battle had remained a struggle within the party, despite 
the similar aiits of Liberal Churchmen and Tories. Tacit 
understandings may have given one or the other a clear run 
in certain circumstances but much more common were three- 
way contests. Now a pact was emerging between Liberal and 
Conservative Unionists not to gppose each other. In the 
eyes of Home Rule Liberals such collusion on the part of 
their former brethren was tantamount to treason. Final 
estrangement was only a matter of time.
The SLA continued to include both groups of Liberals 
but it was a fiction maintained only by the virtual emas- 
culatinn of the organization. Under the influence of Rose- 
bery and Elgin it had been designed to avoid the endemic
2B. Yellowlees to CB June 10, 1886 CB MSS 41232
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policy conflicts of Scottish Liberalism by restricting 
itself to neutral organizational matters, While such a 
policy had managed to survive tlie pressures of the Church 
dispute, it was hopeless to try to straddle the Home Rule 
collision.
The Campaignt Civil War
The weight of battle in 1886 in Scotland was indeed 
carried by Liberal against Liberal. Of the 64 Liberal 
candidates who were opposed, 39 faced Liberal Unionists and 
only 25, Conservatives. Moreover/ 20 of the 23 Liberal M.P.’s 
who voted against the Home Rule bill stood again, this 
time under Unionist colours.
The campaign in Scotland Itself was swift, bitter 
and singleminded. Gladstone's Midlothian manifesto put the 
issue as a simple choice: "Will you govern Ireland by
29coercion or will you let Ireland manage her own affairs"?
The Scotsman agreed with the starkness of the choice before
the country: "The issue which the country will have to
decide will be (Repeal of the Union and Separation) and 
30nothing else."
The basic Unionist objections to Home Rule had been 
established in the press as long ago as December, 1885:
The difficulty in limiting Irish autonomy, the strain that
29. Scotsman June 14, 1886
30. ibid. June 9, 1886
118
would result in future Anglo-Irish relations, the economic
31threat of Home Rule and the question of Ulster.
However the rising tone of debate became more passionate 
as evidenced in the leader columns of the now-completely 
Unionist press. For a time, the Scotsman tempered its 
criticismss "let us provide a safer and wiser means of
dealing with self-government in Ireland than those provided
32by Mr, Gladstone's Bill". However by tlie middle of June
caution was thrown away as it shrilly proclaimed* "it 
directly encourages separation .... it practically repeals 
the Union and hands over our Government to the men who
direct the National League and places the protestant
33minority at their mercy". The Scotsman did not hesitate
to suggest that "Ireland differs from Scotland for one
reason, because her people are infinitely less qualified
34
for self-government."
Unionist speeches carried different emphasis, Arthur
Elliot and Robert Anstruther, as Liberal Unionists in the
East of Scotland underlined their 'Liberalism* and denounced
35the radical influences in tlie Gladstonian party. One of 
the chief assets of the Unionists was the general anti­
pathy that led some to see Home Rule as a means of ridding 
Britain of the Irish burden. The Unionists spared no
31. Glasgow Herald Deo. 28, 1885
32. Scotsman June 8, 1886
33. ibid. June 15, 1886
34. ibid. June 11, 1886
35. ibid. June 20, June 22, 1886
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effort, however, to paint a picture of Gladstone as the
tool of the Irish. R. B, Finlay declared: "The current
ministers have sold their soul to the Parnellites."^^
sir George Grant accused the Home Rulers of wishing "to
leave Irish affairs in the hands of those who would eunnesty 
37murder". Orr-Ewing suggested that if left alone by "the
agitators", the Irish people would soon "become as prosperous
38and contented as the Scots".
However, the most recurring theme was to leave such
points aside and appeal directly to a prejudice against
the Irish nation and Roman Catholicism. In East Renfrew,
Shaw-8tewart characterised Ireland as "a bankrupt province
39swarming with revolutionists". Most such attacks, however, 
were closely linked to the question of Ulster. Haldane's 
opponent in East Lothian, Myburgh, spoke of "the horror of 
handing over Protestants to the tender mercies of their 
hereditary enemies, the Romas Catholics of Ireland who would 
never be content so long as one protestant is left."^^
The Liberal appeal for Heme Rule rested on two counts: 
one, a moral imperative to do right; the other, a hard­
eyed acceptance of Irish realities. To those Unionists who 
described coercion as a necessary evil,^^ Liberals like Sir
36. ibid. June 18, 1886
37. ibid. June 22, 1886
38. ibid. June 17, 1886
39. ibid. June 16, 1836
40. ibid. June 15, 1886
41. ibid. (Shaw-Stewart) June 16, 1886
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Charles Tennant replied: "the principle of granting to
Ireland a domestic legislature to deal with her own affairs
is not only a just and sound one but the only one on which
you can hope to establish satisfactory relations with our
fellow subjects ... to close the long record of disaffection 
42in Ireland". Liberals repeatedly tried to link Home Rule
with the ancient Liberal creed of 'trust in tlie people'.
Haldane described Home Rule as a "question of trust in tlie
people and representative government" Mark Napier put
the British option as meeting Ireland "with trust or with 
44the sword". An equally important Lilieral point was
"justice to Ireland". Wallace denounced coercion and Castle
45rules "no law is just if imposed by an unjust authority".
R. T. Reid suggested that British rule in Ireland had been
46an evil comparable to that of Russia in Poland • However, 
if "trust" appealed to a sense of Liberal generosity and 
a willingness to allow the slate to be cleaned of wrongs 
on both sides, "justice" demanded that the Scots admit to 
sin in their treatment of Ireland. The former asked the 
Scottish voters to see the best in the Irish but the latter 
demanded a recognition of the worst In tliemselves. One was 
not unreasonable but the other was a great deal to ask.
42. ibid. June 18, 1886
43. i],^ id. June 15, 1886
44. ibid. June 20, 1886
45. ibid. June 17, 1886
46. ibid. JUne 15, 1886
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The theme of trust was limited to a particular
Gladstonian perception of the world. By this view. Home
Rule and the cause of other European nationalities like
Italy were closely linked to tlie rise of British democracy,
Gladstone and his followers believed that responsibility
was to be earned, but more importantly, that responsibility
was an uplifting factor leading towards the responsible use
of authority. Thus R, T. Reid claimed: "give (the Irish)
power and responsibility to bring their nation to its senses
47(it has) never failed before," R. B, Bruce, brother 
of Lord Elgin, suggested that no matter the behaviour of 
the Rarnellites in the past, power in the hands of the 
Irish people would put them out."^^ As evidence, Bruce 
pointed to the record of his father, the 8th Earl of Elgin 
who as governor of a rebellious Loiter Canada had insisted 
that the French Canadian- nation and its hitherto Parnel- 
lite-like leaders be given responsibility with Idie result 
a happy and pacified colony.
Liberals protested that political labels were being
falsified and that it was their policy tliat was most likely
to promote the furtherance of the Union. Haldane described
the Liberals as "the true Unionists" who were seeking to
build a real union in tlie place of a none-too-ancient or 
49successful one. Mensies called himself "the Unionist
47. ibid, June 15, 1886
48. ibid. June 23, 1886
49. ibid. June 15, 1806
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candidate" and demanded Home Rule as a replacement of "a
, „ 50paper union .
The Liberals did not fail to emphasize the force of
the democratic authority of the newly enfranchised masses
who had so overwhelmingly backed Parnell in 1885. C. S,
Parker pointed out that if an equivalent section of Scotland
had voted for a restoration of the Scottish parliament this
Siwould have been viewed as a "legitimate claim", Menzies
spoke of "the rights which (the Irish) have constitutionally 
52demanded" while Ferguson identified the eighty- six 
Parnellites as "the mind of Ireland". Of course, the 
implication was that a true Liberal could only acknowledge 
and accede to the legitimate voice of a people. However, 
some, like Campbell-Bannerman, pointed out tlie reality? in
53the face of such national unity, "resistance is hopeless,"
To this extent the Liberal campaign carried a positive 
note. However, they were, in reality put in a hopeless 
defensive position: partly by the weaknesses of the Home
Rule Bill but more no by Gladstone's total failure to reckon 
with the problem of Ulster and all the prejudices that 
were wrapped ^out her. As the Unionists played the 'Orange 
Card' with gleeful effect, the only response open to the 
Liberals was to dismiss the entire issue as a red-herring.
50, ibid. June 15, 1886
51. ibid. June 16, 1886
52. ibid. June 17, 1886
53, ibid. June 17, 1886
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Ferguson baldly asserted that there was "no chance of
54religious persecution through Home Rule" while Wallace
claimed liiat the anti-clericalism of the Rarnellites was 
55Insurance enough, Reid denounced the use of Ulster as a
"bluff" and a " b o g e y C r a w f o r d  declared: "Ulster is not
a nation, Tlie protestants of Ireland are Irish and have
to take their chances as Irishmen, I have no doubt they
57will get their fair share of power and reward," These 
statements were unlikely to soothe the fears of Pres - 
byterian Scotland,
On top of this the quick consignment to oblivion of 
the companion land bill after its very unfavourable recep­
tion in the House, did little to increarje confidence in the 
remaining Rome Rule proposal.
The singleraindness of the campaign is underlined by 
the virtual disappearance of all mention of the church con­
troversy which had so dominated Scottish politico less than 
a year before. While some unionists continued to emphasize 
the point, and other candidates found themselves questioned 
on their beliefs after their address, these were mostly 
notable for their rarity. Local and traditional issues con* 
tinned to be mentioned, usually at the final summation of
54. ibid. June 24, 1806
55. ibid. June 17, 1886
56, ibid. June 15, 1886
57, ibid, June 24, 1886
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a speech, but these consisted only of the briefest of 
notice.
The only real issue was Ireland and in this the 
Liberals were totally handicapped by their Inability to 
appeal to self-interest, the true basis of reform. High- 
mlndednesB was not a substitute. For most Liberals, 
Liberalism had been the veliicle which had brought them 
specific rights and economic benefits. High-mindedness 
might have an effect when considering distant peoples in 
Italy and Bulgaria, but It cut little ice when directed to 
the disliked, distrusted and all-too-close Irish, Tlie only 
self-interest Involved was the benefits ensuing from the 
banishment of Hie Irish, a point utterly overmatched by 
the emotional forces at tlie disposal of Unionism,
Tlie events of 1886 eliminated tlie remains of tlie Mid- 
Victorian Scottish political environment and recast, in 
its place, a dramatically n w  battleground. Consequently, 
the election of 1886 is undoubtedly the single most Impor­
tant event between 1885 and 1906, Liberalism lost not only 
the last of its conservative support but with it went those 
upper and middle class Liberals which had given the Scottish 
party such a unique air of social breadth. For the most 
part, after 1885, Scottish politics were to be divided 
between a Unionism which represented the attitudes and 
interests of the social Establishment and a Liberal Party 
largely dependent on the lower orders of society for
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support though continuing to be led by a hardy band of 
loyalists from the upper echelons. Unionism's strength, 
however, lay in its ability to surmount class identifi­
cations and to secure for itself a large section of lower 
class support. To tliis end, its chief appeal was to the 
religious and patriotic feelings aroused by the HoiTie Rule 
question.
e) The General Election Results and Their Consequences
The outstanding result of the 1886 results was tlie 
massive defeat suffered by the Home Rulers in the United 
Kingdom. Losing 144 seats, tlie Liberal Party was reduced 
from being the natural party of power to what seemed to 
be a perpetual minority status. The Scottish results 
were no less of a catastrophe for the Liberals and, in 
some ways perhaps even more so. Having held 62 of 70 
seats in 1885, the Liberals saw tliemselves reduced to 
43, a loss of 19. While the percentage loss was smaller 
in Scotland than in the United Kingdom as a whole (80.5% 
in Scotland, 43% in the U.K.), its effect was more de­
vastating in a psychological sense. The Liberals' as­
sumption of a natural identity witli the whole of tlie 
Scottish nation, a status not seriously called into ques­
tion since the Great Reform Bill was manifestly at an end. 
While the party could continue to regard Scotland, and 
particularly Eastern Scotland, as a vital base of numerical
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strength, tlie days of a political fiefdom were at an 
end. By one reckoning, of course, Scotland was still 
as 'Liberal' in its loyalties as it had ever been? only 
now 'Liberalism' was divided between two branches. After 
all, of the 19 seats won from the Liberals in 1886 only 
two had gone to the Tories and 13 of the 17 Liberal Union­
ist gains had been made by dissident sitting M.P.'s who 
carried their constituencies over with them. Thus not only 
was Scotland to remain a source of considerable Liberal 
Home Rule strength but it also was to prove to be a major 
centre of Liberal Unionist support, supplying over a fifth 
of that caucus in 1886.
Liberalism had maintained itself in Scotland for 
generations as much by a national antipatliy to 'Toryism' 
as by any of its own particular virtues. The revolution 
in Scotland in 1886 was the outflanking of tliis Liberal 
position by the creation of a 'Liberal' opposition party. 
Hio Liberal Unionists could and did claim that it was the 
Home Rulers and not they who were the true 'dissidents' 
and if tile majority of the party had chosen to stand by 
Gladstone, it was the Unionist minority who wore remaining 
loyal to traditional Liberal principles. A Liberal 
Unionist official proclaimed fervently:
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they were the true church .... it was 
they who held those noble Liberal
principles that had been handed down 
from generation to generation of Liberals 
to all Liberal statesmen since the Great 
Reform Bill .... they were prepared (to 
suffer) in support of that ancient creed,
(Col. Montague Hosier, London Sec'ty of Liberal 
Unionism)
The first post-election edition of Dod's reflected this 
interpretation of the Home Rule split, designating the 
Liberal Unionists as "Liberals" and the Gladstonians 
as "Home Rulers", In a nation wedded to "Liberalism", 
this appeal could not have been without effect. Though 
the platform battles were fierce and bitter both strains 
of Liberals remained with the S.L.A. and, as the Stirling 
example shows, within many of the local associations.
(One important effect of this, of course, was to effectively 
paralyse tliese bodies, a considerable handicap to tlie 
Liberal Home Rulers). The suddenness and single mindedness 
of tlie Home Rule split in Scottish Lil^eralism must have 
caused many wavering Liberal voters to consider the 
division a temporary aberration with reunion certain in the 
near future. Thus they could cast a vote for Liberal 
Unionists in the confident belief that they were still 
loyal to the 'national' party.
The division of Scotland within the Unionist alliance 
reflects the strength of the Liberal side of the
t c
58, MoCaffwKy , op. cit. p. 271
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partnership. In 1885, the conservatives had put up
candidates for 59 seats. In 1086, the combined Unionists
challenged in 64 constituencies (counting Dundee always
as two). Of these, Liberal Unionists stood in 47, almost
three times the Tory portion. More revealing is the geo-
59
graphic breakdown. Of the 17 seats the Tories retained 
to fight, all but 4 were in the West? the two Aberdeenshire 
seats, Linlithgow and the semi-western Argyll, Thus of 
the 8 Highland seats, Liberal Unionists took on 7; of the 
34 Eastern seats, which included all 6 left unchallenged, 
the Liberal Unionists took 25 to the Tories' 3, Only in 
tlie west, tlie bedrock of traditional Tory strength was a 
genuine division of responsbility made with tlie Liberal 
Unionists talcing on 15 and the Tories 13. There is no 
precise pattern for the Western allocations but a few in­
dications can be discerned. Automatic support went to 
sitting M.P.'s! all 8 Scottish Tory M.P.'s and the 7 
Liberals v/ho voted against Home Rule, (One unexplained 
shift came when Ernest Noel left Dumfries District to take 
on another sitting M.P., U. C, Bolton in Stirlingshire.
From the Conservative totals of 1885, Noel probably had a 
better chance in Dumfries; 47% in Dumfries, 38% in Stirling­
shire, In any event he lost to Bolton while R. T. Reid 
secured Dumfries for the Liberals with a Tory opponent not
59. I consider the "West" the counties of Galloway
Dumfries, Ayrshire, Renfrewshire, Lanarkshire, 
Including Glasgow and Falkirk Burghs, Dumbarton and
Bute, Ayr Burghs included . both Ayrshire and Argyll
burghs but I have placed it in the West groupings.
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able to Improve his 188S total). Strong candidates from 
either side were allowed to go forv;ard: Baird in Glasgow
Central; Caldwell, who was denied the Liberal nomination 
in 1885 by tlie disestablishcrs, in St. Rollox'and the 
powerful industrialist, Sir Thomas Colebrooke, in Lanark 
North East. In the most general sense, however, Liberal 
Unionists tended to dominate the urban areas, e.g. 6 of 9 
Glasgow nominations whereas Tories tended towards areas of 
rural influence. Most obviously, in industrial Clydeside from 
Greenock, to the Lanarkshire burghs, it was the Liberal 
Unionists who carried the main weight.
As noted above, success for the Unionists at the polls 
oame largely to the Liberal Unionists, The Tory total of 
10 resulted from holding 7 of the 8 1885 seats (Kilmarnock 
Burghs, despite its title, composed largely of industrial 
burghs, like Dumbarton, on the Clyde, went back to the 
Liberals after the fluke results of 1885) and adding 3* 
the Glasgow middle class seats of Glasgow Central zmd 
Renfreïfshire East and the rural Lanark South, These 
meagre gains were in contrast to the Liberal Unionist total 
of 17. Since 13 of these were held by sitting M.P.'s, 
this factor would seem to be the most important 
in the LD^eral Unionist success. Analysis confirms this.
If one considers the 12 constituencies where a L.U. 
carryover followed a Liberal-Tory fight in 1885, it can be
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found that, on average, a swing of 14% away from the Liberals 
and with the IncuniJ^ ent was the result, (Ihe Liberal average 
falling from 61% to 47%), In contrast if one looks at 
the 18 constituencies which had Liberal-Tory contests in
1885 but Home Rule incumbents facing Liberal Unionists in 
1886, the result was an average decline of only 6% in the 
Liberal vote, (A fall from 62% to 56%), It should be 
noted that both of these groupings show a reasonable 
sample between East and West, urban and rural. Further if 
the 17 seats contested by Conservatives in 1886 are studied, 
the decline in the Liberal vote is found to be close to
the 6% found in the Liberal Unionist contests. Clearly the 
most important factor in carrying over Liberal votes into 
Unionism was personal identification with a sitting member.
The Home Rule issue itself - which did not distinguish 
between Tory Unionism and Liberal Unionism - was good for 
a general boost of about 6% without regard to label; 
whereas, on average, a shift of the member could add another 
8%, Therefore it was not enough to simply pick a label to gain 
an advantage. Consequently, this dependence on personalities 
already identified as "Liberals" may have been one of the 
causes of Liberal Unionism's inability to build on their
1886 success.
After 1885, the Liberals had a complete grip on the 
34 scats of the East and divided the 8 Highland seats with 
their radical fringe, the Crofters, Only the West was a
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true point of party conflict, with the Tories holding 
on to 8 of tlie 28 seats and doing well in an appréciais le 
number of otliers.
Tills regional pattern was altered only in degree in 
1886. The Liberal-Crofters lost three seats in the High­
lands, Arq/11, Invernessshire and Inverness Dist., the 
latter two on L.U. M.P. carry overs, Tlie Unionists were 
always in the future to have considerably more strength in 
the Southern Highlands than in the North.
Tlie Eastern region hardly yielded as a phalanx of 
Liberal strength. Liberal Unionists did pick up 6 of the 
34 constituencies but 4 of these, Elliot in Roxburghshire, 
Barclay in Forfarshire, Buchanan in Edinburgh West and Currie 
in Perthshire West were carried over. (St. Andrews Burghs 
was won H. T, Anstruther, the son of Sir Robert Anstruther 
who had voted against Horae Rule.) Both Roxburghshire and 
Forfarshire were won by small margins on very large swings,
18% and 30%, respectively? almost certainly due to the per­
sonality factor. Both returned to the Liberal fold in 1892,
The real revolution was concentrated in the West. From 
20, the Liberal total dropped to 10, bîius switching their 
position with tlie former opposition who now became dominant. 
The traditional Toryism of the West, the conservative and 
imperial outlook of establisliraont Liberalism on the Clyde 
and the special potency of the Irish issue came together 
in great strength for the Unionists. Tlie character of the 
Liberal holdouts was revealing: the Lowland burghs of
Dumfries Dist,, Kilmarnock Dist, and Paisley; the working
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class Glasgow seats of Blackfriars, Camlachie, Bridgeton, 
(College, held narrowly, was middle class); and the indus­
trial sections of Lanarkshire, North West, North East and 
Mid. Tlie L.U. M.P.s who fell below their colleagues in 
average carryover from the Liberals were Sutherland of 
Greenock ( 8 % ) Corbett of Tradeston (12%) and Sellar of 
Partick (12%) - all in the industrial belt. Thus, though the oc­
casional. urban radical Unionists, like Caldwell might spring 
up, Western Unionism was rooted in the counties and the 
suburbs, The best evidence of tiie extreme division of
Scotland into West and East is that while the Liberals took
20 Scottish seats with a total share of the vote in each
case of over 58%, none were in the West, three were
Crofters and the other 17 in the East, Midlanark with 57% 
was the highest in the West.
Always a wayward factor, the Irish vote was again 
important in 1886. After the alliance with Toryism in 
1885, the Irish returned to their traditional Liberal 
loyalties in 1885, going against the general trend and com­
plicating the pattern. The only seat to show a large 
Liberal gain was Lanarkshire North Nest where the swing 
to the Liberals was an extraordinary 9%. According to 
Kinnear^^ this constituency had the highest concentration 
of Irish Catholics in Scotland, perhaps up to 25%. In the
60. Palling suggests that Greenock could never decide 
between Ireland and Free Trade, p. 397
61. Kinnear op. cit. p. 130
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three other seats in which the Liberal share rose 
(Dumfries Burghs 3%, Lanark N,E. 1%, Duirtbartonshire 1%) 
all had Irish Catholic populations in excess of 12%
(12%, 18%, 13%)„ However, this is to be contrasted with 
the fact that of the 27 seats with a Catholic population 
over 9% the Unionists won 17 and the Liberals 10 while 
of the 43 others, the Liberals won 34 and the Unionists 9. 
One obvious outside factor was the much heavier concen­
tration of Irish in the West of Scotland where many other 
forces worked against the Liberals. Kinnear notes that the 
swing away from the Liberals was greatest in tliose con­
stituencies vdiich had a Catholic population of between 3%
and 10%. The trend was much more favourable towards the
62Liberals both nbove and below that level. " He suggests 
that the 3-10 level was sufficient to provoke a stronger 
anti-Home Rule vzave than usual without beinc al'jle to raatch 
it in return. Above 10% , the Irish vote swamped any back­
lash and less than 3% was too small to create one.
Sutmary
There was little sign of any bond of sympathy between 
the Scottish and the Irish nation. On the contrairy, 
religious differences, Scotland's ties to Ulster, fears 
of further indigent Irish immigration, threats to commercial 
and financial interests in Ireland and defence consid­
erations all combined to create a climate of considerable 
hostility.
62. ibid. p. 18
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During the early months of 1886, the mood of Scotland 
was one of uncertain expectancy. The parliamentary vote to 
defeat the Tory government suggested both the division that 
was to come in Liberal ranks and a tendency amongst the 
Scottish caucus to cling somewhat longer to their faitli in 
Gladstone despite increasing doubts. Scottish party opinion 
outside of the caucus was apprehensive and nervous.
The release of the Home Rule measures had a cat­
aclysmic effect on the party. The suffering was parti­
cularly severe in Scotland where party links had been 
notably close and socially broad. The net effect was to 
destroy the remains of the "national* character of the 
Victorian party and to align politics much closer to class 
division. While the alienation of the "moderates’ of the 
West led in part to the future strength of Liberal Unionism 
there, it would be false to suggest any direct parallel in 
support for the Irish issue. Despite the fervent hope of 
many prominent Liberals in Scotland that the schism would 
prove temporary once Horae Rule was disposed of, the close 
links between the Unionists and tîie Tories drove an un­
bridgeable gulf into the ranks.
In Scotland, the force of the electoral battle occurred 
between the two Liberal factions and was bitterly single- 
minded in the extreme. Tlie most frequently used Unionist 
weapon was that of open appeals to antl-irish and anti- 
Cathollc prejudice. The Home Rulers could appeal only to
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’morality’ and an acceptance of 'reality'. Tlie re was no 
room left for the oldest and most potent base of Liberal 
support - an appeal to self-interest. Consequently, tlie 
Liberals were left at a severe disadvantage.
The results of the election created a new political 
landscape in Scotland that would endure until the First 
World War. The Liberal losses in Scotland were as massive
as in any other part of the United Kingdom but they differed 
in a way significant for the future. The bulk of seats lost 
to Unionism went to sitting Liberal Unionists, thus leaving 
a country, at least, in one sense, still "Liberal". This 
was the final tribute to the endurance of Scottish Liberal­
ism: it could only be defeated by the creation of a
* Liberal' opposition party.
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(a) Organizational Reconstruction
The framework of a single Scottish Liberal Association,
enbracing hoiâx Homo Rulers and Unionists survived until
October 1886. However, the angry mood of vengenc© amongst
the radicals was not to bo denied and the efforts of Elgin,
in particular, to preserve the S.L.A. as a vehicle of
future reconciliation, were doomed to failure. Those few
Unionists still in touch with the organization, such as
Rbbert Cathcart, stressed that their remaining in the
Association was completely dependent on a continuing ban on
discussion of the Irish question. However, at the first
meeting of the S.L.A. after the election, the radicals forced
through a resolution in support of Gladstone's Irish policy.
Ohe Unionists instantly resigned and cut their last links
with the party.
In the ashes of 1886, the Scottish leadership had 
to turn to reconstruction. The chief organizational leaders 
at this time were Lord Elgin, chairman of the S.L.A. and 
Edward Marjoribanks, the Scottish whip, Elgin's position 
was curious I undemonstrative yet of the first importance.
One of the tiny band of Scottish aristocrats who remained 
loyal to Liberalism after 1886, and preferring to reside in 
Scotland rather than a detested London, he supplied Scottish 
Liberalism with a prestigious and respected resident focus 
which it would otherwise have lacked. His impartiality in
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organisational matters, in keeping with his care and con­
cern for the Liberal 'family* of Scotland, marked him as 
a Whig of the very highest tradition. Marjoribanks was, 
like Elgin, a member of the Eastern Scottish social elite 
but unlike Elgin, he did not hesitate to throw his weight 
about in party disputes. He displayed a strong and active 
opposition to both Scottish Home Rule and the Scottish 
Liberal Imperialists.
The Liberals were particularly fortunate in 
managing to retain the loyally' of many of their leading 
officials and organizers. J. P. Macdougall had pronounced 
conservative views but stayed with the party as did G.O.T. 
Omond. Enough of these veterans remained to supply the 
Scottish Liberals with a vital etrengtîi of experience and 
to allow the weakened traditional leadership to keep the 
radicals from entering the controlling circles of the party:
Macdougall will made a good secretary if 3tept 
within certain lines, he has energy and 
knowledge while Omond and Sollîirk would pro­
vide the prudence and tact in which he may 
be lacking,^
Marjoribanks hoped that the consequence of the defeat of 
1886 would provide enough preoccupation to prevent the 
radicals from seizing their improved opportunities:
We may have some trouble in keeping A, L, Brown 
and Co. quiet but for the first eighteen months 
the association should have plenty to do organi* 
zing itself.2
1. Marjoribanks to Elgin Nov. 21, 1886 Elgin MSS
2. Marjoribanks to Elgin Dec. 16, 1886 Elgin MSS
138
Much more worrying was tlie growth of Scottish Home Rule
(S.H.R.) feelings "The only real rook I sea aliead is this
3Scottish Home Rule Association." 
b) The Scottish Home Rule Movement
It was not surprising that Gladstone's Irish pro­
posals should have triggered a movement in Scotland seeking 
equal treatment. "Home Rule for Scotland" never came to 
dominate Scottish politics as the cliuroh issue had done but 
for some years it was to be an important and highly con­
tentious issue, h Scottish Homo Rule Association was founded 
in 1886 to become the leading extraparliamentary pressure 
organization. An earlier movement in the 1850's had dis­
solved in the exci tcm. nt of the Crimean War. Rosebory had 
played a major role in the resuscitation of nationalist 
feeling in the 1870's and 1880's. Nationalist ideas did 
not seem to follow any of the ideological lines of previous 
controversies though one of S.E.R's strongest supporters 
was the radical M.P., Dr. G. B. Clark, the author of the 
first S.H.R. resolution in Parliament in 1887, Sympathizers 
with S.H.R. included such establishment figures as Rosebery, 
Canpbell-Bannerman and Munro-Ferguson. The opposition to 
S.H.R. was equally diverse, including, most notably, 
Marjoribanks, Haldane and Bryce.
Gladstone and his closest follwyers on the Irish 
question, like Bryce and John Morley, saw S.H.R. as the 
thin end of a federal wedge which could only hurt
3. Marjoribanks to Elgin Nov. 29, 1886 Elgin MSS
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Gladstone's Irish crusade. Bryce expressed these fears:
What I hear from Scotland regarding this so- 
called Scottish Home Rule movement gives 
great cause for much uneasiness .... it is 
likely to divide the Liberal Party in Scotland 
more seriously than the Irish issue .... it 
can hardly fail to prejudice the Irish question 
in the minds of Englishmen because it will 
point not to sucli a solution as the bill of 
last spring but to a reconstruction of the 
British constitution on a federal basis ....
The bare idea of such a change will affright per­
sons who might be willing to let Ireland have 
such a legislature as you have proposed and 
may seriously retard a settlement of the Irish 
difficulties .... 4
Gladstone, himself, assumed tliat the Scots would quickly 
dismiss the idea:
I have not as yet heard any facts to lead
me to suppose the Home Rule movement in 
Scotland likely to take a dangerous shape 
but perhaps you ha* more .... X decline 
to admit as a postulate that there is to 
be equal treatment for the tliree countries 
I feel every certainty that Scotland will 
malce up her mind quickly and certainly .... 
a Home Rule Parliament for England would be 
too absurd. ^
Bryce conceded Scotland's special needs but felt they 
could be adequately satisfied by innovations short of 
a disruption of Parliament:
Speaking as a Scotsman, I cannot see that 
Scotland has any need of a separate legis­
lature " a Scotch Grand Committee with a 
relegation of private bills to some extra- 
parliamentary tribunal would meet all she has 
to complain of ....&
4. Bryce to Gladstone Nov. 29, 1886 Bryce MSS 11
5. Gladstone to Bryce Nov. 30, 1886 Bryce MSS 10
6. Bryce to Gladstone Nov,' 29, 1886 Bryce MSS 10
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In 1888, he was to give strong support to efforts to
7establish just suoh a Grand Committee. Very signif­
icantly, Bryce revealed the traditional Scottish ambition 
to establish and maintain influence in fields wider and 
more profitable than those of his homeland.
it would be a loss to both countries for 
Scotchmen not to have a voice in specifically 
English legislation.®
The rising note of intense defensiveness amongst those 
who opposed S.H.R, sprang in part from a fearful appreci­
ation that the federal argument was developing an internal 
insistence of its own, apart from tlae efforts of its ad­
vocates. Even Bryce conceded that it was "logically strong". 
Any proposal that offered semi-autonomy to Ireland alone 
seemed, within the context of the United Kingdom structure, 
to be fundamentally unsound. The 1886 Bill's proposal of 
a Dublin Parliament of limited power, and a Westminster 
Parliament closed to Irish representation and retaining 
Imperial powers was unsatisfactory to all sides. The 
proposal that would re-emerge in 1893, that of Irish 
representatives at Westminster being empowered to rule 
on Scottish and English local affairs while the represen­
tatives of those countries were forbidden to interfere in 
Ireland, was little better. The only satisfactory settle­
ment was equal treatment for all - which meant either the
9
7. Bryce to Gladstone March 5, 1888 Bryce MSS 12
8. Bryce to Gladstone Nov. 29, 1886 Bryce MSS 10
9. Bryce to Campbell-Bannerman Dec. 16, 1886 CB
t4SS 41211
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status quo, full breakup of the Union or federalism.
ÎÎ16 efforts of the S.H.R.A. to push not only for Scottish 
Hcane Rule but for a full federal plan was dis concerting 
to Gladstoniana like Bryce;
I am sorry to say that the accounts from 
Scotland are far from satisfyihg. The 
Scottish Home Rule movement has not remained 
in the stage of a mere expression of a wish 
for greater and even better local self- 
government but now has taken shape in the 
specific demand for a "Pairliament sitting 
regularly in Scotland to deal with all 
specifically Scottish questions, together with 
a Scottish executive, responsible to the 
Scottish parliament and the crown." .... this 
plan .... would probably transform the 
British Constitution by making it Federal 
will alienate many (in England) .... while 
the (1886) Bill did not propose to keep 
the Irish numbers at Westminister, the 
proposal of the Scotch Home Rulers is to give 
Scotland both her own Parliament and repre­
sentation in the Imperial Parliament which 
would become a supreme Federal Council for 
the Three Kingdoms, England also receiving 
a separate parliament of her own."10
Bryce's opposition to federalism may well have been in­
fluenced by his deep interest in American affairs. The 
American Civil War, which was not a distant memory in 
1866, seemed to offer the lesson that federal structures 
with substantial devolution of power from the centre could 
lead to sectional conflict and political dismemberment. 
Bryce felt that the situation in Scotland required the 
exercise of the G.O.H.'s unmatched influence:
10, Bryce to Gladstone Dec. 22, 1886 Bryce MSS 11
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most of the Scotch meirilDers in London 
whom I have seen are alarmed at the pro­
gress of til© agitation but I dotbt if 
this authority is onou^ to stop it.
Tliey think, however, that an opinion from
you that (S.H.R.) is premature, to say
the least .... would have great influence ....
Pour years later# even after the strength of the movement 
had waxed still further, Bryce continued to put the 
greatest faith in Gladstone's influence in Scotland;
I continue to believe that Mr. Gladstone's 
authority will be sufficient to induce nine- 
tentlis of the Scottish radicals to let us deal
with Ireland s e p a r a t e l y . ^2
The question of S.H.R, continued to simmer through the 
next two* years feeding on a feeling of neglect in the 
country at large and, within the caucus, on tlie continuing 
difficulties of attempting Scottish legislation in an 
English-dominated legislature. Scotland's difficulties were 
not caused by enmity or obstruction so much as by lar;k 
of attention. % e  often incomprehensible nature of Scottish 
legal and Church affairs helped foster this condition.
The frustrations of reform-minded Scottish M.P.s were 
expressed by Leonard Lye 11, M.P. for Orkney and Shetland;
I fear it will not be easy to get the necessary 
reforms carried (on a legal reform). Parlia­
ment seems very shy of Scotch law questions 
of which it understands very little and there­
fore has to accept any measure on trust in
the proposer ' s word .,..
11. Bryce to Gladstone Dec, 22, 1Ô86 Bryce MSS 11
12. Bryce to Rosebery Jan. 10, 1090 Rosebery MSS
Box 64
13. Lyell to C.-B. Feb. 12, 1889 C.-B, MSS 41233
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Moreover, deep resentment was created by the continuing pat­
tern of a Unionist (English) majority outvoting the 
Scottish majority (Liberal) in the House on specifically 
Scottish questions. Gladstone attempted to counter the 
use of these points as arguments for S.H.R.;
the moment that we declare for Horae Rule in 
Scotland, we are open to the observation that 
such a question as that of licencing ought to 
stand over for the consideration of a Scottish 
legislature .... (throwing) into arrear and into 
the shade every other Scottish question on which 
the national opinion of Scotland is entitled to 
bear sway.
However, by this time, the movement in Scotland was
rapidly gaining ground. Childers, who sat for an Edinburgh
constituency, spoke of the increasing pressure on him to
15declare for the "Federal Idea". Roseber^r suggested that
"a scheme approximate to the federal principle would serve
to reunite and rehearten the Liberal ranks still "bewildered
IGas to the scheme of 1886." Bryce thought S.H.R. was 
slipping but admitted that everyone else in Scotland 
"answered tliat in their opinion the idea was gaining ground 
and that the demand could not be resisted, %is is the 
belief of Campbell-Bannerman and Childers and apparently 
also of Marjoribanks who also doesn't like the movement at 
a l l ___
14. Himsard April 9, 1889
15, D. Hamer Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and 
Rosebery Oxford 1972 p. 159
16, ibid. p. 158-9
17. Bryce to Rosebery Jan. 10, 1890 Rosebery Î4SS Box 64
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Vîhat was developing in Scotland was essentially a 
struggle bettmen' tlios© who took the long view and those 
who took a short one, Tiaose who sided with Gladstone, in 
opposition to the idea of concentrated on demanding
a simple and uncomplicated focus on Ireland. For the aging 
Gladstone, the 'old man in a hurry", a sense of urgency 
forïDado him from taJcing on any encumbering burdens just 
at tlie moment whentthe Piggott affair seemed to have 
delivered a final triumph into his hands. On the other 
hand, the desire for S.H.R, sprang from nationalist griev­
ances, a lesser commitment to the cause of the Irish and, 
for some, a distant projection of a federal Britain as a 
blueprint for a federal Erftpire, Some like, characteris­
tically, Campbell-Bannerman, could appreciate the strength 
of both sides:
My contention is that it is only by local 
parliament and local executives in each 
of the three kingdoms that we can settle 
Homo Rule at all, and on the whole although 
there will be difficulties, the advantages 
outweigh them. The argument put forward by 
John Morley in Edinburgh - "where should We 
English Liberals be without the help of you 
Scotchmen?" is surely a rum sort of argument 
in the mouth of a Hcxne Ruler .... I am there­
fore.; ready (but not anxious) for it: and my
experience is that everywhere I go the body of 
a meeting favours Scotch Home Rule and I meet 
no complaints against it. It is not a doctrine 
imposed on the people for our own purposes but 
a genuine growth of popular opinion ...* (but)
I think we should deprecate tlie idea of com­
plicating the Irish question by a simultaneous 
demand for Scotch Home Rule .... but one will 
follotf the otlier as sure as eggs is eggs. It
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should b© pointed out that Scotch Home Rule 
involves English Home Rule and that not one 
in a thousand Englishmen has ever grasped the 
idea of having a local parliament as apart 
from the Imperial Parliament so that Hootch 
Home Rule must wait until the sluggish mind 
of John Bull is educated up that point,
The cause of Scottish Home Rule had a particular 
importance for a group of influential Scots witli ramifi­
cations far beyond simple nationalisms Tlie Liberal 
Imperialists, The establishment of a federal structure 
throughout the United Kingdom appealed not only to tlie 
nationalist impulses of Rosebery and Ferguson but also, 
and more importantly, to a wider theme, the extension of 
federalism to the British empire. These ideas had been 
flowering in Rosebery's mind soon after the Hawarden Kite 
opened tlie floodgate of 'Home Rule' thought:
I cannot understand people -preferring sep­
aration to Home Rule,I detest separation 
and feel nothing could make me agree to it.
HcHne Rule, however 1b a necessity for both 
us and tlie Irish, They will have it within 
two years at the latest. Scotland will follow, 
tlien England. Vfhen that is accomplisliod, Imperial 
Federation will cease to be a dream. To many 
of us, it is hot a dream now but to no one 
will it be a dream tlien.^
Ferguson, in particular, took up the S.H.R, tlieme with 
enthusiasm with the intention of linking it to a larger 
scheme t
18. Caii^ be 11-Bannerman to D, Crawford Nov, 19, 1889 
Campbell-Bannerman MSS 41233
19, Rosebery to C.-B Dec. 23, 1885 quoted in Crevyo 
op. cit. p. 124
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Wo had a long discussion on Scotiish Home 
Rule at Loith, some of my people are extreme. 
Many say what are the use of Imperial Politics 
to uso All we want is to be able to do as we 
like with la\7S that affect our everyday lives,
I have not heard the way to upset this arguraent 
,,,, still I got on very well along Imperial 
Federation lines and sticking to the position 
of Scotland in the United K i n g d o m . 20
Ferguson's commitments soon brought him to an internal 
party clash :
I have put down a Scots Home Rule amendment 
for which Bryce has violently attacked me,21
Even as the elections approached, Ferguson's interest 
grew:
Scotch Home Rule has gtown very fast .... 
some new system (is demanded) . I mean to 
go for it as much for Imperial Federation
as for Scotland.22
In the years to follow the growth of these ideas wcis to 
have tlie profoundsst effect on tlie course of the Liberal 
Party,
c) The Rise of Working Class Issues
Beneath the preoccupation with the constitutional
question, other new concerns were quietly forcing them­
selves upon the Scottish Liberals. Having lost the bulk of 
its upper class support and now largely dependent on the 
support of working class voters, the Liberal Party was
20. Ferguson to Rosebery Jan. 18, 1892 Rosebery MSS
10018
21. Ferguson to Rosebery Feb. 10, 1892 Rosebery MSS
10018
22. Ferguson to Rosebery April 27, 1892 Rosebery MSS
10018
147
forced, with noticeable reluctance to turn towards social 
and working class issues. At the same time, the grcn’J'th of 
Trade Unionism and socialism in the 1880*g was generating 
the extraparliamentary movement and awareness that pre­
viously had been lacking,
TliG regional patterns of support created in Scotland 
by the 1886 election had a considerable effect on the 
receptiveness of the party to social politics. In the West 
of Scotland, as in England, Liberal representation had been 
reduced almost entirely to urbanised working-class districts, 
On the other hand. Liberalism in tlie non-indus trial East 
continued to be dominated by a naturally more conservative 
section of society. However, the Western representation 
in the party failed to reflect these new realities? even 
more than the East, it stood for a politics irretrievably 
fixed in an earlier age, Tlie most common type of Western 
Liîaeral, both in Parliament and out were the old middle 
class radicals like Sir Charles Cameron, Stephen Williamson 
and A, D, Provand, linked to commercial interests, generally 
unreceptive to the claims of labour and still spiritually 
committed to tlie fading causes of disestablishment and 
temperance. Genuine social radicalism was rare witliin the 
Liberal caucus. Only four of its members between 1886 and 
1892 could make claim to it: Dr, Robert Wallace, M.P. for
Edinburgh East? J* H. Dalziel from Kirkcaldy Burghs? Dr,
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Clark of Caithness and, most colourfully, Keir Hardie*s 
close friend, R. B, Cunnlngham-Graliaine of Lanark North- 
West. However, for all tîieir radicalism, none of tlie se 
Liberals were in any way working class or directly connected 
to labour movements (Cunningham-Grahame was, to a limited 
degree, an exception to this). The two most prominent 
Scottish lalDour men. Hardi© and John Burns, were both 
forced to make their way into Parliament by way of seats in 
England. The Mid-Lanark by-election of 1883 was dramatic 
evidence of the antipathy held by the old-style middle 
class-dominated local associations for working class candi­
dates. Hardie's treatment at the hands of the local associ­
ation, an almost contemptuous brush-off, in spite of the 
pressure exerted by the physical presence of Schnadhorst, 
up from London, was all too typical. In 1889, Marjoribanks, 
the Scottish lihip persuaded John Burns to withdraw from
Dundee, defusing anotlier conflict, and secured for him a
23clear run in Battersea, As a result of the Mid-Lanark 
affair, Schnadhorst had promised Hardi.e a safe seat else­
where in Scotland, After dealing witli Burns, Marjoribanks 
negotiated with Hardie and his Scottish Labour Party to 
give tliem three seats but all these promises came to naught 
when the Scottish local associations rebelled and re­
pudiated the agreement. In 1892, Munro-Ferguson tried to 
take a direct hand in promoting a working-man as a Scottish 
Liberal candidate. He commended to Rosebery:
23. Barker op. cit, p. 135
1&9
.... John Holburn, a tin-plate worker, 
from Newcastle) who ought to be in 
Parliament, X should like to bring him 
to you some day. If you give any money 
help to the party again, I don't tliinJc 
you would do better than give to this 
man .... he is just what is n e e d e d . ^4
However, the paternalism evident in tliis latter hardly 
marked Holburn as a Hardie-style candidate. Indeed 
Ferguson a c k n o w l e d g e d  this to Rosebery:
The "Labour Party" may give trouble 
.... Holburn is the old stamp of Union
man 25
Ferguson's only quibble was Holburn*s nationality; "Too 
many English over the border all rea%." In any event, 
even this sort of very diluted approach had no effect 
when Holburn was rejected by the relatively radical con­
stituency of Kirkcaldy Burghs. Thus, without any "Lib- 
Lab” element and an industrial representation tied to 
an out of step traditional radicalism without social 
concerrif;, the Scottish Liberal Party was left in a dang­
erously weak position on its left flank. Curiously, one 
effort to remedy this defect was to come from a section of 
the Scottish Party which, by some estimates, would come to 
represent its 'right* flank: the Liberal Imperialists,
The "Lib-Imps", as they came to be known, were a 
loosely bound group of young Liberals belonging to the
24 Ferguson to Rosebery Jan. 18, 1892 Rosebery MSS 
10018
25, Ferguson to Rosebery Feb. 19, 1892 Rosebery MSS 
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East of Scotland social and intellectual elite. Not all 
of tliem were wealthy: Haldane and Asquith had to live off
the earnings of their legal practice. Nor was Asquith even 
a Scot. But long before they entered into formal organi­
zation in the late 1890's, this group, centred about the 
Firth of Forth, were distinctively set apart from the 
rest of Scottish Liberalism. Ambitious and unsatisfied 
with a Liberalism chained to tlie endless tunnel of Ireland, 
tliey searched in a number of directions for a new basis to 
resuscitate a Liberalism gone flat and stale. The most 
striking thing about these efforts was the intellectualism dis­
played. They sought not merely riev? issues but an entire 
new plan and philosophy, which eventually evolved into an 
attempted merger of social politics and Imperialism,
Some like Haldane were evidently more concerned with 
the domestic aspect of tliis combination while others, 
like Rosebery focused more on overseas concerns but both 
factors remained intrinsic to the general scheme,
"Imperialism" implied a return to Palraerstonian foreign 
policy and an emphasis on the future of Imperial Federation. 
Home Rule All-Round, as the groundwork of a wider fed­
eralism, was to serve to harness nationalist opinion in 
Scotland and Wales as well as pacifying Ireland, This 
grandiose scheme, however, required a concrete domestic 
base: "The best way to have a strong hand in Foreign
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Affairs is to be as advanced as possible at This
judgement might be characterized as liberalized "Bismarck
ianism": satisfying domestic wants in order to retain a free
hand aJoroad, It is questionable just how far the "Lib-
Imps" were prepared to go in order to be "advanced". To a
large extent their interest was motivated by a negative
fear of full-blooded "socialism". In order to seize the
new political high ground of pressing urban social problems,
they realized that the Liberal Party would have to move in
advance of the revolutionaries. Then, as now, "socialism"
was an ambiguous word claimed by Marxists, by traditional
radicals like Harcourt and even by Rosebery who once refer-
27red to himself as a "committed socialist". Benignly, it 
could mean a simple concern for social questions; more 
commonly it was coming to mean something more menacing, 
Ferguson tried to integrate this desire to "dish" the Marx­
ists into his growing belief in the need for a federal 
structure. "(At Westminster, Scottish) social questions are
not properly grappled with, leading to a serious growth 
on
of socialism".
The impact of Henry George and his 'single tax' ideas 
had made the question of urban land valuation of major 
interest for social radicals, Haldane began developing
26, Ferguson to Rosebery Jan. 28, 1892 Rosebery MSS
10018
27, Ferguson to Rosebery Aug. 18, 1887 Rosebery MSS
looi?
28, Ferguson to Rosebery March 16, 1887 Rosebery MSS
10017
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ideas to curb land speculation, to put vacant sites to 
use and to empower local authorities to acquire land com­
pulsorily . Ferguson attempted to inject some of these 
ideas into a Scottish local government bill in 1889,
R. T. Reid moved a motion on May 6, 1890 contending that 
local authorities be allowed to acquire land by order.
(But, as Barker notes, Reid did not belong to the Haldane 
'inner' group and hence received little support from that 
quarter.Ho^^ever, the traditional radicals of West 
Scotland led by Andrew Provand fought such ideas as dang­
erous and attempted to reduce the policy to one of an ad-
30
justment of rates.
I»al30ur provided the other main field of interest for 
the social radicals. As early as 1887, Ferguson was dis­
playing a eager concern for the problems of trader un ion i sm and 
working men in Scotland, though his "education", under the 
influence of Haldane and through him, the Fabians, was 
never very profound. He enthused on the si%bject to 
Rosebery:
The vote on the regulation of hours of labour 
to eight was interesting. You should have 
heard the discussion. I- did not know the 8 hours 
movement had gone so far in Scotland nor that 
the English unions were so much better organ­
ized than ours. I voted against the proposed 
clause but the West of Scotland miners deserve 
great sympathy. You should say sometliing about 
this subject at Airdrie. Drink is at the bottom
29. Barker op. cit. p. 187
30. ilDid, p. 187
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of most of the mischief in Lanarkshire, 
where there is a lot of Irish and floating 
cheap labour with a few very powerful coal 
masters like the Bairds.
The weakness of Scottish trade unions referred to by 
Ferguson, which had plagued Keir Hardie's organizing 
efforts in Lanarkshire, as well as being one cause of the 
thin support he received in Mid-Lanark in 1888, continued 
to concern Ferguson in years following:
The reason they gave me in Lanarkshire why 
the miners' unions did not exist there was 
that Catholic and Protestant cantonkerous- 
uess stopped tiiem.^ 2
The rising tide of interest in social issues within 
the Liberal Party reached a peàîc of sorts in 1891 and it 
had a particular and sometimes contradictory effect in 
Scotland, A protracted strike by tdie railwaymen of Scotland 
was large in the public mind in the winter of 1890-91, At 
stake was the recognition of tlie union and, much more im­
portantly, persistent compulsory demands by the companies 
for excessive working houars to a degree which threatened 
public safety. The situation made a large impression in 
Parliament: even Harcourt was moved to condemn the railway
companies. However, the real breakthrough for lal:our came 
when the eminently moderate and respected C.-B, spoke at 
Falkirk, giving great sympathy and support to the cause of 
the strikers. The 'fall-out' from this action was prime 
evidence of tdie difficulties Hi at a Liberal Party, seeking
31, Ferguson to Rosebery Aug. 18, 1887 Rosebery MSS 10017
32. Ferguson to Rosebery Nov. 7, 1891 Rosebery MSS 10018
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lower class support but dominated by elite figures, could
invite upon itself. Lord Elgin, though not a hard-line
conservative, was a menher of the board of the North British
Railway Company and wrote in some heat to C.-B., rebuking
him and calling his attention to acts of violence ccanmitted by
the strikers against property and strikebreakers. C.-B.'s
reply is indicative not only of the atmosphere of 1891 but
also the special qualities that raised him above the
ordinary Scottish Liberal:
You somewhat misapprehend my view when you 
imply that I take tlie men's side in the sense 
of approving of all that they have done .... 
the general desire of the men for easier hours 
was not a sudden or malicious idea but had ex­
isted for a long time and had attracted general 
public sympathy .... it was a nonsense for the 
companies to refuse to recognize the union .... 
there is no party in question in all this but at 
a public meeting dealing with the public questions 
of the hour, X could hardly pass by witliout notice, 
the one subject of acute interest throughout 
Scotland at this moment,
In the autumn of 1891, Haldane and Sydney Webb failed 
to move the English W.L.F, to place the leading labour 
question of the hour, an eight hour day for miners, on the 
Newoastlo Programme, Judging from tlie record of Scottish 
Liberals in dealing with the labour movement, especially 
their treatment of Hardie three years earlier, there was no 
reason to suppose that the Scottish rank and file would 
react any differently from their English colleagues. Indeed, 
in 1889, a regional conference of the North Eastern
33. C.-B, to Elgin Jan. 23, 1891 Elgin MSS
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Scottish Liberals treated with contempt a resolution 
backing the miners c a u s e . Y e t  in October 1891, the 
S.L.A,, meeting in conference in Glasgow gave strong ap­
proval to the regulation of hours in mines.
Thus, tlie complexities of Scottish reaction to social 
issues becomes evident. The long-standing antipathy to 
labour in Scotland endured while the same men could back 
the miners* greatest cause, Tlie relative unimportance of 
S.L.A. resolutions and the character of the radicals who 
dominated the conference does not simplify matters. The 
elite, which held real power, was divided between personal 
Interests such as Elgin's, the intellectual flirtations of 
the Roseberyites and the plain common sense justice of 
Campbel1-Bannerman.
In contrast to this confused picture, anotlier aspect 
of radicalism v/as becoming crystal clear. That traditional 
hobby-horse of Liberal radicalism, disestablishment, 
triumphed within the party in 1891 and was formally adopted 
as party policy. As early as 1888, a majority of the 
caucus had come to pledge themselves to tlie measure. Yet, 
these events, which would have convulsed and driven the 
party into self-destruction in 1885, passed off with only a 
minimum of interest. Only the leaders of the dissenting 
churolies made much of it. In short, disestablishment was 
returned to the long and tiresome queue of Liberal 'fads',
34, Barker op. cit. p. 147
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a millstone on the party and ignored by most, 
a) The Parnell Divorce Case and Consequences
Ho^ irever, despite "Newcastle" and the hopes and efforts
of those like Haldane, all otlier questions continued to
pale before the problem of Ireland, Liberal fortunes had
seemed to have been utterly crushed by the damning 'evidence* 
of the Piggott letters published in early 1887. Macdougall 
had reported bleakly:
It is constantly stated and witli apparently some 
autliority that Mr, Gladstone's policy is making 
great progress in Scotland. I don't think there 
is much ground for this assertion .... much  ^
antipathy to tlie Parnellites and their ways.
Michelstown and the'Plan of Campaign' raised temperatures 
in Ireland on both sides. In this atmosphere, the exposure 
of Piggott's fraud in 1889 sent Gladstone's support as high 
as it had been low two years before. Cruelly, the wheel 
came full circle, again, on Nov. 17, 1890 when Parnell 
failed to contest the O'Shea divorce action. The reaction 
of the English Victorian middle class non-conformists, who 
bulked so large in the support of the Liberal Party, in 
rejecting any further links with Parnell was matched by 
the Presbyterians of Scotland:
Tlie feeling amongst our people in Scotland 
is veri^  strong against Parnell remaining as 
the recognized head of his party. There is 
here a strong undercurrent of distrust of the 
Irish character and this recent exposure 
ensures it .... whether they are right or 
wrong, my belief is that tlie Scotch will
35. Macdougall to Rosebery May 12, 1887 Rosebery MSS 
10092
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not tolerate Parnell in his position of 
quasi"partnership with Liberal leaders ....
In the final cutting blow, Parnell^in an attempt to 
rescue his position in Ireland^ turned on Gladstone with 
accusations of perfidy, C.B.'s anger was vented at 
Dumfries on December 17, 1890s
Mr, Parnell has shown by his actions that he 
is unfit to be a leader of a political party 
.... an unblushing attempt to employ for the 
Interests of his own personal cause those fires 
of racial animosity between peoples of the two 
islands which it has been the prayer of the 
best men of the three countries to assuage 
and extinguish,37
The Parnell episode seemed to bring to the surface a
sour weariness in a public fed to the teeth with Ireland,
An air of almost fatalistic calm seemed to come over
Scotland as the elections of 1892 approached, Ferguson's
letters to Rosebery took on an increasingly energetic tone
but remained fundamentally pessimistic. Accurately, he
predicted: "I do not at present give us a more than 20
30
majority with the Irish". At tliis time the English
39headquarters were complacently expecting at least 100, 
Ferguson's summatJ on the situation was prescient: "There
is not great confidence in the government. There is not 
quite enough in us
36, Wilson op, cit. p. 105, C,B, to Earcount Nov, 20, 
1890
37, Ibid, p, 106
38, Ferguson to Rosebery Jan. 9, 1892 Rosebery MSS
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e) The Campaign of 1892
In 1892, Liberals in Scotland,continued to find 
tliemselVQS chained to Hie Irish issue. All the old 
arguments and abuse of 1886 were again rolled out by both 
sides. The Liberals suffered from having committed their 
specific proposals to paper. Whereas Unionists could 
smooHi over their ideas with generalities, Liberals had to 
stand or fall on each comma and period of the Home Rule 
Bill. Tlie question of Imperial representation for the 
Irish, in the absence of a plan of complete federalism, nagged 
at Liberal speakers, v/ho could only clutch at Gladstone's 
inadequate assurances that all would be well in the end.
Worse still, the Irish themselves were discrediting the 
basic tenet of Home Rule: the assumption that Ireland
would be happier, more prosperous and content if she were 
allowed to rule herself. The reports that were gleefully 
printed each day in the Unionist press of violence and 
chaos on the Irish hustings seemed to be making a mockery 
of this idea. With the Parnellite and anti-Parnellite 
factions attacking each otlier venomously in word and vicious­
ly in deed, it seemed increasingly self-evident that the 
last thing the Irish would be capable of was the order 
and self-discipline of government. Moreover, the repeated 
claims on the Irish hustings that Home Rule was to be only 
a first step seemed to hold the Liberals up to ridicule 
as gullible.
The chief villain working against the Liberals was 
Ulster. Although the question of the protestant minority
ÎL59
had been significant in 1886, two factors augmented its 
importance in 1892, Firstly, the passage of six years 
had allowed Ulster to organize itself better and had armed 
it with Randolph Churchill's cry, "Ulster will fight and 
Ulster will be right," Secondly, the split in the Irish 
Nationalist ranks seemed to offer prima facie evidence 
of the power of the Roman Catholic priesthood in the affairs 
of the Irish, That the former idol of Ireland, a Protestant, 
should have been so completely tossed aside under clerical 
influence did not bode well for tolerance in a self- 
governing Ireland.
Without Ulster, it is not improbable that Britain 
might have opted for the Liberal formula? if only to be 
rid of the Irish. However, the spectre of protestant 
•hostages' aroused deep feeling and nowhere more than in 
Presbyterian Scotland. Gladstone, curiously unable to 
acknowledge the nationalist feeling of Ulster, and perhaps 
offended by the nalced foigotrir of the North, never supplied 
his followers with an adequate response to Unionist ac­
cusations, Therefore, LU^eral speakers could only utter 
unconvincing assurances that Ulster would come to accept 
Dublin rule in the end. Some LDoerals took the offensive 
by Insisting that Ulster Protestants would benefit from Irish 
autonomy but this had only the sad air of whistling in the 
dark.
l60
The attempts of Liberal candidates to handle tliis most 
difficult issue ranged from the aggressively unrepentant 
to the sootiling and conciliating. One of the most forth­
right and radical Liberals on the Irish question was R, T. 
Reid, M.P, for Dumfries Burghs, Standing behind the Home 
Rule proposals, he denounced "the bugbears and the 
Hobgoblins" of Ulster, confessing that though he had listened 
he could not, as yet, understand what the Ulsterman were 
afraid of,^^ when questioned about the character of the 
Irish M.P,'s whose quarrels were so public, his response 
was unequivocal, Tlie Irish M.P.'s were his friends, he 
admired tliem and he stood by them. Britain, according to 
Raid was guilty of a legacy of "tyranny" in Ireland which
had resulted only in waste and misery. The record of the
42Union was "fifty years of distress" in Ireland. He 
stressed that Home Rule was "needed badly" for both Ireland 
and Scotland and characterised the Irish as "oppressed" and 
tdieir M.P.'s as neither "disloyal nor traitors" but instead 
as "patriots.
More common was the soothing approach of C.B.;
"Ulstermen would not be slaves but active partners in their 
own c o u n t r y M e n z i e s  insisted that "there was no chance
41. Scotsman July 1, 1892? July 4, 1892
42. ibid July 4, 1892
43. ibid July 1, 1892
44. Glasgow Herald July 1, 1892
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of the South persecuting the North." Wallace in
Edinburgh East pointed to the present power of Ulster's
voice as ample evidence of her strength and security in a
united Ireland . P a u l  in Edinburgh South suggested that
"Ulster would be even stronger under Home Rule" and dis-
47missed fears of Irish tariffs. Most common of all were 
simple declarations for Gladstone's widdom and "Justice 
for Ireland."
Not surprisingly, Ireland was virtually the sole tlieme 
of the Unionist campaign. With a weak ministerial record 
to defend, Ireland presented an easy opportunity to shift 
the burden of defence over to the Liberals. The focus of 
the Unionist campaign of 1892 was the "orange card" of 
Ulster.
In 1886, Ulster had remained only a secondary question , 
but 6 years later that had changed, with the Loyalist 
forces of the North organized and a bond established 
between the Protestants and tlie Unionist party.
Cynically, the Unionists of Scotland employed the bigots 
of Ulster, often clergymen, to denounce the threat of 
"Home Rule" from platforms in Scotland. Such speakers 
were well characterised by Lord Rosebery as : "carrying:the
45. Glasgow Herald July 1, 1892
46. ibid July 4, 1892
47. Scotsman July 2, 1692
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Shorter Catechism in one hand and a revolver in the 
other".
The Unionists could not plead Ulster's cause by any­
thing resembling "national self-determination" - for that 
would imply acceptance of the South Irish cause. Therefore 
popular will was always cast within the structure of the 
United Kingdom as a whole, within which, of course, Ulster 
joined the majority (England and Scotland) in opposition to 
the minority (South Ireland). "Ulster claims to have the
majority on its side - the majority of the electorate of
48
the United Kingdom," Any suggestion that Ireland's loyalty 
had to be earned or that it was hers to choose, was dis­
missed as 'treason'.
Not all Unionists relied on these primitive tactics; 
nor did they have to, Gladstone's proposals were all too 
vulnerable to detailed criticisra; and the vagueness of 
sections of the bill and of Gladstone's defence of it pro­
vided much ready ammunition for reasoned attack.
Those who concentrated on religion included Walter 
Thorbum, Liberal Unionist M.P. for Peebles and Selkirk, 
whom Ferguson described as a "heavy, middle class snob.
He claimed that the Liberals were in league with the Pope 
so that the Catholic church would be established in 
Ireland with the taaces of the Protestants, Glasgow
48. Ferguson to Rosebery June 17, 1892 Rosebery MSS 
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49. Scotsman July 4, 1892
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Unionists made particular use of references to "brethren
in Ulster", Parker Smith in Partick asked his supporters
whether they were prepared "to hand over their fellow
50religionists in Northern Ireland to the agitators,"
Stirling-Mascwell in College division claimed that Unionists
were "in fighting Home Rule .... defending their friends
51and fighting the enemy."
However, in 1892, unlike 1886, Ireland did not entirely
monopolize political discussion. When the subject could be
avoided, most Liberals preferred to turn to the ancient
cry of the ’outs' against the record of the 'ins'. "The
Tories have done nothing in six years that they promised to
do and all the things that they promised not to do." -
52Sir James Carmichael. " While most of this criticism was 
directed towards an alleged al^ sence of social reform, the 
Tory record in Ireland was also denounced as "do-nothing". 
"The Conservatives have done nothing in the past six years
53to grapple with the Irish question," - Capt, John Sinclair,
"The present peace in Ireland is the result of reforms
forced on the Tories and the good-will generated by
Liberal Home Rule efforts," - Stephen Williamson.
Unionists retorted "Liberal government means Ireland and
55no social legislation." - J. Parker Smith,
531. Glasgow Herald July 6 , 1892
51, Ibid. July 6, 1892
52, Scotsman July 2, 1892
53, Ibid. July 6, 1892
54, Glasgow Herald, July 1/ 1892
55, ibid. July 6, 1892
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In 1892 it was still common to identify the phrase
"social reform" with measures such as temperance or the
crofter's cause. Some Liberalse.g. T. Reid and S.
Williamson^^ however manifested an awareness of new forces:
emphasising the new influence as expressed in the Newcastle
Program. Not surprisingly the most socially
conscious areas were the mining districts. Here, however,
issues tended to be concentrated narrowly on specifically
mining matters. Lai^ our issues did arise in other working
class areas but not to such a degree. In Lanark N.W.,
Reade attacked tlie "classes" and identified himself with
the welfare of the masses by suppor-ting a general 8-hour 
57day. Some Liberals however took specific objection to
these proposals, Paul felt that regulation of hours was
an unwarranted intrusion in tlie economy and opposed the
58idea of any national system of pensions.
In Aberdeen, James Bryce was one of the few Liberals 
to face a Labour opponent. Friends like J, W, Crorabie,
M*Po for Kincardine, warned him tliat he was vulnerable 
because of his opposition to SHR and his wobbling position 
on labour questions. He was also assured however that 
Champion, the labour man, was strong only 'with a knot of 
socialists" and had lost support amongst working men by
56. Ibid. July 1; July 2
57. Glasgow Herald July 1, 1892
58. Scotsman July 4, 1892
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advocating protection, Bryce's agent, Buchart told
him: "Deal firmly and finally with the labour 8-hours
60
question. The working man can be easily managed. " On 
June 24, in Aberdeen, Bryce devoted most of his speech 
to lalDour, "Eight hours" was desiraJole for mining and 
like trades, he admitted and, citing Liberal measures of the 
past, tried to identify the cause of Liberalism with the 
cause of the working class. Liberalism stood for civil and 
religious liberty, free trade, popular representative 
government, conciliation, social equality and the easing 
of the burdens of the weak,^^
Disestablishment was still raised occasion by Union­
ists who felt .1.1: di d no harm to remind tlie electorate
that "Every vote for a Gladstonian candidate is a vote for
62the abolition of the Church," - Sir Andrew Agnew, " The
few Liberals who made mention of it, like C.B,, Kinloch,
Ashor, Trevelyan, and Cromfoie, confined tliemselves to a
brief statement of support for the proposal, A few LiJDerals
like McLagan and Ure made equally brief mention of their
continuing' opposition.
f) The Election Results:
The general election of 1892 was decisively lost by 
the Unionists but was not really won by the Liberals.
59. Croiïtoie to Bryce June 17, 1892 Bryce MSS 29 
BO, Butchart to Bryce June 22, 1892 Bryce MSS 28
61. Bryce MSS 28
62, Scotsman July 1, 1892
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Without tlie Irish, the Liberals were, in fact, left 41 
seats short of Unionist strength in tlio House of Commons.
A countrv'’ tired of a Unionist administration but even more 
tired of the millstone of Ireland, left the Lliberals in a 
hopeless parliamentary situation whose ultimate effect was 
to send them into the wilderness for over a decade*
In Britain, the Liberals managed to regain 84 of the 
144 seats lost in 1886, thus recovering 59% of their losses. 
However, this pattern was not a uniform one. In London, 
the Liberal recover^’' was almost complete but in tlie West 
Midlands^Chamberlain’s Liberal Unionist barony refused to 
crack, yielding up only 5 of the 26 seats (19%) taken in 
1886. Scotland, too, fell below the Liberals' national 
average. Of 19 seats lost in 1886, only 7 or 33% returned 
to tlie Liberal fold. In 1892, it was the tenacity of Liberal 
Unionism in its strongholds that denied Gladstone his 
mandate.
The 50 seats won by the Liberals in Scotland were 
certainly fewer than had. been hoped for, though some, like 
Ferguson, had been pessimistic from the outset: "The
63Scottish constituencies seem to be less keen than in 1886."
All told, the Liberals won back eleven constituencies 
(Glasgow St. Rollox, Ayr Burghs, Ayrshire South, Govan, 
Dumbartonshire, Falkirk Burghs, Forfarshire, Roxburghshire, 
Argyll, Inverness Burghs and Invernessshire) but lost 4
63. Ferguson to Rosebery June 17, 1892 Rosebery MSS
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others (Glasgav- Camlachie, Perth, Lanark N. W, and Wick 
Burghs) for an overall gain of 7, well short of the 19 
they lost in 1886. Of the seats won back, 4 (Ayr Burghs, 
Roîîburghshire, Forfarshire and Invernessshire) had been 
taken into tlie Unionist column by their sitting members.
This reflected a general trend in those seats where a sitting 
Liberal IIP had carried his constituency over with him into 
Liberal Unionism. Just as incumbency had produced a greater 
than average swing to Unionism in 1386, so in 1892, the awing 
back to the Liberals in those seats was above average. Clearly, 
the memlDer’s influence had been a temporary effect for a 
single election. Of the other six gains, three came in 
Tory held seats and three in Lilieral Unionist seats.
The Liberal losses were of a mixed variety, Tvjo re­
sulted directly from the old Liberal curse of a divided vote.
In Perth, C. S. Parker, who had survived a radical inter­
vention in 1805, could not do so again with a greatly 
strengthened Conservative vote (from 29% (1885) to 37.5%
(1892)), Ironically, the Unionist vote fell from its 1886 
level in both Perth and Glasgow Caralachie, by 4,5% and 4% 
respectively. In the latter case, it v;as tlie intervention, 
as a labour candidate, of the famous socialist and former 
M.P., R. B. Gunningham-Graliam, taking 12% of the vote which 
denied the Lilierals the seat ; they came only 5% behind the 
Unionist. Tlie other two losses were more forgiveable. Lanark 
North West, always a hairline marginal, swung slightly to 
the Unionists. Wick Burghs, with a tiny electorate was
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always unpredictable and after the election a number of 
Liberals spoke darkly of 'bribery*. Ferguson, v/ho bad 
no great liking for Crofter M.P.s, dismissed the defeated 
Wick Crofter as an example of the low quality of Liberal
Highland candidates; "the worst I ever saw. An awful
64bounder,"
Again, distinct regional patterns were visible in 
the results of 1892. Just as the West proved to be the 
low point of 1886 for the Liberals so it was the area of 
their greatest recovery in 1892. 6 of their 11 gains came
in the 28 western seats. More emphatically, 19 of these 
constituencies registered a Liberal swing. In the East, 
where the Unionists were cut back to 5 of the 32 seats, the 
trends were almost equally divided for and against the 
Liberals. 5 of the 8 Highland seats had Unionist swings. 
Broken down to a more local basis, the Liberal recovery was 
best in Glasgow and along the lower Clyde valley with 
lesser gains in the South West and the industrial belt of 
Stirling-Fife. Results were balanced in Edinburgh, along 
the East Coast and in the Borders,with the Unionists doing 
best in Lanarkshire and the Highlands. It should be noted 
that the Liberals did much better in the Southern Highlands, 
where they g^iined three seats ^ than further north. It is 
to be remembered that this division was exactly reversed 
from that of 1886.
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Finally the changing composition of the Unionist 
alliance in Scotland should be noted. Whereas in 1886, 
the Liberal Unionists took on tlie bulk of the responsibility 
with about three times the number of candidates as the 
Tories - 47 to 17; in 1892 the totals were more equal 38
Liberal Unionists to 21 Tories, Finally, for the first time, 
the Liberals faced what was close to a complete opposition 
slate in Scotland; only one seat, rock-solid Kincardine, 
did not have a Unionist standing.
Suinmary
OTie disaster of 1886 did not, as some Liberals had 
hoped, put an end to the burden and incubus of Ireland. So 
long as Gladstone retained tlie leadership, the Liberal Party's 
fate would continue to be determined by the fortunes of 
Irish Home Rule, The cruel irrationality of events from the 
emergence of Pigqott to the body-blow of the O'Shea affair 
dramatically illustrated the degree to which the Liberal 
party's future was no longer within its own control. The 
final cruelty was -tlie 'victory' of 1892, a 'victory* which, 
ultimately would break the spirit of the party for a decade.
Although conscious of the primacy of the Irish issue, 
Scottish Liberals were, in the years 1886-92 forced to cope 
witli other pressing concerns. One of these, Scottish Home 
Rule, was closely related to idle Irish crisis. Indeed, the 
real strength of the movement lay in the degree to which
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it could draw on more than merely parochial concerns for 
support. While relying on a growing sense of Scottish 
nationalism, the idea also commended itself to the hard 
headed minds of the party by appearing as an intregal and 
necessary component within any proposed scheme of federal 
government for the United Kingdom, a scheme which many saw 
as the only means of satisfying both the Irish and con­
stitutional logic. To others, like Rosebery, the concept 
found favour as a stepping stone for tlieir dreams of an 
ultimate imperial Federation. While grievances of national 
neglect liiilœd with traditional nationalist feeling provided 
the initial base of the movement, it was the need to find a 
workable solution for Irish government, and tlie looming prob­
lem of a maturing Empire that brought in much of the most 
influential support. Consequently, Scottish Home Rule, 
while remaining a campaign for autonomy, was also, for 
many, a campaign for the preservation and development of the 
union and the Empire.
The other new concern for Scottish Liberals, social and 
working class deman.ds, was, in tlie long run, to pose 
greater difficulties. The concent of 'radicalism* was 
changing in the early 1890's but the Liberal Party of 
Scotland seemed particularlv unable to adapt. In the West 
of Scotland, where these issues were most pressing, 'radicals* 
of anotlier age, the middle class comaercial men who con­
trolled the local associations, were in fact the most 
unyielding opponents of tlie new forces and attempted to shut
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them out of tlie party. The rejection of Keir Hardie in 
Mid-Lanark was not merely a local occurrence but a re­
flection of a generally held antipathy to what Hardie 
stood for. Already weak in tlie face of the alliance of 
traditional strength and the exceptional Liberal
Unionist strength in the region, the party could only de­
cline farther as a result of these attitudes, Paradox­
ically, it was in the 'conservative' East that the new 
ideas received more of a hearing whether through Haldone's 
Fabian associations, Rosebery and Ferguson's evolving 
domestic strategy for Liberal Imperialism or the common 
sense of those of C-B's instincts. Nevertheless, the 
industrial conflicts of the early 1390's in Scotland 
brought out much of the deeply felt reluctance of Scottish 
Liberals to new forces that seemed designed to undermine 
much of what thev had traditionally stood for.
CHAPTER 6
Demoralization and the New Radicalism 
1892-95
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Demoralization and the New Radicalism: 1892-95
The result of the 1892 election, a Liberal government 
dependent for its majority on the Irish party, was the 
worst possible for the Liberal Party, Demoralized before 
the election by the effect of the Parnell-0*Shea affair, 
the parliamentary situation left the Liberals committed 
to accourse of action utterly doomed to futility by the 
hand of the House of Lords? a course of action to which 
fewer and fewer in the party felt any serious commi.ttnent, 
Gladstone was left with no option but to go through 
the motions even if the party and, more importantly, 
popular opinion were sunk in apathy. As one of the main 
props of the Liberal Party, the opinion of Scotland was 
particularly crucial and the reports reaching London from 
those like Ferguson in the months before the presentation 
of the Second"iHome Rule Bill were not encouraging:
I did not hear much in Scotland except as to 
lengthy education projects.
On Feb. 6, 1893, one week before the introduction of the 
Bill, Herbert Paul, M.P., for Edinburgh South, reported to 
Ferguson ;
Red-hot from Scotland, he speaks of great apathy 
and a lead being wanted.V2
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These reports proved to be accurate because, in 
spite of the almost contemptuous manner In which the 
Lords tossed the Home Rule Bill out, very few of Gladstone's 
supporters in Scotland were motivated to stir, A* L.
Brown and some of the radical wing organized a few anti- 
Lords rallies but their very novelty highlighted the more 
general attitude. In short, the country was probably 
grateful, at least for the moment, that the whole business 
had been finally removed from general concern. Defeated 
and discouraged, Gladstone resigned in March, 1894.
After some struggle with Harcourt, Rosebery, the idol of 
Scotland, succeeded to the leadership of the Liberal 
Party,
Rosebery's succession might have been expected to 
have had an enormous effect in Scotland, Yet it seemed 
to pass with a minimum of impact. Rosebery was and still 
remains an enigma, a powerful yet vague and shadowy 
figure. As Sir Charles Hardinge told the Prince of Wales :
3
"He's a strange, weird man." Always aloof, he had been 
utterly shattered by the premature death of his wife in 
1890. In the aftermath, his zest for life and politics, 
in particular, seemed to quite vanish, his public life 
reduced to an empty ritual. Tragically, he became Prime 
Minister just at a moment when his party's fortunes 
were sliding to a new ebb. His personal despair matched
3. R. Magnus Edward VII , Penguin, London, p. 384
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the apathy and fatalism then rife within the Liberal 
Party. Tîiough possessed of enormous talents and com­
manding a powerful and enduring loyalty in Scotland, 
he never fully responded to the urgings of many loyalists 
like Ferguson to seize his opportunities. He was a man 
stripped of ambition, content with political dilettantism.
Moreover, though he had first made his mark by the 
promotion of Scotland's interests and as Gladstone's 
Scottish shepherd, his commitment to the country of his 
birth seemdd to fall directly as his personal fortunes 
rose. There is little doubt but that if he had actively 
sought it, he could have used his Scottish strength to 
enormous effect, both for himself and for Scottish Liberal­
ism, Even A, L, Brown, the leader of Scotland's traditional 
radicals, though ideologically set against the Rosebery 
interest, could descrilie him as "the natural leader of 
Scotland."^ He wrote to Rosebery in 1896 after the latter's 
resignations
"I don't think you realize how very earnestly 
some of us desire to be led by one who can really 
speak hs a Scotsmam to Scotsmen,"5
As time passed, Rosebery spent less and less time in 
Scotland and, in 1883, he resigned the presidency of the
S.L.A. on the grounds that:
4. Ferguson to Rosebery June 17, 1892 Rosebery MSS 
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"I am less constantly In Scotland than you 
(Lord Elgin) .... my connection with a 
political organisation in Scotland must be 
real if at ail ....
His personally ambivalent attitude to his native country 
is best illustrated by this passage from a letter to 
Ferguson:
"X am very lonely - personally and politi­
cally and somehow or other I find an air of 
sympathy in Scotland vThicli I find nowhere else 
.... However, X must turn to tlie cultivation 
of my garden and look northwards no more."?
While the traditional leadership had retained its 
position in Scotland after 1886, this had been at the 
price of conceding to the radical wing priority for some 
of their oldest 'fads'. In December, 1886, the S.L.A. 
and the radical N.L.P.S. had united. The effects of this 
merger had been mixed. The radicals had gained control of 
the party conferences and reversed the old non-topical 
character of the S.L.A. In 1891, a programme, considerably 
more radical than the English Newcastle programme, was 
dratim up to include Home Rule all-round, woman's suffrage, 
disestablishment and the eight-hour day for miners.
"The progressive programme at Newcastle 
might be good enough for Englishmen but it
was not good enough for Scotsmen - it wanted 
the democratic ring.V®
“ David McLordy, Glasgow radical.
6. Rosebery to Elgin July 17, 1888 Elgin MSS
7. Rosebery to Ferguson April 7, 1893 Rosebery MSS
loom
8. Kellas op. cit. p. 14 Feb. 17, 1892
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Tliese resolution victories remained hollow, however, 
so long as men like C.B., Ferguson and Rosebery continued 
to dominate the effective political representation of 
Liberal Scotland? and they would do so so long as the 
Western radicals were faced by Unionist hegemony and the 
conservative East remained Liberal. Nevertheless, the 
return to pov?er of Liberalism in 1892 required some 
gestures tov/ards the radicals and * faddists * » Therefore, 
Scottish and Welsh disestablishment proposals went into 
tlie Queen's speech, Gladstone had agreed that the questions 
were now 'ripened* by national opinion:
"Cameron has twice, and in two parliaments,
(I think) had majorities, rather large, of the 
Scotch members present? and every by-election 
reinforces them. I seem as a Scotch member to 
have got the declaration of Scotch opinion which 
I have required.
Ferguson, though a supporter of disestablishment, saw 
action on the issue in 1892 as a means of clearing the 
deck of an old political handicaps
"I saw J. B, Balfour (the Lord Advocate) and 
told him Scots Disestablishment should come 
after Wales in The Queen's speech. Doth Bills 
are badly wanted, Wales will be quiet no longer 
and as we have gone too far in Scotland, we 
shall remain ajDout 10 seats short in the bad 
until we finish this business off. Besides It 
would do a lot of good."iO
9. Gladstone to Rosebery Nov, 10, 1889 Rosebery MSS
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This attitude of wry cynicism and political realism was 
matched by C,B, in 1894 when Rosebery's administration 
put fonward a disestablishment bill:
"You may avoid the name (Cameron) which may 
be offensive to some of the Church people: 
but substantially the bill represents the 
least we can do. Tiie line I tliink is to be 
effusive over the Presbyterian Church - the 
characteristic church of the Scottish people 
.... largely moulded by its characteristic 
spirit .... lament its present division into
three bodies equal in zeal, etc., etc.....
disestablishment would raise ratlier than degrade 
.... (but) the Church people are and will remain 
hard against us and that wo must not in the futile 
hope of pleasing them damage the zeal of our own 
©Importers «"
Such was the inoffectualness of the Rosebery government 
that the Welsh bill, which preceded the Scottish, was 
still bogged down in the Commons, when the Government fell 
in June, 1895.
There were some other slight concessions to another
'fad* - temperance. The prime object of the radicals was
the institution of "local veto", a provision which would
allow local authorities to regulate or ban the sale of
liquor, Peter McLagan, former M.P. for Linlithyowshi re
who had made this his hobby-horse for years, had retired
in 1893. John Wilson, M.P. for Govan, took over McLagan's
mantle and was soon complaining of the lack of interest
12on the part of Rosebery. Eventually, a mild
11, C.D. to Rosebery March 13, 1894 Rosebery MSS 
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proposal was brought forv/ard which tlie faddists accepted 
reluctantly:
temperance people do not like the 
Government's veto Bill, They much prefer 
the one known as McLagan's which is in the 
hands of Mr, John Wilson, M.P, but they re­
frain from criticizing the Government measure 
for fear of v/eakening their c a u s e , y
In any case, Rosebery had virtually ruled out action on 
this front in a speech in Glasgow on November 11, pointing 
out the certain objections of the House of Lords.
b) Old Faddists and the Now Radicalism
More iniuori-.ant for the future of Scottish Liberalism 
than the mutterings of shop-worn 'faddists' was the rapid 
rise of labour as an industrial and political force. 
Scattered unions were beginning to unite on a wider basis 
and growing in self-confidence. Socialism %vas becoming a 
political force, particularly on the Clyde, and its growth 
was putting severe strains on labour's relationship with 
Liberalism:
"It would be well if you spoke in Glasgow 
before tjie end of the year. The Labour men 
are getting very wide apart from tlie 
Liberals in the West, So much so that 
Graham, the secretary of the Western section told 
me this morning tJiat it would be difficult and 
really impossible for any of the labour men 
to be adopted by any of our Liberal associations.
13. Ferguson to Rosebery Nov. 16, 1894 Rosebery MSS 
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The Scotch socialist goes so thoroughly to 
work that he will not stop short of nation­
alizing many things and tlie mass of the 
Liberals won't hear of tliis programme. Graliam 
says there are bound to be splits and probably 
seats lost? he thinks the Rories will do a 
little better next time."^^
The summer of 1894 brought a national coal strike in 
Scotland that served to highlight the cause of labour and 
its increasing militancy. The men went out in June and 
held out for the summer, h lack of unity weakened their 
strength and, eventually, by October, a settlement was 
made on the comers' terms.
The strike left the Scottish Liberals in a curious 
position. Liberal doctrine stood for rigid non-interference 
in the economic affairs of industry but at the same time 
claimed to be the party of 'progress' and depended on 
working class votes. Bryce's correspondence witîi Rosebery 
hints at this discomfiture:
"the miners are thoroughly disheartened and 
prepared for virtual surrender .... Tlie men 
will be driven to an unconditional surrender 
and will blame us for not having tried to help 
them. In case a proposed conversation shows that 
the Lanarkshire and Ayrshire coal awners will 
reject my professional intervention, I should 
doubt the wisdom of inviting a rebuff.
15, Ferguson to Rosebery April 10, 1094 Rosebery MSS 
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A month later ;
"The strike is really at an end in the West 
... a HiQ only thing that can be clone to lessen 
the defeat of the miners is to induce the non­
association masters to agree to a fixed wage to 
be maintained for a certain time, say a year at 
a minimum. The association masters are quite 
obdurate .... it seems quite probable tliat Fife 
and Leith may make a separate settlement ....
Trevelyan (the Secretary of State for Scotland), writing 
to Brycef held to the traditional Liberal belief in strict 
neutrality:
"Ï have been to idle provost of Glasgow who 
has told me a great deal about the strike.
Your province, that of conciliation was evi­
dently hopeless with sad perverseness and 
obstinancy on both sides. Mine and that of 
the Lord Advocate, which is peace and order haÉ 
kept us both very anxious and constant work but 
there has been no calamity* We have been 
attacked by both aides though not very fairly so 
I suppose we have about preserved the balance."^®
Perhaps the best expression of the difficulties of 
the Scottish Liberals, especially in the West, in coming 
to terms with the new working class movement was offered 
by A. D. Provand, Liberal M.P. to Glasgow Blackfriars.
His constituency contained many of the worst districts of 
the city, including the Gorbals, and was almost solidly 
working class. Provand, as a Glasgow-born Manchester 
mercîhant was an example of the old middle class radical 
tradition of Glasgow. By and large he was not a reactionary,
17. Bryce to Rosebery Sept. 1, 1894 Rosebery MSS Box 67
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often dealing with progressive themes and later toying
19witli Georgite ideas. Yet a memorandum he sent to Rosebery 
in 1894 was an extraordinary documentation of social in­
compréhension. He had heard from Ferguson that Tweedmouth 
was attempting to revive the abortive 'deal' of 1891 with 
the Scottish Labour Party in order to avoid a repetition 
of the 1892 Camlachie result, Prowmd was furious:
"Tlie words 'Labour Party' are misleading 
those who call themselves Socialists .... 
terrorism is tlielr only political weapon and 
they have been taught its uses and values by 
recent political developments. Lord Tweedmouth 
had negotiations three or four years ago with 
Mr. Cunninghame-Graham and Mr. Hardie and latterly 
intentions of some kind through Mr, Munro- 
Perguson and that he has talked veiled collectivism 
is well known to the Socialists. I have therefore 
to say til at if anyone officially connected with 
the Government makes any bargain with the repre­
sentatives of Socialism in Glasgow tliere are scores 
of leading Liberals in Glasgow who will not again 
be seen on a Liberal platform and thousands of 
voters who will in the future go to Liberal meetings 
solely out of curiosity ,,,, it would create a 
split in the Liberal Party as pronounced as the 
Home Rule Bill did. I meet many convinced men in 
my visits to tlie city .... who, while they are 
good Llloerals have the most pronounced opinions 
in reference to tliose attempting negotiations 
with the Socialists .... a socialist cannot 
possibly be returned for any Scottish division.
Mine is probably the most radical in all Glasgow 
.... Socialists could not be elected here even 
if they were opposed by a Conservative alone 
.... no bargain is possible. Their leaders seek 
their own personal advancement .... it Is a 
mistake to suppose many working men believe in 
Socialism .... The methods of the Socialists are 
simply to terrorise the Liberals (and bargain 
or appeasement inviting more) .... they say that 
possessors of inherited wealth are thieves and
19. Ferguson to Rosebery Feb. 6, 1898 Rosebery MSS 
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and that I and all other mercantile men 
are worse than thieves .... the strength of 
socialism arises from the slums. All their 
object lessons are drawn from them and the 
worst features of the slums are the creations 
of drink. Nothing would benefit and disarm 
Socialism so much as a check upon the drink 
traffic. Practical Drink Legislation would 
settle the question in the minds of nine-tenths 
of such persons on account of the change that 
would follow in our cities within a reasonable
period."20
In the light of this statement, Trevelyan's report the 
next month seems rather optimistic:
The state of things is critical as regards 
the Labour Party here but not hopeless by 
any means.
In 1895, Labomr candidates were to run in five of 
the seven Glasgow divisions including both Trevelyan's 
and Provands. Fortunately for the Liberals, none won more 
than 700 votes and did not affect any of the results.
% e  public apathy, which had crippled Gladstone's 
Home Bill efforts in 1893, thickened about the aimless 
Hosebei^ administration. Part of the cause was the growing 
political and intellectual bankruptcy of Liberalism in the 
fall of 1894* Campbell-Bainnerman found himself bereft of 
ideas :
20, Provand to Rosebery Dec. 20, 1894 Rosebery MSS 
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"I have to speak to my const!tutenta later 
in the month and am at a loss what to say ...."22
It was no more comforting to him when ho came to 
Scotland:
I have been the rounds of my Fife constituents - 
they are all quiet and I was very well received. 
But there is very little life or enthusiasm.
So far as I can get at it, it is a feeling which 
prevails of exhaustion or even sickening and of 
repugnance to any great effort. Meetings applaud 
what one says about the Lords and tliey are with 
us in the abstract: But it is like offering a
new dish to a man distended with a rather unwhole­
some meal: He knows it will only maîæ his indi­
gestion worse and he has no healthy appetite .... 
(attacks on tlie House of Lords) have small sup­
port: there are few abolitionists nor does one
hear the march of the unicameral men. I was 
obligated to coo like a dove and X believe a 
suspensory veto is all my people would stand.
The market for Disestablishment is very flat."23
He also wrote to Bryce of Scottish public "exhaustion 
and sickness of politics."24
November had seen a by-election in Forfarshire and 
Campbell Bannerman's report at the time is revealing of 
the state of disorder in Scottish Liberalism.
"I do not Imow what to tell you to expect in 
Forfarshire. We were terribly handicapped by 
our candidate being an utter stranger and a 
man who looks as if he had never been out of an 
accountant's office in his life. His great 
recommendation was that he is and always has 
been a U,P. - and therefore he was sent to a
22. C.B, to Rosebery Oct. 5, 1894 Roseloery MSS
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county where there are practically no U.P.'s 
Lots of our people would not vote for him 
except under compulsion ,.., I shall be greatly 
relieved if we have a 500 majority . .. our 
people will have done their best in depressing 
circumstances."35
In fact tlie result was a Unionist majority of 206 reversing 
a Liberal majority of 866 in 1892,
Tlie campaign of 1895 was the final episode of the 
Home Rule period. While the battle lines and the groupings 
established by Home Rule were to remain the parameters of 
political conflict, Ireland ceased to be a political 
preoccupation, 1895 reseitO^ led 1885 botli by marking the end 
of a fading Liberal government and by lacking any central 
theme. However, the divisive intensity of the Church issue 
in 1885 in Scotland lacked any real counterpart. More 
significantly, distinctively Scottish issues and opinions 
were rapidly disappearing.
One cannot escape the feeling as one reads the re­
ports that politicians, on botli sides, were perfectly con­
fident of the outcome of the election and content to let 
the inevitable take its course. The campaign had some­
thing of the atmosphere of a charade aliout it, Tlie Liberals 
expected to lose, though never pubicly admitting so, while
25. C.B, to Rosebery' Nov, 17, 1894 Rosebery MSS 10003
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tlie Unionists complacently waited for victory to drop into 
their lap.
The Liberal campaign was a non-starter from the 
beginning. Tlie humiliation of their defeat in Parliament, 
revealing a total breakdown in morale, made them easy 
targets for ridicule from opposing candidates and hecklers 
in their audiences. The only Liberal response was to 
denounce the whole affair as a "shabby Tory trick" - an 
accusation that merely seemed to underscore naive witlessness.
The Lilieral leadership was hopelessly divided.
Ros^ery, who was in any case barred from campaigning, longed 
to abdicate. The mutual antipathy of Harcourt and Rosebery 
wasan open secret and the subject of many Unionist taunts:
"The Liberals cannot afford to win the General 
Election? it is scarcely a secret that Lord 
Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt will not 
again sit together in the Cabinet C o u n c i l . " 2 6
Every Liberal candidate had to face questions alDout his 
own loyalty to one 'leader* or the other. Matters were 
not helped when some Liberals took an open stand against 
their official leader e.g. A,Fletcher in Greenock.
For the lack of anything more promising, most Liberals 
had seized upon the House of Lords as the principal target 
of their campaign. Clearly having lost both the will and
26, Glasgow Herald July 1, 1895
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the ability to rule, the Liberal accusations seemed little 
better tlian a sham. î\fhile most Liberals opened their 
campaigns on the theme of the Lords, a lack of response 
seemed to diminish its prominence towards the end.
Much as the cry in 1092 had been 'Ireland blocks all*
so, in 1895, it became 'tlie Lords block all*. Sir diaries
Cameron's manifesto was typical: All other questions,
particularly Home Rule would have to await measures to deal
27with the Lords* veto.
Most of tills was simply ignored by the Tories, probably 
shrewdly. Those who took the trouble to defend the Lords 
as an institution portrayed it as a 'hon-partisan* body 
defending tlie people against 'excesses* such as Home Rule, 
The Glasgow Herald went as far as to extend this role to 
the Unionist party itself, characterizing it as "the
20property, the intelligence and education of the country."
Unionists, confident of victory, were content to strike 
more statesmanlike attitudes than they had in 1892, Tliere 
was little evidence of the open pandering to religious prej­
udice and, instead, soma suggestions for the improvement of 
material conditions in Ireland, Home Rule was visibly on 
its last legs and another defeat of the Liberals would bury
27. Ibid. July 8, 1895
28. Ibid. July 3, 1895
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it at last. Tlie suggestion was that peace and tran­
quility would come to both Ireland and Britain once the 
agitation was fehovm to be futile. Above all, the Unionists 
cast tliemselves in tlie role of a wise, experienced and 
competent team ready to tales over from the frenetic and 
muddled Liberals so obviously out of their deptli. Even so, 
the Tories were careful to remind their audiences tliat a 
Liberal majority would lead once again to "a scheme of
disintegration whicli must pop up again like some evil jack- 
29
in-the-box. ' Tiie Liberals would always be ready to sell
30themselves to the Hibernian Mephistopheles." Nor was
the lingering Lilaeral threat to tlie Church forgotten,
eithero However, by 1895, these matters required only
mention to foe effective, Tlie Unionists could afford to foe
contemptuous of foes who were tied to "Home Rule, pinchbeck
31revolution and sham local option,"
1895 did see, however, the first widespread glimmerings 
of a new basis for Liberal politics. The eclipse of the Hrane 
Rule issue naturally allowed other interests to force their 
way forward. Disestablishment vms still raised by the die- 
hards but to little notice. Also lingering without enthus­
iasm were temperance and land reform. What was really 
emerging for the first time was what might be galled
29, I b i d .  July 9, 1895
30, I b i d ,  July 9, 1895
31, I b i d .  July 9, 1895
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'social politics'. 1895 can be pinned down as the first 
time a significant number of Scottish Liberal candidates 
gave substantial emphasis to the interests of the urban 
working classes. It is also clear, however, that it would 
be at least another decade before social questions achieved 
the status of voting determinants in tlie mind of the 
electorate.
There was no particular increase in Scotland of 
specifically 'Laloour' candidates. Like the five Glasgow 
entrants, of whom, Smillie in Camlachie, with 11% of the 
vote, was, by far, the most successful, Scottish Labourites 
remained a weak fringe, curiorii ticn ^ rather than contenders,
Tlie only unmistakeable working-class Liberal candidate
was Ferguson's protege, John Ho lb urn; altliough Green in
32
Tradeston identified hhnself vaguely as a working man. 
Ho3burn appealed;
"Three quarters of tlie House of Commons is out 
of sympathy with tlie claims of Labour ,,., (l) 
am one of your own class ,.,. (and) was on the 
bench a fortnight ago .... (pledged) to stand 
by the classes to which I b e l o n g . "^3
He was returned but was the only working-man in the Scottish 
Liberal caucus. Tliis was in contrast to tlie English 
caugua where the Lib-Lab tradition was becoming well 
established,
32. Ibid. July 2, 1895
33. ibid. July 2, 1895
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However, the Liberals did have a few candidates 
who stood for the 'new' lëft, 'Plie most interesting was 
A, E. Fletcher in Greenock. It was not without signifi­
cance that he was English. The Herald ridiculed him as 
'a dreamer of socialistic dreams' but tliis was not an 
inaccurate assessment.He certainly referred to himself 
as a 'socialist' and in 1900 ran under both Liberal and 
ILP banners. His programme in 1895 included the limitation 
of hours, factory reform, manhood suffrage and an attack 
on unemployment. To establish his Liberal credentials he 
also threw in the old standards of temperance, disestab­
lishment, Home Rule and the recent Armenian controversy.
He described his general stance as advancing "legislation 
generally based on ethical and democratic principles and
aimed aththe breakdown of the power of monopolists, rent-
35raokers, sweaters and land grabbers," Donald Firie in 
West Renfrewshire demanded "payment of M.P,'s with a view 
to securing working men's representatives .... employee's
compensation .... an end to sweating (and) eight hours for
. „36miners."
The old radi ca.1. John Wilson in Govan now made prominent 
cause of "an improvement in the condition of the working 
class" through factory reform, and employer's liability,
34. Ibid. July 2, 1895
35. Ibid. July 2, 1095
36. Ibid. July 2, 1895
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37aid to the unemployed and old age pensions." Even the
virulent anti-socialist Provand advocated 8 hour limits
38and caaployer's liability, Adam in Glasgow Central and
39Trevelyan both spoke of the need for graduated income tax,
Colville in Lanark N,W. and Lambie in Lanark South backed
40
Provand*s measures, Colville, a large industrialist, 
also supported a minimum wage and fixity of tenure during 
strikes. At the least, some like G,B. made a point of 
identifying Liberalism witli the cause and interest of the 
working class.
These innovations were, however, by no means univer­
sally accepted. Some Liberals totally ignored social 
questions; while others went further and publicly denounced the 
in'iItration of "socialistic" ideas into the Liberal
Party. William McEwan, in EdinlDurgh, the great brewer,
42attacked the radicalism of the Newcastle programme,
Alexander Ure of Linlithgow and the old Glasgow radical,
Cameron, denounced any measures of state pensions and wel- 
43
fare pai^ mient, Glbson-Carmichael, Gladstone's successor
37. Ibid. July 4, 1895; July 8, 1895
38. Ibid. July 8, 1895
39. Ibid. July 8, 1895; July 12, 1895
40. Ibid. July 8, 1895; July 9, 1895
41. Ibid. July 16, 1895
42. Ibid. July 9, 1895
43. Ibid. July 8, 1895
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in Midlothian attacked both ploughmen's holidays and
44the limitation of hbuxs for any workers. It was an 
omen of the future when he conspicuously withdrew the latter 
objection under the pressure of tlie Midlothian miners.
It is significant, though not surprising, that most 
of those Liberals who made mention of social interests were 
from the industrial West while hostility was centered in 
the East, Tlius, in 1895, a subtle, but profound change 
was entering Liberal politics, Hie old cry of 'the classes 
versus the masses' was taking a new meaning. As tlie middle 
ranks of society confirmed their social conservatism through 
Unionism and with the emergence of a politically conscious 
working class, Liberals were beginning to take up the cause 
of the lower members of society, instead of, as in the past, 
that of the middle against the top. These noises were being 
made but, as Provand's memo suggests, the genuine adapt­
ability of Scottish Liberalism was still highly questionable.
e) The Election Results
The results of the 1895 poll were catastrophic for 
the Liberal Party in Britain. The Unionists, seemingly, 
had been confirmed as the new historic party of government 
with the Liberals reduced to tlie position of the 'pre- 
Disraeli' Tories: "The stupid party." The gains of 1892
44, Ibid. July 8, 1895
45. Ibid. July 16, 1895
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vrere more tlian reversed, the Liberals losing 97 seats
in the United Kingdom and falling to a total of 177,
13 less than in 1886. At first glance, the defeat was
less severe in Scotland. In England tlie Liberals lost
42% of the seats they held in 1892 but in Scotland only
22% went over to the Unionists. In addition, it has been
calculated that the sv/ing in popular vote to the Unionists
46in England was much greater than that in Scotland 
However it is to be remember^that in 1892, the Liberals' 
recover^'’ from tlie losses of 1886 was much more restricted 
in Scotland than in England, In short, in 1895 the English 
Liberals fell farther than the Scots mostly because they had 
climbed back up further. Nonetheless, given the fact that 
the Liberals were led by Rosebery, the Scottish losses, 
resulting in a new low of 39 seats (4 less than 1886), could 
really be regarded as a disaster.
The Unionists gained 14 seats in Scotland (Glasgow 
Collage, Glasgow St. Rollox, Dumbartonshire, Ayr. Burghs, 
Ayrshire Soutli, Kilmarnock Burghs, Falkirk Burghs, Stirling­
shire, Roxburghshire, Edinburgh South, Elgin and Naim, 
Argyll, Inverness Burghs and Invernessshire), On the other 
hand, tlie Liberals won back, against the tide, three (Perth# 
Lanark N.W., Dumfriesshire). Nine of the 14 Unionist gains 
were in those seats won by Liberals from Unionists in 1892. 
With the exception of Edinburgh South (a swing of 3%) , the 
other five gains came via swings well above the national
46, Kinnear op. cit. p. 24
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average, e.g. Kilmarnock 6%; Glasgow College 11%.
Likewise, two of the three Liberal wins reversed losses 
of 1892: Perth and Lanark N.W. Perth was won despite a
Unionist swing of 7.5% because of the healing of the 
Liberal split of 1892. Lanark N.W., won by Ferguson's 
protege, John Holbum, tipped once again marginally 
against the general trend as it was to in every election 
through 1910.
About one quarter of the Scottish constituencies (17) 
went against the national trend, swinging towards the 
Liberals. H'/elve of these, however, were those constituencies 
which had swung towards the Unionists in the Liberal year of 
1692: the result being, to some degree, a late compensation.
There was no particular regional pattern of voting 
shift within Scotland. The West was onlv slightly more 
anti-Liberal in movement than the East. Some patterns do 
emerge along the Lower Clyde where the Unionists improved 
their position in eveaq,^  single constituency. In Edinburgh, 
the Lothians, Stirling, Fife, and the East Coast only a few 
Liberals could fight the tide. The Liberals did best in 
the Highlands, Lanarkshire, the Borders and the South West.
In many respects these patterns are a remarkable 
reverse of those of 1892, Despite the varying shifts of 
support, the enduring basis of Scottish politics remained 
a Unionist West and a Liberal East. Viewing these results, 
Ferguson, tlie new Scottish % i p , wrote his leader and patron, 
Rosebery;
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"X am vexed for your sake at tlie result 
of the polls, especially in Scotland, 
otherwise I don't care much .... Hi ere 
is nothing I can look forward to more than 
to pulling the party together in Scotland 
for you.
Ferguson's attention was fixed on the trail of defeats in 
the West:
"I will get Captain John Sinclair to take 
care of the Western Section where we have 
come to grief. The Edinburgh 36 seats did 
very well ,»,, we are almost as we were 
Russell of the Scotsman used to say that the 
East was reliable while the West never was,"*^^
It might have been more profitable for Ferguson to reflect 
that the supposed heartland of Rosebery's influence, the 
regions aJiout tlie Forth, had, in terms of popular voting 
shifts, behaved almost as badly as the West. Liberal 
victories in the East, founded on a fund of loyalty 
built up by Mr, Gladstone, could be taken for granted, as 
was the weakness of the Tory-Radical West. If Rosebery 
could not rouse loyalty aJiove that tradition then his worth 
as a basis for a new movement in Liberalism was considerably 
devalued. The behavior of the Liberal Imperialists in 
the future showed that they never grasped this reality.
47, Ferguson to Rosebery July 27, 1895 Rosebery MSS
100 ig
48. Ferguson to Rosebery Aug. 9, 1895 Rosebery MSS 
10019
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Summary
From the ooint of view of Scotland and Scottish in­
terests , the most striking feature o*^  this oeriod was the 
virtually complete failure of Roseberv to have any signif­
icant Impact on the fortunes or politics of his native 
land. Having succeeded Gladstone after the latter’s final 
defeat in the Home Rule struggle, Rosebery led a government 
marked chiefly by its lack of morale, aimlessness and 
ineptitude. tJhile some of the old ' fads * of Scottish 
Liberalism were put down as bills, very little effort or 
interest came from the top to promote their passage,
Rosebery, who be gan his career as the popular champion of 
Scotland, seemed, once at the top, to be oblivious of its 
existence.
The state of apathy that emanated from the leadership 
pervaded tlie Scottish party. It seemed frozen in a state of 
lack of animation, its memlDers unable even to develon speeches 
lot alone new ideas, The dangerous gap that was opening on 
the left between the new labour interest and the party con­
tinued to grow. While not yet ready to challenge effective­
ly at the ballot box, the new movement was steadily building 
up its forces outside of the Liberal oartv. With the 
traditional Eastern estalilishment holding unchallenged 
control of the party and its * left * domj.nated by the old 
anti-labour radicals, and much of tlie party still com­
mitted to a non-interventionist ethic, the vulnerability
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of the party was growing rapidly.
As the Roseber\? government stumbled towards collapse, 
despair and apathy gripped the party's supporters in 
Scotland, Such was the collapse of morale that when defeat 
in tlie House led to the general election of 1895, Scottish 
Liberals seemed to campaign under an acceptance of their 
forthcoming defeat, an assumption eagerly accepted by the 
Unionists as well. Individual candidates were challenged 
to take sides in tJie rancour between Rosebery and Harcourt, 
a choice made especially difficult in Scotland where ideo­
logy might conflict with personal and national loyalties 
to Rosebery?-, With the retreat of "Ireland” as an issue, 
1895 marked the emergence for the first time of social 
reform as a major element in the Liberal platform and the 
widespread identification In'- Liberal candidates with the 
desires and interests of the lower classes. In the 
election results, the Liberals lost less ground in Scotland 
than in England but perhaps only because they had pained 
less in 1892. The result was the reaffirmation of a 
Unionist West and I.iberal East in Scotland. Rosebery's 
personal failure to exert influence in his own countzyr 
boded ill for tlie future schemes of his supporters.
ampTER 7
THE DOWmARD SPIRAL: 1895-1899
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The Downward Spiral: 1895-99
a) The Composition of the Late Victorian Party
Hie party shambles of 1895 encouraged the growth of 
competing and increasingly incompatible factions within 
the party. Founded as a coalition of varying 'progressive' 
forces, since the early 1880's tlie party had been held 
together chiefly by the personal authority of Gladstone 
and the haliibs of tradition. Hie removal of Gladstone 
from active politics and the weakening of the unifying 
philosophy of 'Liberalism® allowed fuller play to the natural 
centrifugal forces within. Scottish Liberalism did not 
escape these developments.
In Scotland, by one analysis, the party was divided, 
as it always had been, between an inner circle defined 
more by personal factors than ideology and an outer ring 
of functional groupings as well as the nondescript party 
rank and file. The 'inner club' included the Roseberians: 
Ferguson, GDisoîi-Carmichael, Haldane, Crawford and the 
Tennants; Campbell-Bannerman and his friends: T, R. Buchanan#
James Bryce and Captain Sinclair; and tlie independent 
figures of influence like Elgin, Tv;eedmouth, Marjoribanks 
and Maerdeen. It would be incorrect to suggest that this 
constituted some form of intimate cabal; distinct 'houses' 
existed within it and members were often fiercely at odds 
with each other. However, the unifying characteristic 
was mutual acknowledgement of influence and position.
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Hie elite was more than a political gathering.
Hie image of a Scottish 'family' was sometimes less 
metaphorical in the case of these leaders. Tlie case 
of Donald Crawford, M.P, for Lanark North East is a good 
example. An Edinburgh Scot of great legal aJ3ilities, 
educated at Balliol and Heidelberg, he was a memlier of 
Rosebery's set. He gained unwelcome pulilicity as the 
plaintiff in the Dilke divorce case, an affair which in­
volved Rosebery in the settlement and spiritually reduced 
Crawford, However, even before the scandal, Crawford had 
been attempting to terminate his marriage in order to marry
Miss Valentine Munro-Ferguson, v/ho was later to jilt 
1Haldane. Asquith's marriage to Margot Tennant was another 
example of tlie closed world of the 'Forth' society.
Ironically, it was this liaison to a woman Haldane considered 
frivolous that made him begin to drift apart from Asquith. 
Ferguson and Rosebery's close friendship resulted not only 
from personality and politics but went: back to strong family 
ties between the Primroses and Fergusons. Wliile the Rose- 
bcryitea were the most obvious example of 'family', these 
patterns criss-crossed through the Scottish Liberal leader­
ship, Captain John Sinclair, who served C.B. as close 
friend and political manager, in the fashion of Ferguson to 
Rosebery, married the daughter of the Earl of Aberdeen. 
Aberdeen's wife, in turn was the sister of Edward Marjoribanks
1, James op, cit. p. 183
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Hiese close personal relations naturally led to a con­
siderable amount of mutual promotion. Ferguson was par­
ticularly notaJale for this in his role as Rosebery's 
political operator in Scotland. In the period before the 
formation of the Liberal government of 1892, Ferguson's 
correspondence to Roseberv was filled with suggested pro­
motions for various Scottish figures. Most conspicuously 
he pus)led hard to have Crawford take over the Scottish 
Ml ip from Marjoribanks (who would go to the Scottish 
office) . This suggestion is curious in tlie light of
Ferguson's o"wn description of the 'post-Dilke Crawford' as
2
"will not live .... more like a dormouse tlian ever."
These could hardly be the qualities required of a VThip and 
one can only conclude tliat Ferguson saw the promotion as 
psychological therapy for a needy member of the 'family'.
Outside of tliis circle and undoubtedly on the peri­
phery were: the old traditional radicals: A. L. Brovm,
and his followers, Donald Pirie, A, D, Provand and Edward 
Robertson; the remaining crofter M .P . s and the newer lalDour- 
oriented radicals of tlie industrial areas. The rest of 
those consigned to 'the outer regions can best be described 
as 'the plain', those Liberals whose political talents or 
social influence were insufficient to qualify for tlie 'magic 
circle *.
2, Ferguson to Rosebery Nov. 9, 1891 Roseliery r4SS 
10018
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After 1895, however, and especially after Rosebery's 
resignation a year later, this pattern of the 'ins' and 
'outs’ became less important even at the centre as each 
faction sought to gain on ascendancy in a fluid, almost 
chaotic, situation. Seemingly, tlie most potent were the 
Roseberyites. wealthy, well-connected and socially inte­
grated members of the East of Scotland social and intel­
lectual elite who found political unity in tlie figure of
Rosebery: "our salvation - the Wallace who will ultimately
3
lead the party to victory." A quite distinctive group of 
influential Scottish Liberals began to form loosely aliout 
the less charismatic but more dependalDle figure of C.B. 
Prominent in tliis group were Captain John Sinclair, Sir 
John Kinloch, T. R. Buchanan, James Bryce, Leonard Lyell 
and possibly, R, T. Reid, These Liberals, though usually 
men of inherited wealth and position, tended to be socially 
distinct from the Rosebery group. Unlike the latter they 
had few ties with England or London society and tended to 
be more exclusively tied to Scotland. Outside of these inner 
groupings lay a nuraloer of 'interest' groups of varying com­
position and importance. These included the remains of tlie 
crofter movement in the highlands, and old temperance and 
disestablisliment radicals in the lowland burghs and the 
beginnings of a new radical block concerned with the social 
conditions of the larger urban areas.
3, A. C, Wood to Ferguson Sept. 27, 1897 Rosebery MSS 
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Nevertheless, the division between 'ins* and 'outs' 
remained important. Tories might see A, L. Brom, R. T.
Reid and James Dal2 iel as equally dangerous radicals. In 
fact, each held a significantly different position in the 
political struggles within the Liberal party. Reid’s 
academic background and social 'respectability’ led him to 
be personally close to -tlie Roseberyites despite his fierce 
anti-imperialism. He was an unliesitatincr supporter of 
Rosebery instead of the more ideologically compatjlolo 
Harcourt. Brovni, the bete noire of the Liberal establish­
ment, was undoul)tGdly an 'out'. The fact that his influence 
within the old radical ranks was considérai)le cut no ice.
He was regarded as a rather tiresome and somewhat scruffy 
boisterous terrier on the fringe of the pack. Dalziel, who 
had moved considerably into social politics was an'out', as 
well, though perhaps by a more passive judgement, ' Though 
he had leaned towards Harcourt over Rosebery his real loyalty 
always remained with the disgraced Dilke.
It would be a vast over- simplification to suggest tliat 
any of these groups were mutually exclusive of each other 
or that frontiers were at all distinct. Many individuals 
defy any precise classification: Haldane, socially and
politically belonged with the Roseberyites yet his cosmo­
politan proclivities always took him beyond the small world 
of Scottish politics which he seemed to regard with con­
siderable contempt. Also to be considered were the odd 
ideological alliances developed such as the links between
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the Fabian influence within the Rosebery group and the 
industrial socialists.
b) Radicals, Newspapers and English Carpetbaggers
It might have been expected that the anti-Rosebery
activities of Harcourt after 1895 would have boosted the 
radical cause within the Scottish party. In fact, the 
English leader's radicalism counted far less for many 
Scottish radicals when set against Rosebery's Scottish 
nationality and social influence. Moreover, it was not of 
small note that the Scottish Whip, Ferguson was a thick and 
thin Rosebery man. Ferguson's confidence that he would be 
able to weld Scottish Liberalism together as a base of 
support for the leader of the party shines through the fol­
lowing letter to C.B.:
"I asked Captain Sinclair to take your pleasure 
as to your being Chainaan of the Liberal Scotties 
in this parliament, paziel has already expressed 
a warm approval but I have mentioned the matter to 
no one else but Rosebery who said "of course".
It would add enormously to the weight of any de­
cisions at which the body arrives and in the times 
ahead it is sound policy for selves and country 
to make Scots Liberal opinion as reliable as 
possible".
Certainly Ferguson was fully prepared to use strong measures 
to coerce the radicals if they caused troublei
"A member showing himself to be of more harm 
than good to his party (will be penalized) j 
for example, I refused money to Weir and infor­
med his association that I had done so giving 
them my reasons.
4. Ferguson to C.B. Dec. 14, 1895 C.B. MSS 41222
5, Ferguson to Rosebery Sept. 1, 1895 Rosebery MSS 
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It la clear that the condition of the radicals left 
them in little position to resistthe dominance of their 
opponents. On October 20, 1895, in Glasgow, the S.L.A. 
executive decided to restrict policy considerations to the 
caucus thus removing the influence of the radical-dominated
S.L.A. The consequences would be to sever the radicals 
from an 'official* voice and, thus, greatly lessen their 
impact and reduce the authority of the radical wing. 
Gibson-Carmichael reported in contemptuous terms of the 
radical faddists and their feeble performance in Glasgow:
"I was relieved to find that A. L. Brown was not 
there and was bored to find that Pirie was .... 
Brown was suffering from a bad sore throat which 
I regretted the less because it made long speeches 
inqpossible .... the disestablishers, all their 
valour seems to have departed this earth...."®
C.B., too, perceived the rapid decline of the old church 
radicals in 1897;
"As to dissent, I think Tommy Shaw is right 
- a frank and firm reference to it is advisable 
but saving his presence there are few of our 
public men d^io care much about it; and fewer 
still in private."?
If this particular problem of radicalism was contained, 
there were others to vex Scottish Liberalism; for example, 
the continuing lack of a respected newspaper voice in 
Scotland. Proposals to remedy this deficiency were an al­
most annual occurrence after 1886, but all ideas to establish
6. Gibson-Carmichael to Rosebery Oct. 20, 1895 Rosebery 
MSS Box 72
7, C.-B. to Bryce 1897 Quoted in Spender, op. cit, p. 18 7
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a rival to the bitterly anti-Liberal Scotsman and Glasgow 
Herald carae to no fruition. Liberals did receive the 
support of local papers such as Long's Dundee Advertiser 
but as Ferguson complained: "we shall never be right in
Scotland until we have a good p a p e r . T h e  disaster of 1895, 
and the position of Rosebery and his friends in Eastern 
Scotland gave now impetus to the search for the means for 
a new paper in late 1895. Tlie proposed publication was to 
be Edinburgh-based with an overlap into Northern England
9
but remaining in essence "thoroughly Scottish", However, 
enthusiasm was not enough and like so much about Rosebery, 
the idea remained only an ephemeral promise,
This desire to insist on a "thoroughly" Scottish party 
reflected the enduring nationalist feeling within Scottish 
Liberalism with regard to tiieir own party affairs, A 
lingering sore was created by English carpet-baggers, 
Scotland had always provided a refuge for English Liberals 
who could not secure a seat in their ox-m country and in the 
circumstances after 1886, the strength of the East of 
Scotland increased the degree of attraction. However, it 
was repeatedly evident that the arrival of such refugees was 
resented by Scottish M.P.s who did not wish to see Scotland 
reduced to a dumping ground for unsuccessful Englishmen or 
to see the national integrity of the Scottish caucus called 
into question. In the later years of the century, it was
9. Ferguson to Rosebery Sept, 9, 1895 Rosebery MSS 
10019
9. Ferguson to Rosebery Sept. 6, 1895 Rosebery MSS 
10019? Sinclair to Rosebery Jan, 2, 1896 Rosebery 
MSS Box 73
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Increasingly felt that Scotland's hospitality was being 
abused.
In 1880 only 3 of 50 M.P.s wore English and of these, 
Gladstone was accepted as a Scot. The other two , g * O, 
Trevelyan and C. S, Parker worked hard to identify x^ ith 
the Scottish issues of their constituents. However, after 
1886, the English in Scotland had groim to 6 and in a con­
siderably reduced caucus, at that. Asquith, Lacaita and 
Birrell were true carpet-baggers in tliat their interest in 
Scotland was never profound. After 1895, and anotlier 
shrinking of the caucus sise, there still remained 6 English 
imports* Asquith, Birrell, Trevelyan, John Holburn, Leng 
and Robert Wallace, Therefore, when John Morley, who had 
been defeated in Newcastle in the general election pro­
posed to return to parliament via Montrose Burghs, replac­
ing a Scot, J. S. Will, some bad feeling was inevitable.
Morley had never shown any particular affinity for 
Scotland or her affairs; indeed, quite the reverse. In 
1891, he had felt uneasy about a request from Ferguson to
come as a speaker *
"Morley does not want to be brought up just 
now. He says, except once in Glasgow, he has
never succeeded here and that he will only 
listen to our own men .... The religious 
feeling that does exist against him.P&O
10. Ferguson to Rosebery Doc, 19, 1811 Rosebery MSS 
10018
205
In 1895, Ferguson, like many other Scots, took exception 
to Morley's devotion to Gladstone's Irish plan which barred 
Home Rule all round* This nationalist feeling which had 
proved a handicap even for a native Scot, James Bryce, 
when he had opposed SHR, was the basis of a warning sent 
by Ferguson to Morleys
"I do not believe that my countryraen ever 
adopted or ever will adopt in its full and 
unrestrained scope Mr, Gladstone's view of 
Home Rule for Ireland .... The necessity for 
more measures of Home Rail All Round .. .. I 
am not the only one xfho holds this view strongly. 
Haldane and Robert Wallace may be exceptions to 
what I regard as the rule but they are the only 
ones I k n w
Ferguson wrote to Rosebery of Morley:
"If he preaches his word in Scotland at 
this time of day he will foe repudiated."
Morley's views were undoubtedly a hemdicap in Scotland 
though Ferguson'who had a special Interest in S.H.R. 
doubtless exaggerated the effect. More Important was the 
general grumbling over the introduction of another English­
man to Scottish representation. Ferguson also stated these 
objections clearly:
"I should have thought the East of Scotland was
overstocked with celebrities already,"^3
11. Ferguson to Morley Nov. 24, 1895 Rosebery MSS 
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12. Ferguson to Rosebery Nov. 24, 1895 Rosebery MSS 
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13. Ferguson to Rosebery Nov. 19, 1895 Rosebery MSS 
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"Morley's selection will weaken the Scottish 
representation as a Scots b o d y . "14
C.-B, swung his significant weight behind these feelings*
"I thinlc it regretable that he should take 
refuge in a Scotch seat and doubt his being . _
hero will help us in our little Scotch politics."
He took the same stance six years later xfhen Cecil 
Harmawortli, a Liberal from the opposite pole of the party 
from Morley received a by-election nomination for North- 
East Lanark in 1901*
"The Lanarkshire seat is a moss and must go its 
own way. 1 do not at all like the idea of a 
pure English coming down and capturing a seat 
or oven a hold upon a constituency - but if my 
countrymen like it, xfhat can be done.”l®
c) The Resignation of Rosebery and CD's succession
Par more damaging to the fragile order of the Scottish
Party than any of this was Rosebery's precipitous resig-
nati<m on October 3, 1896. His national position in Scotland
gaVe the resulting turmoil a particular impact there with
his political friends naturally rallying to his support,
deluging him with telegrams of protest. However, it was an
unexpected disappointment that tlie S.L.A. could offer no
more than a fe€^ >le regret* "thanks to you for your services
in the past, a hope that you might at a future time lead 
17the party."
14. to Rosebery Nov. 24, 1895 Rosebery MS8
10019
15. C.-B. to Rosebery Doc. 13, 1895 Rosebery MSS 10019
16, Quoted in Spender op. cit. Vol. 2, pp. 4-5
17, Gibson-Carmichael to Rosebery Oct. 22, 1896 Rosebery^
MSS Box 74
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Ferguson had no hesitation in giving the strongest encour­
agement to his friend;
"Public opinion is running more for you here 
than it was in the past, The working men are 
with you .... those who don't want you are the 
middle class faddists or Enthusiasts like 
John Wilson - t®nperance M.P, Govan? Knox of 
Kilbirnen, another leading Western Free Kirîonan; 
Sir John Kinloch who is never happy
Gibson-Carmichael attempted to convince Rosebery that 
whatever the S.L.A. said, Scottish opinion was still 
behind him;
"in Dundee, there are many who are angry with 
you about Armenia, in Dunfries a few, in 
Glasgow a fair nunibor .... every otlier part 
of Scotland I hear of approves of (you) ••• 
the keen disesteüilishers are divided, the 
single tax men are against you, also the 
teetotalers in the West but not in the East 
.... (no) part of Scotland where there is not 
a large majority in the Liberal Party who are 
anxious to be led by you.
The resignation of Rosebery meant a victory of sorts for 
the radical wing of the Liberal Party through the advance 
gained by Harcourt but in Scotland the RosdDeryites 
were confident of the ineffectualness of the radicals fringe
"(A, L. Brown) has practically no following 
outside tlie office bearers of the free Church 
.... even in Galashiels (Brovm's home)."20
18. Ferguson to Rosebery Oct. 14, 1896 Rosebery MSS 
10019
19. Gibson-Carmichael to Rosebery Oct. 22, 1896 
Rosebery MSS Boje 74
20. Gibson-Carmichael to Rosebery OCt. 22, 1896 
Rosebery MSS Box 74
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"amongst the strong Free Kirkers and tee­
totalers there is not the same feeling as 
with the leading politicians and with the 
masses *•«. except with A. L. Brown and 
maÿbe with a few others ,.., There is an 
entire absence of (radical) feeling in 
Scotland."21
Ferguson consoled Rosebery with the judgement* "we are
22not a party fit to lead." But he was still certain of an 
eventual returns
"There is no doubt in my mind that he must 
ultimately return .... under the pressure 
of necessity."23
However, even Ferguson could see that, for the moment, at 
least, another Scot was to taka the lead for Scottish 
Liberalisms
"with no party leader .... I imagine we 
shall go on much as before. Tlie Scotties 
at any rate coming closer around you ( C . B . ) " 2 4
"Our men in Scotland will group themselves rather 
closer round Campbell-Bannerman, for a bit."25
The period between the resignation of Rosebery and 
the selection of C.-B. as leader in 1899 was probaloly the 
effective low point of the Liberal Party before 1914. 
virtually rudderless, an object of general derision, the
21. Ferguson to C.-B. Nov. 2, 1895 C.B, MSS 41222
22. Ferguson to Rosebery Oct. 22, 1896 Rosebery MSS 
10019
23. Ferguson to C.B. Oct. 12, 1396 C.B. MSS 41222
24. Ferguson to C.B. Oct, 12, 1896 C.B. MSS 41222
25. Ferguson to Rosebery Oct. 17, 1896 R, MSS 10019
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party faced catastrophe stripped of all purpose and 
morale. Tîiis chaos was equally true of the Scottish 
party. An incident in 1897 was symptomatic. The S.L.A. 
executive had issued an invitation to Harcourt, then 
leader, to come to Scotland to speak to the Association.
However, Leng and Ferguson as active Rosd^eryites sought 
to diminish the impact of the speech by diverting the 
venue to the lesser city of Dundee, A, L, Brown and his 
friends, outraged, put pressure directly on Harcourt to 
come unsponsored to EdinJ^urgh to speak from a radical plat­
form on the question df Armenia, Ferguson made it ümown 
that he considered the idea inflammatory and Brown's actions 
" I m p o s s i b l e " A s  the situation built up to explode,
27Harcourt could do nothing but refrain frcmspeaking altogether.
It is important to note that Ferguson’s real position 
and attitude underv;ent a crucial change with the self- 
removal of his patron, Rosebery, from the party leadership 
and the seeming ascendancy of the hated rival, Harcourt,
So long as Rosebery led the party, whatever the conditions, 
Ferguson's coiimiitment to Rosebery's personal course did 
not conflict with his party responsibilities as Scottish 
Whip, However, after October 1896, Ferguson was placed in 
olwious conflict with his new nominal leader. Ferguson's 
official Scottish dtiief, C, B, as caucus chairman, was not
26, Ferguson to Rosebery July 8, 1897 Rosebery MSS
10019
27. Ferguson to C.B, July 13, 1897 Rosebery MSS 10019
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regarded as an enemy but rather as a benign neutral in 
the war between Harcourt and Rosebery. 'Hius Ferguson 
could maintain the facade of working for the benefit of 
tlie Scottish party, as a whole, while, in fact, concen­
trating his real dedication on the return of Rosebery in 
spite of the latter's obvious disinclination to do so, 
Ferguson's letters to Rosebery undenvent a marked change
from tliat of confident command and leadership to that of
28
sul^terfuge and conspiracy. He managed to maintain a 
much more straight-forward attitude to C.B., then quite 
unsuspected. To him he wrote of the state of Scotland, 
At the internal level*
"The Party in Scotland is behaving 'with 
great propriety' as our forebears said 
when there was a great row.
but of the country at large:
"more dead than alive .,,, the wire pullers 
remain quiet ,... the constituencies, like 
Frenchmen, are regarding the future with 
perfect c a l m , " 3 0
The supersession of Harcourt by C, B. in January, 
1899 tore this fragile arrangement apart. Ferguson was 
caught in a classic conflict of interest, committed pers­
onally to the resumption of leadership by Rosebery and,
28. see especially: Ferguson to Rosebery Feb. 6, 1898
Rosebery MSS 10019
29. Ferguson to C.B. Dec. 16, 1898 C.B, MSS 41222
30. Ferguson to Rosebery Dec, 16, 1898 Rosebery 
MSS 10019
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officially, to the existing leader; worse, the new 
leader was no longer an Eng3.ish radical but a fellow 
Scot, friend and long tijoe associate. Ferguson had pre­
dicted C.-B.*8 coming for some time but had never really 
grasped its implications. At first he saw it as a means 
to lever Rosebery back by assigning C.B, to the Commons 
under the overall lead of Rosebery from the Lords:
"C.B. is the only possible nomination for 
House work ••,« it is the very general
opinion in S c o t l a n d . " 3 1
C.B, was confirmed as Leader of the Opposition on Feb. 6, 
1899, In no sense was he put forward as the choice of 
Scottish Liberalism. A strong seoticm including Haldane 
and Tweedmouth wanted Asquith, but he was not interested,
32
primarily for personal financial reasons. Ferguson's 
frustration exploded in the wake of C.-B.'s first major 
address in Parliament as leader, an address which seemed to 
drift to a support of a "Little England" overseas policy:
"It is merely plain enough now that if we never 
fail to find In (C.B.) a pleasant and interesting 
conversationalist that we should not less fail to 
find as unlimited a capacity for wobbling as that 
which destroyed his predecessor .... I am most 
thoroughly disgusted .... C.B, is another dunce man 
••.. he has flopped into Harcourt's net ,•.• a 
deplorable exhibition.33
31. Ferguson to Rosebery Deo. 16, 1898 Rosebery MSS 
10019
32. James op, cit. p. 407
33. Ferguson to Rosebery Feb, 25, 1899 Rosebery MSS 
10019
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Rosebery's telling rebuke speaks volumes for the cross­
currents of personal friendship and political objects 
which marked the Scottish Liberal elite :
"You show too much discontent with your 
new leader . .. (C.B.'s speech) doesn't 
represent my views - but why should it?
It probably represents the view of the 
Liberal Party in tlie main and that is 
what C.B, has to think of. Remember too, 
tliat he is thoroughly straight, a gentleman 
a Scot, a friend of yours and do not be to 
hasty to despair of him or even criticize
him". 34
Bryce Was well aware of the source of Ferguson's 
unhappiness; the perception tliat C.B.'s gentle moderate 
character and inclination to the centre of Liberal opinion 
represented the greatest possible obstacle to the revival 
of Rosebery's leadership prospects and the hopes of the 
Ro3ebe:ç?ites to seize, control or alter the direction of 
the Liberal policy:
"You would best unite the party, would 
prove the most acceptable to the whole 
party and would malce it less easy for the 
'Dissident Liberals’ to give trouble if 
they were so inclined .... you are the
choice of the great m a j o r i t y . "35
entree months earlier Bryce had reported "in the heart of 
Scotland they are eager to have Rosebery back again. 
C.-B. himself took the leadership in a spirit of renewed 
hope,notforeseeing the events of 1899:
34. Rosebery to Ferguson March 14, 1899 Rosebery MSS 
10019
35. Bryce to C.-B. Jan. 13, 1899 Bryce MSS 21
36. Nov. 5, 1898 quoted in Wilson op, cit. p. 280
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"X confess that X look for^^ard to it 
without fear and with a confident ex­
pectation of some actual enjoyment .«..
<fhat an inciA>us we have been living under, 
not only for recent years, but for a do%en 
years. That incubus has removed itself and 
those of us who remain can realize a friend­
ship and hearty comradeship which we have 
never had.
And in a more Scottish vein :
"I am enough son of my country and have 
enough of the 'shorter catechismr' still 
sticking about inside me to do my best with 
a thing if it comes straight to
Perhaps the best description of the situation that C.B, 
inherited In 1899 was offered in an epitaph The Nation 
in 1908:
"He came to the rescue of Liberalism when 
it was a mere hulk floating captainless 
and rudderless on the waste of waters,
Summary
In the late 1890’s, the Scottish Liberals continued 
to be dominated by an inner circle of power. This elite 
was not of an ideological character and was often fiercely 
divided against itself. However ties of respect, social 
position, education, blood and marriage kept the circle 
closed and lent substance to the image of a 'family*.
37, C.-B, to Bryce Jan, 15, 1899 Bryce MSS 21
38, quoted in Wilson op. cit, p. 295
39, quoted in Wilson op. cit. p. 296
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Distinctive groups often developed within the elite, 
grouped about a prominent leader or cause.
One group, the radicals, declined significantly 
in strengtii and influence during Hi is period. Mciny 
found their loyalties divided between Harcourt, the 
English radical and Rosebery whose magnetism as a fellow 
Scot endured, tlie group seemed to lose cohesiveness.
One developing pattern in Scottish political life 
did unite all sections of the family, Tiie rising numbers 
of English carpetbagging Liberals coming to Scotland 
in search of safe seats provoked a deep resentment 
throughout all levels of Scottish Liberalism.
It is significant that Rosebery’s resignation in 
1896 failed to provoke any serious reaction despite the 
best efforts of his friends. That such a drastic act 
should fall flat even in the country that only recently 
had so lionized him was a measure of the decline in his 
political stock. The interregnum between Hie resignation 
of RoseberT and the selection of Campbe 11-Banneman as 
the new leader in 1899 undoubtedly marked the nadir of 
Liberal fortunes as bitter and petty factional squabbles 
over the succession consumed what energy’ remained In the 
party. Rosebery's interest, headed by Munro-Perguson,
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was concentrated in Scotland where an attempt was made 
to build up a power base. Ironically, it was Scotland 
under Munro-Ferguson's uncomprehending eyes, that was 
to produce the new leader, Campbell-Bannerman, and thus 
end hopes of a Rosebery Restoration.
CHAPTER 8
Scotland and the Empire
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Scotland and The Empire
a) Patriotic Politics and Imperialism
Hindsight now suggests that tlie selection of Campbell- 
Bojinerman as the new leader of the Liberal Party in 1899 
was the first, and, perhaps, in the long run, the most 
essential step towards a recovery of Liberal fortunes.
However, C.B. was deceived if he thought that the political 
'incubus' represented by the Irish issue was al^ out to be 
lifted from the shoulders of the Liberals, The Home Rule 
question, itself, was to fade but the forces which supported 
it were to re-emerge, reconstituted as the Imperialist move­
ment and subsequently, more specifically, in the South 
African war.
The political effect of the Irish issue had been to 
deliver over to the Unionists virtually all the high ground 
of patriotism* Mid-century Liberalism under Palmerston had 
been able to base its appeal on both patriotism and morality. 
One of the distinct trends of the forty years following the 
1884 Reform Bill was the increasincrly demagogic, self- 
interested and irrational character of British political 
debate. The imperial issue of 1899-1900 was merely the 
growth of the original appeal of Unionism into an even greater 
patriotic vision.
Until the 1880's, the Empire had always been a peri­
pheral consideration of the British national interest. The
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Mid-Victorians had rightly perceived that Britain's wealth 
depended most on her industrial strength and her commercial 
supremacy in the non-British world. But the intervention 
of new factors in the 1870's: the rise of commercial and
industrial rivals, the erection of tariff walls and the 
entry of European claims into the rest of the world, closing 
territory to British traders, all served to undermine the 
old faiths. Trade did not necessarily follow the flag but 
protected opportunity did and in the minds of the late 
Victorian public grew up what A, P. Thornton has called 
"the Imperial illusion":
"That power increases and status is enhanced 
in proportion to the extent of territory that 
a nation exclusively commands.
However, these practical considerations seemed at
times to exist only as rationales for more influential
abstractions. Rosebery dismissed "Empires founded on trade
alone .... (they) irrevocably crumble" and suggested instead
?a vision of "a larger patriotism."' In this new guise, 
patriotism was to embody new ethics and new duties. The 
New Imperialism, as it was then styled, took a dual view 
of the Empire, dividing it between the "white" dominions 
which, it was hoped, would unite with Britain in a great
1. A. P. Thornton The Imperial Idea and its Enemies
Macmillan, London 1959 p. 19*
2. Ibid. p. X
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Anglo-Saxon Imperial Federation and tlie tropical terri­
tories which were to become the 'burden' of the white 
man's Federation. The duty of the Empire was:
"To lead the world in the arts of civili­
zation, to bring light to dark places, to 
reach the true political method, to nourish 
and protect the liberal tradition ,,., to 
be the trustee for the weak and to bring arro­
gance low.
John Buchan wrote of a man who dreamed such Imperial 
dreams :
"In those days, tlie afterglow of Cecil Rhodes* 
spell still lay on Africa and men could dream 
dreams .... it was a vary young man’s talk ....
He had had his 'call* and was hastening to answer 
it•Henceforth, his life was to be dedicated to 
one end, the building up of a British Equatoria, 
with the highlands of the East and South as the 
V7hite man's base. It was to be both the white 
man’s and the black man * s country .... It was 
to be a magnet to attract our youth and a settle­
ment ground for our surplus population. It was 
to carry with it a spiritual renaissance for 
England .... Here was a man dedicated to a 
crusade ready to bend every power of mind and 
body to a high ambition .... a young knight 
errant gravely entering upon his vows of service.
Imperialists of the best kind did not talk of superiority
to others but rather of responsibilities to others.
Fatally, Imperialism failed to appreciate that such noble
ideals could just as easily be construed as paternalism on
the grandest scale, what Santayana described as "the
5school-boy master of the world." Worse, a 'higher 
'3. ibid. ix - X
4. John Buchan Island of Sheep Penguin, London pp. 15-17
5. Thornton op, cit, p. 94
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patriotism' could and did easily descend into simply a 
more vicious form of chauvinism.
Imperialism never fitted easily into existing British
political divisions. To suggest that the Liberals were
anti-Empire is to swallow Tory propaganda slogans. In
fact, much of the Imperialist elite were self-declared
Liberals, Perhaps most prominent were Rosebery and
Chamberlain but with them,were Dilke, Forster, Cromer, Seely,
Milner and Rhodes, The paradox of the Imperialists was
that while they appealed to the Tory instincts of patriotism
and property, what they were in fact proposing amounted
to a vast innovation, even a revolution. Imperialists
of the expansive visions could never be conservatives.
Milner was a social reformer who helped establish Toynbee
Hall^ and Rhodes contributed ^ 10,000 to the Liberals in
1891 because he hoped that Irish Home Rule would be the
7first step on the road to the great Federation. However, 
the Imperialists had to face the sober truth as Salisbury 
outlined it to Milner:
"the Conservative Party is a party shackled by 
tradition, all the cautious people, all the 
timid, all the unimaginative, belong to it 
Yet, the Conservative Party is the Imperial 
Party. X must work with it idio indeed am just 
such a one myself - but you must work with it 
if you are to achieve even a part of your 
object."8
6, Smith op, cit. p. 106
7, Shannon op. cit, p. 326
8, Ibid. p. 229
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Yet the language of ’Imperialism’ remained essentially 
Liberal :
"Imperialism is to fight not for selfish 
British interests but for great causes 
which are in danger or great principles 
which are imperilledin order to succour 
the oppressed and do justice to the 
weaJc," (Joseph Chamberlain)^
These were sentiments which would have gained the sympathy 
of the Gladstone of Italy and Bulgaria .... and, most 
ironically, of Ireland. And herein lies the crux of the 
matter, Gladstone and the Gladstonian tradition never 
stood in opposition to the Empire, but rather to the cor­
ruption of its use. They would have regarded Chamberlain's 
words above as cant and hypocrisy. To Gladstone, the Empire 
was a force for great potential good and in that light he 
was determined to preserve it. The anti-imperialism of the 
Liberal Party rested on an objection to the practices not 
tlie sentiments of the Empire-Builders; most notoriously, 
the Jameson Raid which seemed to reveal all the motives of 
gross greed, the worship of power and the institution of 
amprality which they loathed.
b) Scottish Attitudes to Empire
The Empire had always had a particular importance to 
Scotland. Lacking any overseas possessions and bankrupted
9, quoted in R. Faber The Vision and tlie Need Faber and 
Faber, London, 1966 p. 74
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by the Darien catastrophe, she had turned in 1707 to a 
union with England and her Empire as a last chance to 
gain access to the new worlds opened to European trade. 
Rosebery supplied a characteristically Scottish inter­
pretation of the Union, likening it to "a poor man marrying 
an heiress, .... mortifying to pride at first, irksome 
occasionally, in the long run harmonious because founded on 
i n t e r e s t . with a poor land of their own, the result of 
the Union was to make the Scots into a nation of emigrants 
and travellers. Some went only as far as the industrial cities 
of England, others went on to London; but tlie greatest wave 
crossed tlie oceans to settle in the newly-acquired lands.
In one sense, thus, the Scots became natural 
Imperialists. The Empire was now theirs to use and it was 
an opportunity seized with enthusiasm. Sea captains, traders, 
administrators, explorers, missionaries, soldiers, settlers, 
and pure adventurers poured out of Scotland. The British 
armies that fought the American colonifets were notable' 
not only for Hessian mercenary troops but also for the 
extraordinary number of Scottish officers that led them, 
Scottish enterprise made full use of Imperial opportunities 
from the Canadian fur trade to the development of Uganda.
It has been estimated that up to 75% of all British foreign
10, James op. cit, p. 113
11. Gibb op. cit. p. 145
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and colonial investment companies were of Scottish origin
12or based on Scottish models. In the age of the steam­
ship, it came to seem as if most of the globe-spanning 
British merchant marine had been built on the banks of the 
Clyde and tliat each ship had, by regulation, a Scottish 
marine engineer.
However, no matter how prominent the place of Scots 
in Imperial history, the Empire remained essentially English 
in character. Overseas possessions took on Scottish char­
acteristics only as the result of direct Scottish settlement. 
Nowhere was the Scottish legal system adopted. Nowhere 
was the Church of Scotland established; though the Church of 
England often was, leaving overseas branches of the Kirk 
in the embarassing position of being placed in opposition 
to an establisliment. Scots could regard the exploits of 
their countrymen with pride but tliey could have sensed 
little in the way of a "greater Scotland".
The Englishness of the Empire was matched by the 
Englishness of the Imperialist movement. At the most 
obvious level was the exalting of English institutions 
and the adoption of an English ideal even by Scottish 
Imperialists like Livingstone and Buchan:
"(Buchan was) the Scottish 'outsider' with 
his idealized admiration for the closed 
circle of English power where everyone knew
12. McCaffrey, on. cit. p. 244
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everyone else, where everyone knew where 
everything was ™ "The pass on the right 
as yon cross over into Ladakh" - and where 
everything and everyone not so known was 
not worth knowing."13
There was also the unconscious adoption of English opinions 
and attitudes as the root faith of the movement. The 
spirit of nationalism was antipathetic to tlie cause of the 
Empire. Never having suffered conquest and never having 
needed a national Liberator: a Joan of Arc, a Bruce or an
O'Neill, the English have never had a true appreciation of 
the power or nature of nationalism, hence, the. seemingly 
endless English agony in Ireland, To the Imperialist, a 
nation was not a matter of sentiment or history but a 
capacity to conduct an orderly government under the rule 
of law and the protection of liberty ~ the hallmarks of 
Anglo-Saxon civilization. The Empire would win, the 
Imperialists argued, the loyalty of less fortunate peoples 
by providing them with Right and Good Rule, It was a funda­
mental article of faith that by keeping a sense of respons­
ibility to otliers, by doing the Right Tiling, good adminis­
trators could win over the loyalty of colonial populations 
from retrogressive and anarchical nationalists.
However, the Scottish experience was very dif­
ferent from that which gave rise to these misconceptions, 
Scottish history and culture is permeated with a sense of 
national struggle and identity. Of course, simply to be a
13. Thornton op. cit. p. 92
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nationalist is no guarantee that one will sympathize with 
others of a different culture. Nonetheless, it is reason­
able to ask whether the Scottish approach to Imperialism 
was different and, if so, was it because of this 
national factor.
It is very difficult even to establish what the re­
action to the Imperialist movement in Scotland was, Scot­
tish historians, themselves, disagree considerably. Pryde's 
interpretation by Henry Felling:
"as the century drew to a close, local issues 
were dwarfed by an all-pervading Imperialism 
.... Scotland (was) swept along with the main 
current ...."14
However, more recently, the opposite view has been strongly 
argued by William Fergusons
"Scotland (the Imperialists) found a difficult 
field for their labours. There, in spite of the 
hysterical trumpetings of the press, existed a 
powerful core of radical "little Englandism" 
and a cynical refusal to plaster material needs 
with moral whitewash. For many of tlie Scots, 
the Empire denoted objects rather than ideas - 
places to go, to explore, to exploit, prosely­
tize or settle. Except among the Anglicised upper 
class^the Empire had little of the quasi-religious 
significance which seemed to appeal to all classes 
in England."15
This dispute reflects the conflicting nature of the 
evidence available. On one side is the record of individual 
Scotsmen in Imperial affairs. It may be, for instance, no
14. Felling Politics and Society p. 93, Pryde op. cit. p. 219
15. Ferguson op. cit. p. 333
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coincidence that the right of cultural survival was 
given to the conquered French settlers of Canada by two 
Scotsmen, General James Murray and the 8th Earl of Elgin. 
By contrast, it was the very radical but no less 
English, Lord Durham who, in contempt of the French 
Canadian nationality, stood as tlie most vigorous advocate 
of their assimilation. Of Elgin, it has been written:
Despite every countervailing factor, James 
Bruce was and remained a Scotsman. There is 
nothingmore natural than" that a Scotsman with 
his more difficult appreciation o f the nation­
hood of others should have led the way in treat­
ing French Canada with common fairness.
It is Interesting to note that it was his son, the 9th Earl,
who, as the Colonial Secretary from 1905 to 1908, closed
the era of Chamberlainite Imperialism and created realistic
17imperial policies for the 20th century. Even Buchan 
testified in later years to his ability to overcome the 
myopia of those like his patron Milner who were unable to 
grasp the meaning of colonial nationalism:
"I realized What Sir Wilfred Laurier, first 
of all imperial statesman (Prime Minister 
of Canada 1896-1911) realized, that you could 
not bind a growing Empire with any elaborate 
constitutional bonds, I realized tlie strength 
of Colonial Nationalism - the different Dominions 
had still to rise to national stature and that 
until that day comes it was idle to talk aJiout 
any machinery of Union.
16. Gibb op. cit, p. 82
17. Hyam, R. Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office 
MacMillan London 1972
18. Smith op, cit, p. 183
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His biographer suggests that his appreciation of colonial 
sentiment and minority cultures such as the Boers and
19French Canadians derived largely from his Scottishness.
It is, however, difficult to establish much, from such 
individual examples^suggestive as they may be.
The evidence on the contrary side is equally diffuse 
but it does seem to command more V7eight. During the time 
of the Bulgarian Agitations of 1877, Scotland, despite the 
strength of the Liberal Party, had been marked by a con­
spicuous quietness. This was due not only to the attitude 
of the Scottish whigs but seemed to pervade the whole 
body of Liberalism, Tliat a few meetings were held by
20dissenters in the smaller burghs only highlights tliis fact. 
This lack of interest was in stark contrast to the fever of 
emotion that swept Scotland two years later at Midlothian, 
However, it is a myth that the cutting edge of tlie Crusade 
was foreign affairs. As Hanham notes, the anti-tory re­
action was based far more on the agricultural and industrial 
depression of the later 1870's and the personal attachment
of Scotland to the Grand Old Man than to any revulsion
21from Disraeli’s Imperial policies.
In viewing Scotland’s attitude to Imperial events, 
the close connection betv/een military events and Empire 
building must be remembered. The glory of battles won and
19. Ibid. p. 183
20. Shannon Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitations 
Oxford 1965
21. Hanham op. cit. p. 228
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conquests made could be kept quite separate in the public 
mind from policies dealing with peaceful ruling of an 
Empire. Scottish troops always played an especially vivid 
and important role in tlie expansion of British rule. Domes­
tical ly, the military was a crucial vehicle for all levels 
of Scottish society from illiterate highlanders caught in 
the aftermath of the '45 to the most aristocratic like 
James Murray, brother of the Duke of Atholl. Between 1797 
and 1337, Skye alone contributed 21 lieutenant - generals
and major generals, 45 colonels, 600 commissioned officers
22and 10,000 soldiers. Nor was it merely a matter of close 
relations between many Scots and the military. The regiments 
were raised on a territorial basis tliat gave rise to 
identification and passionate loyalties long after recruit­
ing needs had filled many so-called Highland units with 
23non-Scots, Thus emotion and interest combined to give 
the Scottish public a particular enthusiasm for the wars 
of the Empire. Speaking of his efforts to canvas for 
peace in the CrJjnean War, Cobden wrote to tlie radical Scot, 
Duncan McLaren:
Nowhere has the movement fewer partisans than 
Scotland; the reason is obvious. First, 
because your heads are more comliative than even 
the English and secondly, the system of our
military rule in India has been widely profitable 
to the middle and upper classes in Scotland, who 
have had more than their numerical proportion of
22. W, H. Murray The Western Islander of Scotland
Eyre Methuen Ir>ndon 1972 p. 225
23, See esp. C.B. MSS 41233
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its patronage; therefore, the military 
party is very strong in your part of the
Kingdom," (Sept. 19, 1853)
The self-interest of Scotland in the military 
was Increased by the rise of iron and steel technology.
The yards and workships of the Clyde grew fat on naval 
contracts as Britain found her supremacy at sea challenged 
in the latter years of the 19th century. War, and 
espocially the Boer War, brought boom-times and it is 
significant that in 1900, 400 Clydeside shipwrights marched 
on Glasgow University to demand the expulsion of a professor 
who had expressed sympathy for the Boers.
The most compelling evidence would seem to be the 
reaction of the Scottish electorate in 1900 to the Khaki 
campaign and the degree of support it showed for 
Chamberlain's Unionism. However, whatever Scotland's 
attitudes to Imperialism or the Empire, and it can only be 
concluded tliat, on the evidence, the question is still 
open, it would be an error to suggest that the election was 
a plebiscite on "Imperialism" . While the word was frequently 
invoked,it is clear that the basis of'Khaki' was a clearly 
defined war, not a policy or philosophy.
Given this, Scotland's behavior in 1900 becomes 
easier to understand. No matter what national opinion was on
23.a. Mackie Life of Duncan McLaren op. cit. p. 10
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doctrine© of Empire, the Scot© would be the ve3,-y leist 
people to take a soft line in the face of a direct chal­
lenge to British arms. This was particularly so when that 
challenge came, not from a remote land of primitives, 
but from a well-armed and organized nation of Europeans 
who were receiving none toodiscreet sympathy from Germany.
c) The position of idie Scottish Liberals
It was therefore a very difficult situation in which 
the Scottish Liberals were placed in the summer and fall of 
1899. To hark back to the legacy of Fox and take a line 
of high-minded unpopularity was to tempt the final ruin 
of an already tottering party. To join tlie war party was 
to risk moral bankruptcy. Most Liberals took refuge in 
studied neutrality, questioning the details of diplomacy 
and war preparation. However, the visible face of the 
party was one of open warfare as small groups at each end 
of the question launched attacks on each other and. destroyed 
the healing calm that their new leader had hoped for.
The struggle within the Liberal Party was not an 
internal version of Unionist-Liberal conflict. To identify 
the Liberal imperialism of Rosebery and Ferguson as 
"Jingo" is to do their creed a disservice. Indeed, there 
was little of the Jingo in it; it seemed to be conscious 
of tlie Liberal tradition of rationality in politics and
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thus present ân imperial scheme as a thinking man's 
approach to public questions. Their tactical desire to 
rob the Unionists of exclusive rights to 'patriotism' 
was as much pragmatic as it was congenial. If the Unionists 
were disarmed of their foremost weapon, political discussion 
could be directed to those domestic social issues where the 
real future of Liberalism lay. In 1899, the division within 
the Liberal ranks was unlike the split of 1886 not only in 
that no forraal rupture occurred, but much more importantly 
because the creed of the "dissident" Liberals of 1899 was 
not really compatable with that of the Unionists,
The Liberal Imperialists were not 'war-hawks' and, 
indeed, Ferguson was perceptive enough to clearly foresee 
the real outcome of the war;
"I am very depressed at tlie thought of war, 
for the British record is so bad in South 
Africa that success may be as bad as former 
failures.
This comment compares interestingly with Bryce's;
"I hope we shall do all we can to avert v;ar for 
it would be a great misfortune and might lose
us South A f r i c a . "25
Obviously there was common ground between the 'Imperialists' 
who had no illusions about past British rule and the 'radi­
cal' who feared losing a part of the Empire. Earlier in
. Ferguson to C.B. Sept. 2, 1399 C.B. 1488 4122 2
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the year, Ferguson had rejected Dr. Jameson as a candi­
date in terms tliat would have stood Sir Robert Reid well: 
"I hate the Raid and all c o n n e c t e d . T h i s  would tend 
to suggest that the 'Imperialist-Pro-Boer' struggle in the 
Liberal Party was subtler than is sometimes implied. It 
may be suggested that the frictions brought out by the 
war had as much to do with tactical judgements, ambitions 
and personalities as with ideologies of ]%ipire.
Summary/
Despite the fading of 'Home Rule', the oatriotic issue 
in its new guise q P 'Imperialism' was to continue to haunt 
the Liberals in the last years of the 19th Century. As a 
doctrine and mythology, Imneirialism nrovided a singular 
paradox politics. In essence, it was innovative, radical 
and inspired wide horizons of thought, Manv of its chief 
disciples were self-declared Liberals. Yet political reality 
kept it chained to the fortunes of the party of tradition, 
the Conservatives, Tlie practical requirements of such a policy as 
opposed to its lofty ideals, left it fundamentally unaccept- 
ible to most of tîiose who called themselves Liberals.
26. Ferguson to Rosebery Feb, 25, 1899 Rosebery MSS 
10019
Reid was the only M.P. to rise in tlie House and 
condemn a parliamentary inquiry,»’ into the Raid as 
a white wash and a scandal. As a consequence he 
was pilloried mercilessly in the press.
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No conclusion can bo drawn whether Scotland v;as more 
or less Imperialist than the rest of the United Kingdom.
Tlie sense of an appreciation of nationalism that was 
inherent in everv Scot, by fact of his nationality, un­
doubtedly gave Scots pause prior to any full acceptance 
of the anti-nationalist assumptions of the Imperialist move­
ment. However, the facts of Empire, as opposed to grandoise 
philosophy appealed deeply to the Scottish nation both for 
historical and contemporary/ reasons. The Empire meant 
opportunity, for enrichment, for achievement, and for 
settlement. Most critically it stood for military glory 
and -the pride of Scotland in tlio record of her men in 
armsp Given these factors, Scotland, while not necessarily 
'Imperialist', had no antipathy whatever to the maintenance 
and growth of -blie Empire.
In the face of tlie South African crisis, this p rob all le 
Scottish sympathy for a bellicose stance on the part of the 
government, created grave difficulties for the Scottish 
Liberal Party. Given tlie times, the development of Rosebery 
and the Lilieral Imperialists, with their particular strength 
in Scotland posed the most serious of challenges to any 
future party unity. Yet curiously, tlie documents of the 
time seem to indicate an area of understanding 
between 'Imperialists' wlio had few illusions about the 
'rightness' of British rule and 'radicals' who feared
the loss of a part of the Empire.
CHAPTER 9
Scotland and the Khalci Election
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Scotland and the Khaki Election
a) War Fever and Party Division:
In late September, 1899, as war seemed to creep in­
exorably closer, C.B, and Bryce began to exchange almost 
daily letters filled with dismay. When the first shot came, 
Bryce’s judgement was immediate:
"Although the Boers may be the first to 
fire, they have been goaded and frightened 
into this hasty and deplorable conduct by a 
long course of provocation."^
However, it was db'ùrious that this opinion was exceptional 
even within the Liberal Party:
".•,. a good many Liberals will support 
the government , we may have to face 
a split in the party...."2
C.B. agreed:
"The ordinary Liberal is saying .... dis­
closure since the war began of the vast 
power of the Boers far beyond (internal 
defensive needs) shows that they meant 
mischief against us .... shows they must 
be put down
Asquith’s report in mid September from East Fife seemed 
tp confirm these fears:
"It would be a mistake to suppose that our 
people as a whole are in any way strongly 
pro-Boer. I talked to one or two represen­
tative Liberals before I spoke - Free church 
ministers and such - and was rather surprised 
to find how anti-Kruger and bellicose was the 
frame of mind,"^
1. Bryce to C.B, Oct. 5, 1899 C.B. 41211
2. Bryce to C.B. Sept. 29, 1899 C.B. *41211
3. C.B. to Bryce Nov. 10, 1899 C.B. 41211
4. Asquith to C.B. Sept. 19, 1899 quoted in Spender 
p. 241
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J. W. Cronifoie, M.P, for Kincardine agreed;
"I have not been much in Aberdeen but I 
have been a deal about in this part of the 
country and I should say that the general 
opinion of Liberals is this : "War is a bad
business but the Boers have brought it on 
themselves and it can’t be helped," I am not 
saying that this is a statesmanlikeview, I 
only say that it seems pretty fairly to sum 
up the view of the average Liberal, nothing 
like what there was three years ago over the 
Armenian question, not to mention 1878,"5
In mid-November, Br^ 'ce confirmed this assessment of opinion 
from Aberdeen but offered some hope:
"it has struck me that you might come to hear 
in what mood the Liberals are here. Pirie 
(M.P. for Aberdeen North) and I have both addres­
sed large ward meetings and have both taken the 
bull by the horns. No dissent was expressed but 
a section appeared surprised at our condemnation 
of the Ministerial dipiomacy. They have heard 
only one side of the case hitherto - for all 
the papers here support the government and they 
did not know the facts, Few people do .... but 
we brought more and more of them around,"®
but Bryce still had to concede the burden of the all- 
pervading war-feeling:
"my esqperience in Scotland is that nobody
wants at present to hear anything except 
the war. All one says about the House 
of Lords, Temperance, Lafid Values, seems to 
be quite thrown away ...."7
In light of tliese attitudes, C.B, tried to steer a middle 
course, avoiding any direct denunciation of the war itself
5, Crombie to Bryce Oct. 7, 1899 Bryce 21
5. Bryce to C.B, Nov. 12, 1899 C.B, 41211 
7, Bryce to C.B. Nov. 16, 1899 C.B. 41211
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and deploring only the actions of Chamberlain and the 
government in making it come about.
The stance of the Liberal Imperialists was to 
declare, in keeping with Rosebery’s belief in the necessity 
for continuity in foreign policy, that in such a national 
crisis the government had to be supported whatever the 
errors of the past. In the meantime they had to deal with 
their position within the party. Ferguson’s divided 
loyalties became more obvious than ever; while he worked 
tirelessly to promote Rosebery’s interests, as whip he was 
still charged with a responsibility to the party as a whole 
and to C.B,, in particular. Although his partisanship is 
unquestionable;
"a good large section is against us (The 
Roseberites), but I am sure we Imve the 
majority of the party,"®
his correspondence, with C.B. remained remarkably helpful
and evenhandedt
"our party is much divided .... I have been 
advising candidates not to hold their meetings 
for awhile .... we all regard you as the one 
who is able to speak without involving us in 
accentuating divisions and that therefore, it 
is a matter in which we should simply carry out 
your own views without offering those ’sugges­
tions’ in which the S.L.A. is so fertile
His assessment of public opinion was much like that of 
Bryce and Crombie*
8. Ferguson to Rosebery Oct. 30, 1899 Rosebery 10019
9. Ferguson to C.B. Nov. 8, 1899 C.B. 41222
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"The party is split, as you know, but I 
believe that the greater part of it, perhaps 
three-quarters, especially those who don't 
talk support the war without inquiring very 
closely into its causes.
Prom his own experience with his constituents C.B. could 
only agree:
"There is a great deal of war-fever and they 
are a little bewildered by the buckets of 
contempt and abuse poured on me by the 
Scotsmam and other papers. I do not think 
that it goes very deep but for the moment 
there is a coldness."H
The following week brought news of "Black Week", an 
unparalleled series of British military disasters. As 
C.B. foresaw on November 10, this only served to increase 
the Liberal difficulties:
"The very difficulties of the war and the 
strength of the enemy help the government in 
the country!
On December 20, Robert Pullar, a senior Scottish Liberal, 
wrote sadly to C.B.:
"may our people recover from their war fever 
and return to their right mind."^3
At this feverish moment, however, came a strong 
Indication that in fact tlie war did not monopolize all
10. Ferguson to C.B. Nov. 19, 1899 C. B. 41222
11. C.B, to Bryce Dec, 7, 1899 quoted in Spent
p. 262
12. C.B. to Bryce Nov. 10, 1899 C.B. 41211
13. Pullar to C.B. Dec. 20, 1899 C.B. 41232
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political activity, A by-election was held in Clackmannan 
and Kinross and despite the observations cited above, an 
outsider held the seat for the Liberals with almost no 
reduction in majority. Even more surprisingly, the war 
was not the chief issue of the canpaign. A fierce struggle 
for the Liberal nomination seemed to be tlie centrepiooe 
and, amazingly it revolved about the ancient temperance 
question.
When the vacancy occurred^the Liberal establishment 
had expected Dewar, Lord Provost of Perth and the head of 
the famous distillery to inherit the seat without trouble. 
However, with names like Tennant and McEv/an already in the
party lists, the anti-drink forces decided to take a stand.
15"The teetotalers are on the v/arpath." Pressure was put 
oh Ferguson to reject Dewar but Ferguson put it off by 
leaving the matter to the local association. The en­
during strength of the temperance men was demonstrated 
when tiie association rejected Dewar and chose Eugene Wason, 
an outside temperance leader. However, apart from the 
liquor issue, Wason belonged to the mainstream of the party 
and this seemed to minimize conflict within the party. 
Ferguson sent a promising report;
"Woods sends the most encouraging reports.
Wason is doing better than expected as the 
teetotal candidate because though you could 
not have a more reliable supporter in the house
14. Ferguson to C.B. Nov. 8, 1899 C.B. 41222
15. Ferguson to C.B. Nov. 19, 1899 C.B, 41222
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he has never been regarded as one of 
the most brilliant partisans on the 
platform,"16
The tone of this message is again notable for its marked 
friendliness to C.B. at a time when Ferguson was actively 
advancing Rosebery. Whether this is a reflection of deceit 
or of genuine ambivalence is Impossible to say.
However, Ferguson's prejudices were revealed by the 
candidacy of the Master of Elibank for Midlothian, Tfhile 
lamenting the genuine troubles the Liberals were having 
in attracting good candidates, Ferguson took special aim 
at Elibank:
"We are very short of candidates and money for 
fresh ones .... The Master of Elibank has no 
money and is never of the same opinion for 24 
hours. I am at my wits end for good men."^7
The judgement of Gibson-Carmichael, another Liberal 
Imperialist, was much more favourable:
"The Midlothian Committee have recommended 
the Master of Elibank to the general body of 
the association who will take him next 
Saturday. He has made a good start and if 
only he 'catiker' on with the miners will be 
all right.
Since he was barely 30, Elibank may have been less than 
an ideal candidate but considering that he was to rise to become
16. Ferguson to C.B, Dec, 10, 1899 C.B. 41222
17. Ferguson to C.B. June 9, 1900 C.B. 41222
18. Glbson-Carmichael to C.B, June 25, 1900 C.B. 41233
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the chief VThip of the Liberal party by 1910 he could hardly
have merited Ferguson's dismissal. It was well known that
Elibank*s view of Imperialism stood distinctly to the
radical side and Spender has suggested that this plus his
intention to run in a Lothian seat, which the R o s e b e r y ites
considered their particular territory, was the root of
19Ferguson's attempts to create difficulties.
Another example of Ferguson's biases interfering with
a candidate occurred in West Fife. One candidate for tlie
nomination, Anthony Hope, a pronounced pro-Boer, was
described as a disaster by Ferguson because he had "demor-
20alized" West Perthshire in 1895, In fact, in that year, 
he had raised, against the tide, the Liberal vote in the 
riding.
By September, 1900, Ferguson's partiality in his exer­
cise of his office as Whip was being openly complained of. 
For over a year Ferguson had played a double game and 
served two roasters. At the same time as he was engaged in 
recruiting candidates and keeping C.B. Informed of the
state of the party organization, he was submitting lists to
21Rosebery of those who might be in the Imperialist camp.
The conflicts of Interest were obvious and known within 
the party. In April, Tweedmouth suggested Ferguson's
19. Spender op. cit. p. 288
20. Ferguson to C.B. June 8, 1900 C.B. 41222
21. Ferguson to C.B. Sept. 2, 1900 C.B. 4X222;
Ferguson to Rosebery Aug. 22, 1900 Rosebery 10019
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22replacement by Capt. Sinclair, ' ' Though he denied having 
misused the office, Ferguson himself recognized the im­
possibility of his situation and pledged his resignation
effective with the termination of the looming election
23campaign. ' So Byzantine had the intrigues of tlie inner 
chamber of Scottish Liberalism become by 1900 that when 
Rosebery, as President of the S.L.A,, proposed to attend 
one of its meetings, C.B, was sent into a fit of suspicion;
"What is he up to? He has never attended
onb b e f o r e . "24
The old petty divisions also went on:
"The friction between East and West is 
continuous,"25
but they were reaching new depths:
"The Glasgow S.L.A. executive are now all 
complaining that at your meeting they did 
not get such good seats as the Edinburgh 
men."2^
b) The Campaign ;
The circumstances of October 1900 provided the
Unionists with the opportunity to revitalize and refur­
bish their 'patriotic* image. The surrender of the regular 
Boer armies had seemed to herald the end of a short war
22. Tïveedmouth to C.B. April 17, 1900 C.B. 41231
23. Ferguson toC.B. Sept. 12, 1900 C.B. 41222
24. C.B. to Bryce Jan. 14, 1900 C.B. 41211
25. Tweedmouth to C.B. Nov. 29, 1899 C.C. 41231
26. Gibson-Carmichael to C.B, June 25, 1900 C.B, 41233
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which, though commencing disastrously for British arms, 
had resulted in a glorious victory. That the opposition 
had been well armed and organized "Europeans' made the 
glory seem all the greater. An election would give a 
popular stamp of approval to tlie triumph and development of 
the Empire,
For the Unionists, the principle at stake in South 
Africa was the same as that in Ireland: the maintenance
of the integrity of the Empire. The way in which the Irish 
Nationalists had taken such an open and unconcealed delight 
in the early Boer victories emphasized the point all too 
clearly: Home Rulo would only encourage the dismemberment
of the Empire and a weak hand overseas would lead to renewed 
troubles in Ireland, The Unionist gamble eventually failed 
when the emergence of guerilla warfare in South Africa and 
the consequences of the British military response irredeemably 
tarnished the image of Imperialism.
The 'Liberals' circumstances in 1900 could hardly 
have been worse. At the bottom of a long slide, the 
Liberals could find agreement within themselves on few 
matters of importance. Caught up with too much of the 
Gladstonian legacy and with as yet too little commitment 
to social politics, they could not sort out their OTrm 
identity let alone make an effective appeal. The struggle 
between factions within the Liberal party was almost as 
insistent as that between parties. The Liberals were
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caught with a new leader to whom few, outside Scotland, 
felt any deep loyalty. To most, he was an amiable but 
lightweight caretaker whose greatest virtue was that he 
divided least. The public image of C.B, was that of a 
cosmetic covering the continuing real battle for control 
between the Harcourt and Rosebery factions. The Unionists 
naturally made great play with this situation and 
Liberal candidates in 1900 found themselves regularly 
and persistently heckled about their personal loyalties.
In these circumstances it was impossible to establish any 
clear party line with which to fight any election.
In Scotland, the party seemed to split all too 
clearly into factions over the South African question.
The Liberal Imperialists ^ave unequivocal support to the 
war though suggesting that it was they who were the best 
equipped to create a just settlement, a more "Liberal" 
Empire. At the other extreme, Sir Robert Reid and the 
radicals denounced Imperialism and all its works. The 
majority of the party, however, followed C.B. in attempting 
to survive by talking around the issue and awaiting more 
rewarding times.
With the war and all the easy issues on their side, 
the Unionists made most of the running in 1900. They 
followed a standard formulas lauding the victories in 
South Africa and the future of the Empire, denouncing the 
Liberals for their dotÜDts and denigrating tlie pretensions of 
the party to be an alternative government when it could
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barely hold itself together.
There were two sides to the "Imperial" arguments
on© positive and one negative, R. B, Finlay, one of the
most influential Unionists in Scotland,î set out the
former in his inaugural speech on Sept. 6, speaking of
a "great sweeping period", for the Empire, its future and
27South Africa's place in it. Some lilte the radical
Unionist, Nairn, in Kirkcaldy, (he supported women's
suffrage) went so far as emphasizing that any settlement
would have to take into account the interests of the South
African blacks. He suggested, with reason, that the
Liberals might hand the natives over to the tender mercies 
28of the Boers. This was a perfect example of radical 
Imperialism's dedication to benign paternalism.
Hotmver, it was much more common for Unionists to
concentrate on the dark but easy road of negative
Jingoism at a moment of national war fever. This often
consisted of identifying political opponents with 'enemies
of the nation' and making accusations of treason, both
implicitly and explicitly. One of the most vicious Jingos
was Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, standing in Edinburgh Central,
Describing himself as a "Liberal in all matters but the
Empirehe characterised the Liberals as a "party of 
29
traitors." Gordon Stewart, in Perthshire East suggested
27. Glasgow Herald Sept. 6 1900
29. ibid Sept. 24 1900 
29. ibid Sept. 24 1900
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that the Liberals had learned their "treason" from con-
30
sorting with the "Irish Traitors," Gordon i‘n\Elgin and
Nairn identified Clark, Bryce and Reid as "the Comforters
of Kruger" and told the voters "to tell the Boers where 
31Britons stand." J. Sanderson in Hawick accused Thomas
Shaw of being "an enemy sympathiser" and a "betrayer" of
32the "gallant British soldiers," Bryce's opponent accused 
him in Aberdeen of being a particularly dangerous "traitor. 
It is Interesting that one of the loudest of these auper- 
patriots was Bonar Lawcin Glasgow, Some like Shaw-Stewart 
In East Renfrew represented the election as the last battle 
between "us and the B o e r s . "34
While the Unionist pitch was usually at a level of 
crude chauvinism some did raise the more intellectual and 
economic implications of Imperialism as an ideology. Duncan 
reminded Govan of her dependence on Imperial and World 
markets as well as the good timt the Empire would bring to 
dark corners like the Sudan and South Africa. Reid related 
the Empire to Greenock in terms of the sugar trade. In 
1095, McKillop had suggested that the social welfare of the 
working class was necessarily entirely dependent on tlie 
national prosperity. In 1900 he extended that idea,
30, ibid Sept. 26 1900
31. ibid Sept. 26 1900
32. ibid Sept. 27 1900
33. ibid Sept, 20 1900
34. ibid Sept. 26 1900
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suggesting that prosperity being depenchnt on trade and 
trade in turn dependent on Empire, the latter was tlie 
ultimate source of benefits to the lower classes.
For the Liberals, the South African issue was an 
uncomfortable and dangerous burden. Their greatest dan* 
ger was to fall into the trap laid by Unionist doctrine and 
to become identified as a "Fifth Column". To avoid it, 
they took different routes.
Those with the least worries were the Imperialists who
disarmed the issue by embracing the cause of the war, though
often deploring failures of Unionist policy in South
Africa. Haldane, for example, "wholly approved" of the
war, defended, the record dfrLord Milner, a particular bête
noire of the Liberal Party, and advocated an Imperialism
that would lead to a "free" tolerant and progressive 
35Empire." However, it is noticeable that Haldane's pur­
pose was to remove the Empire as an issue, not to maximize 
it in the Unionist fashion. Asquith dismissed the
election as a "patriotic trick" preferring to devote his
36address to social reform". Indeed, it is noticeable 
that the Imperialists were the Liberals most able to con­
centrate on 'Liberal" domestic issues. Identifiable 
Liberal Imperialists in Scotland included Ferguson, Haldane,
35. ibid Sept. IS 1900
36, ibid Sept, 17 1900
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Asquith, Leicester Harmsworth, Sir John Long, T. G. 
Heddorwick, Sir John Jardine, Alexander Ure and the 
Tennant family.
At the other end of the scale was Dr, Clark, M.P. 
for Caithness, who had acquired the 'blackest* name in 
all Scotland, He had been an agent for the Boers before 
the war and since its outbreak had been an open and active 
sympathizer. This, added to his radical crofter and 
socialist background, was more than sufficient to identi­
fy him as an unqualified traitor* Tliroughout Scotland, 
Liberals found that the epitliet 'colleague of Dr, Clark' 
was used as often as ' friend of tlie Boers ', Clark was 
violently prevented from even appearing in Caithness where, 
in any case, he had been stripped of the Liberal nomination 
which had gone to Leicester Harmsworth, an English Liberal 
Imperialist.
Aside from Clark it is difficult to speak collectively 
of the remainder of the left of the Scottish Party.
The term used by their opponents, 'pro-Boers' was patently 
unfair yet it covered an identifiable group of Liberals out­
spokenly opposed to the Imperialist movement. These included 
Sir Robert Reid, Adam Black, Thomas Shaw, T. R. Buchanan,
A. Souttar and James Bryce among the most prcfftinent. Reid 
had established himself as the leading figure of this 
group by his lonely attacks on the Jameson Raid and the 
passage of time did not water down the passion of his
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anger. He accused the Government of 'cowardice' in
seeking election in wartime and declared tliat the country
was wakening to the cost of the government's ineptitude in 
37'a jingo war,' The pro-Boers were not necessarily little 
Englanders opposed to the Empire itself. Bryce’s views 
have been quoted above. Similarly, Reid was enraged by 
the chauvinism and deception of the Imperialists, not the 
fact of overseas possessions. A genuine little Englander 
was Joi'in Morley. In his eyes, the folly of the Unionists 
was that they had only succeeded in adding another burden.
Nonetheless, the degree of attention paid by Liberal 
candidates to social questions was very striking and from 
this emerges a number of patterns. Part of the problem 
of the Liberal party at the time was the sheer complexity 
of the division. The party was not simply broken into 
factions; it was divided differently at different strata 
with new disputes overlaying the old.
What was a Radical in 1900? One could be radical on 
the church. One could be radical on the war. One could 
be radical on drink. One could be radical on Ireland, One 
could be a Little England radical* One could be radical on 
social reform. 'Social reform" could mean the old 
temperance or land issues or something new like housing and 
pensions. Thus the lines drawn up over South Africa had 
little meaning when applied to social politics.
37. Glasgow Herald Sept. 14 1900
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A list of Liberals who took an interest in social 
reform shows strange bed-fellows, indeed. On one side 
were the socialist-influenced radicals like Fletcher, 
Maxwell and Black, On the other, stood the Liberal Im­
perialists like Asquith, Haldane and Jardine, as well as, 
a few of the more traditional Liberals who were influenced 
by their working class constituencies: Provand, Wood,
Caldwell, and P. R. Buchanan, Bryce found his attention 
directed to social issues by the reality that it was the
working class voters of his constituency who constituted
38the Liberal votes.
Those who were reluctant to enÛDrace the new ideas 
are harder to identify, Morley and Ure had expressed their 
unease in the past over the new social ideas of inter­
ventionism but it is probable that most of those with 
doubts did not go out of their way to express them in 
public.
More numerous were the traditional Liberals who clung 
to the old nostrums like temperance and institutional 
reform but introduced into their programme bits and pieces 
like "8 hours" or workman's ccmpensation, Some of these 
included Colville, Glen-Coats, Dunn, Menzies and Douglas.
Finally there was the not inconsiderable group which 
failed to make mention of social reform at all. Whether
38. Bryce to C.B, Oct. 30, 1900 C.B. MSS 41211
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this reflected a lack of support or interest or whether 
it was simply a measure of the overwhelming presence of 
the South Africa issue, it is impossil^le to say.
It might have been hoped that Ireland would have 
ceased to be such a burden for the Liberals in 1900 but 
it was not to be. Home Rule itself was only mentioned 
in those seats with large Irish populations (Lanark North 
West and Greenock). However, Irish support for the Liberals 
was severely affected by the issue of sectarian education. 
The Tories had given support to the idea of state sub­
sidies for Catholic parochial schools in Scotland and the 
establishment of a Catholic university in Ireland. The 
Liberals, steeped in a long and proud history of struggle 
for freeing education from ecclesiastical control, could 
have only one response. Presbyterian, and of a fierce 
educational tradition, the reaction of Liberal Scotland 
was only that much stronger. C.B, and Bryce were not pre­
pared to temporize on tlie question:
It would be a good thing if you said a 
few plain words on the Irish university 
question on Friday. You are an unimpeach­
able educationalist - and also approximate 
the reluctance of honest fellows in the 
counties f: to adopt so reactionary a scheme 
as a sectarian university.
On SeptemJ^er 25, the archlfcishop published a letter giving 
direction to support the Conservatives because of the
39. C.B. to Bryce March 19, 1900 Bryce MSS 21
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question. Shaken, the Liberals in Irish areas frantically 
waved the Home Rule banner* Tîie full effects of these 
rival forces are hard to discern but it is certain that 
the Irish did not react uniformly, Colville, in Lanark 
North East received Nationalist support even though he was, 
at best, lukewarm on tlie schools issue. After the 
election, C.B. and others put a large amount of tlie blame 
for the disasters in Scotland on the Irish votes
"In my Burghs, my failing off is mainly 
due to the Irish turning against me on 
the education questions Not unnaturally 
for I should be sorry to agree with tliem. 
But it makes a Big difference if we do not 
get votes from the Protestant and anti­
sectarian side to balance them."40
However, other evidence calls these judgements into question. 
In the five most Catholic constituencies, Lanark N.W., 
Lanark-Mid., Lanark M.E., Kilmarnock Burghs and Greenock 
there was, in each case, a swing towards the Liberals 
against the national trend, The only constituencies with 
Catholic populations in excess of 8% to register Unionist 
swings were three Glasgow seats and C.B.'s own Stirling 
Burghs which stood only twentieth in terms of Catholic 
population. It may well have been that within the Irish 
community, the recommendations of the Church were often 
passed over in preference for traditional support of the 
Home Rule Party and in sympathy for the Boer nation. The 
Glasgow Irish had been openly and enthusiastically
C.B. to Thomas Shaw October 17, 1900 quoted in 
Shaw op. cit. p. 246
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43'pro-Boer', holding large 'stop the war' rallies*
Surprisingly, in spite of their desperate’ handicaps 
the Scottish Liberals do not seem to have been dotm* 
hearted during the campaign. Ferguson, who, in previous
campaigns had displayed a shrewd political eye, was sure
42that any losses would be balanced by gains. Bryce's
fears in London that "Scotland is still reported to be 
43
Jingo" were tempered by the atmosphere that he found in 
AberdeenV "There is less excitement in Scotland than I
44expected and the omens do not seem to be unfavourable."
His cautious hopes were raised further by the end of the
month to a full expectationcdf success, "The prospects
are now good ... the constituencies have resumed a
45reasonable mind and at al3. tiiTies like courage." Bryce 
was to do well personally in Aberdeen but this was not 
to be the Scottish pattern.
c) The Election Results
In Britain, the result of the election was a virtual 
repeat of 1895? the Unionists improved on their position 
at dissolution but fell short of their 1895 total, Tliough 
hardly a Liberal victory, tlie result was, considering 
the circumstances, a considerable defensive success. The 
effect of the result, however, was to continue the Unionist
41. j. F. Handley The Irish In Modern Scotland University 
of Cork Press Cork, 1947 p, 287
42. Ferguson to C.B. Sept. 22, 1900 C,B. 41222
43. Bryce to C.B. Sept. 16, 1900 C.B. 41211
44. Bryce to C.B. Sept. 23, 1900 C.B. 41211
45. Bryce to C.B. Sept. 28, 1900 C.B. 41211
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hegemony of politics based on 'patriotic' issues.
"What think ye of Caledonia? 'stands Scotland where 
she did* as Shakespeare and Charles Parker asked. Is it 
not deplorable?"Scotland offered Liberalism little 
comfort in 1900. The Liberals had made gains in both 
Wales and England rising from 25 seats to 28 and from 112 
seats to 123 seats respectively but in Scotland the party 
fell to a new low of 34 seats from 39, This was the first 
time Liberalism had been in the minority in Scotland since 
1832. In terms of popular vote, the Liberals retained a 
slight lead 51.2% to 48,8% but this does not include three 
unopposed Unionists, In Scotland the swing to the Tories 
was, on average 0,7% but to complete a picture of confusion, 
the general sv;ing in the United Kingdom, where the Liberals 
gained seats, was against the Liberals by better than
In 1895, 17 seats registered Liberal swings; in 1900 
there were 19 plus 5 others which ro'i a.lned level.There is 
some evidence that Unionist success in Scotland was due to 
aîmormally eccentric patterns of voter reaction. Of the 
six seats captured by the Unionists, (the Liberals gained 
one), five recorded swings in excess of 7%, In 1895, of 
45 seats recording a pro-Unionist swing, 19 recorded swings 
in excess of 5%. In 1900, only 9 were in excess of 5%
including 3 very safe Liberal seats which had massive
46. C.B. to Thomas Shaw Oct. 17, 1900 Shaw op. cit. p. 246
47. Kinnear op. cit. p. 26
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Unionist swings: Aberdeen East (8.5%), Orkney and Shetland
(11%) and Sutherland (25%),
Liberals on the East Coast seemed to experience a 
slightly better reception than those on the West. Of the 
12 seats with swings in favour of the Liberals in excess 
of 3%, 7 were in the East. The Unionist swing was spread 
throughout Scotland but it was heavily concentrated in 
Glasgow and the Highlands.
There is some evidence that Liberals who were marked 
out as radicals or 'pro-Boers* did considerably less well 
than the Imperialist groups. Of 14 who were clearly 
identified with the first group(Bryce, Black, Reid, Souttar, 
Dalziel, Shaw, Morley, and Hope) 10 saw a decline in their 
vote portion. On the other hand, of 13 who were acknowledged 
Imperialists (Ferguson, Haldane, Asquith, Long, H. Tennant,
E, Tennant, Farquharson, Jardine, Hedderwick, Parker,
Annand) 7 had increased percentages. With the remaining 
'centre' candidates, declines outnumbered improvements 
about 2 to lo
For the Liberal inner circle, the most shattering 
result was the defeat of T. R. Buchanan, in Aberdeenshire 
East. Buchanan, a veteran and much respected member of 
the caucus was defeated by a Liberal Unionist, A. W. 
MacConachie. Shock at the defeat was a leading subject 
of post-mortem correspondence: (A great loss" - Bryce):
48. Bryce to C.B. Oct. 27, 1900 C.B, 41211
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"inexplicable’'*^  ^said Shaw. Buchanan was a leading Liberal 
: figure, in a very securely Liberal seat. His opponent was a 
Jingo who was described asY "everything that is dis­
gusting"^^? "a h o r r o r C r o n h i e ,  who had a particular 
local knowledge of the region, felt much of the fault was 
Buchanan's owii:
"What we call tlie "organization" was in a 
state of ruins. Hitherto Buchanan had depended 
on the sheer force of the Liberal conviction 
of the country* That for general reasons 
collapsed and he had not .... the personal 
element to fall back on .... he never took any 
trouble to go about the county or live in it.
He was a political entity, representing in his 
person Liberal opinion but of no personal 
significance to the electors .... (opposite 
of MacConachie)."^^
The emphasis which Crombie put on tlie personal touch 
and the importance of individual candidates was a theme 
often suggested by others. By 1900 familiar patterns 
of modern political activity such as door to door canvassing in 
place of dependence on the forces of deference were apparent;
and set speeches were becoming more of the street corner
variety, frequent, brief and impromptu. Crombie himself
ascribed his near defeat in 1895 to his opponent's
"working theiconstituency in the modern manner by visiting
53and shal^ ing hands." Ferguson was sure that the cause of 
the loss of Sutherland was tlie weakness of the local
49. Shaw to C.B. Oct. 22, 1900 C.B, 41227
50. CromlDie’ to Bryce Oct. 1900 C.B. 41227
51. C.B. to Bryce Oct. 29, 1900 C.B. MSS 41211
52. Crombie to Bryce Bryce MSS 21 Oct. 1900
53. Crohlbie to Bryce Bryce MSS 21 Oct. 1900
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Liberal candidate, McLeod. “ The losses in the Highlands: 
Sutherland, Wick Burghs, Orkney and Shetland owed some­
thing to local factors: "The Scottish crofters wereoften
naval reservists and the crofting counties supplied many 
55
army regulars." Ferguson was openminded enough to hail
radical anti*»Imperialist Thomas Shav/'s triumph in Hawick
56Burgh as 'a completely personal victory."
Bryce outlined tlie sort of difficulties that Liberals 
had faced:
"We had a good deal against us from the 
newspapers vilifying us, nine months energetic 
canvassing by the other side while our people 
were doing nothing, a good deal of war feeling 
and to top it all a drenching night which stood 
much worse for our voters who are all nearly 
wotking class for whom we had no covered 
vehicles."5?
Ferguson agreed that Liberal organizational apathy
up against Unionist energy crippled the Liberal effort
58
on the East Coast, The timing of the October election
also meant tliat the fishing fleets were not in port, thus
depriving East Coast Liberals of a traditional source of 
59
support. Additional strain came from the Liberals 
having tried to fight therélection on the old register.
54. Ferguson to C.B. Oct. 24, 1900 C.B. 41222
55. Pellinrr Social Geography op. cit. p. 94
56, Ferguson to C.B. Oct. 24, 1900 C.B. 41222
57, Bryce to C.B. Oct. 3, 1900 C.B. 41211
58. Ferguson to C.B, Oct, 24, 1900 C.B. 41222
59, Ferguson to C.B. Oct. 24, 1900 C.B. 41222
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as much a disadvantage then to the Liberals as it is 
to Labour today.
The real recriminations were reserved for the 
West where the disasters had been concentrated:
"Glasgow is damnable ..., the wretched result 
on the Clyde where warlike eigjenditures are 
popular? partly to the Catholic vote 
partly to Khaki? and partly to our own factions 
which has taken some of the heart out of us."GO
Ferguson offered an analysis
"Tlie west went to pieces partly for the 
v;ant of outstanding men there and because 
the Catholic vote went heavily over - 
we lost some of those in '95 however - and 
the West has only proved again that it is not 
always Liberal like tlie East. The employers 
put On the screw everywhere and some of our 
candidates were very raw,"Gi
Thomas Glen-Coats, a prominent Western Liberal put it all 
down to: "War fever and the old register,However,
others were inclined to point a finger more personally;
"This poorly organized party to which you 
have so unselfishly stuck .... The organization 
in the West is under the thumb of Ronald 
(Ferguson) .... is rotten .... it could be 
altered and should be."^3
Ferguson, looking ahead, saw evil consequences following 
from the Western defeats:
60. Spender op. cit. p. 294
61. Ferguson to C.B. Oct. 24, 1900 C.B. MSS 41222
62. T.G.C. to C.B. Oct. 26, 1900 G.». MSS 41235
63. Thomas Shaw to C.B. Oct. 22, 1900 C.B, MSS 41227
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"The relations between East and West may 
possibly be subjected to fresh strains 
as a result of the collapse of the West,
TTi© East has always complained of the money 
lost in the Glasgow office! the conditions
are favourable for recriminations."64
Pew Liî:>eralB had any doubts that war fever had been
the chief source of their difficulties. Crombie, however,
65put little on it in Kincardine, While most took a
fatalistic view of the situation, Shax-r was convinced that
the party xfould have benefitted from a stronger and more
"negative carping" attitude. Furthermore, there had been
little in the xfay of positive suggestions for the future
of South Africa, perhaps a settlement like the Canadian 
66Confederation. C.B, was receptive to this critique:
"We made a mistake in holding our tongues as long as xm 
67
did." The idea of an assertive opposition to the xfar 
had come from the moderate quarter of G, O. Trevelyan as 
early as March 1900 when Jingo pressures on the Clyde 
forced the resignation of a pro-Boer professor at Glasgov? 
University.
"The time seems to have come as in 1793 ....
The pressing duty of the Liberal Party should 
be to protect freedom of opinion .... the 
outrage at the University of Glasgow ,..."68
64, Ferguson to C.B, Oct. 24, 1900 C.B, m s s  41222
65, CromüDie to Bryce Oct. 1900 Bryce MSS 21
66, Shaw to C.B. Oct. 22, 1900 Shaw op. cit. p. 250
67, C.B. to Shaw Oct. 17, 1900 Shaw op. cit. p. 246
68, Trevelyan to C.B, March 3, 1900 C.B, mss 41231
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To cast C.B, in the role of Fox protests against itself 
but there can be little doubt that the eventual cry of 
'methods of barbarism' was securely in that tradition.
The Irish education issue had certainly not done
them any good though whether the effects were as negative
as assumed was open to doubt. The most conclusive trouble
was probably the condition of the party. The Roseberyites
69dissent on the flank had undermined party credibility and 
long years of defeat and decline had reduced party morale 
and weakened the organization. Perhaps the best analysis 
of the crisis of the Liberal spirit in Scotland was 
offered by J, W. Crombie:
"I remember a generation that was divided into 
Liberals and Tories on political principles alone 
.... (opinion) crystallized by the issues on 
great questions that afforded themselves and 
to have voted Tory would not only have been 
treason but it would have been against their 
Interest, Home Rule does not personally affect 
Scotland and any personal effect it had was in 
favour of Unionism, The great hand of self- 
interest has been lessened and with it, party 
ties, Tlien came the death of Mr. Gladstone 
and the dispersion of the Liberal Party. In 
consequence, all party ties have got into con­
fusion - to argue as the Scotsman does that 
the Tory party is tlie Liberal party is no doubt 
utter nonsense; but it is specious enough to have 
its effect on a generation of voters who never 
had occasion to take politics seriously - who 
never fought for cheap bread, or the franchise 
and who noxf see little more than txmedledum 
and tweedledee between Tories and Liberals ex­
cept that fashion, Influence, Lairds and 
employees are all on the side of the former.
This is a very sad and humiliating view to 
take of one's dountry but I am persuaded it
69. Shaw to C.B. Oct. 22, 1900 C.B. 41227
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is true and we must face it, I believe xve 
can only hold our own in tlie constituencies 
by 'organization' which is not politics at 
all. But I do see hone for tlie future because 
I am certain that as soon as a reallv crreat 
issue comes up which affects the neoole per­
sonally and directly we will once more get 
back to our old political p o s i t i o n .
Summary
At the turn of the centurv, Scottish Liberalism 
had come a great distance from where it had stood in tlie 
glory days of Midlothian. Battered and riven with 
factional divisions, it had Iona since lost its old 
position as the national partv of Scotland, By the end 
of 1900, it would even have ceased to be the majority 
party of Scotland,
The ver%/ nature of oolitics had changed. No longer 
were parties lead by titans as they had been in 1S80. 
Instead, leadership had fallen into the hands of lesser 
beings who, in the case of tlie Liberals seemed wholely 
engaged in an endless and tiresome series of sectional 
feuds. Politics increasingly divided upon class lines. 
While tlie active noliticians of the Liberal Party in 
Scotland tended to continue to be drawn from idle middle 
and upper ranks of society, their electoral suooort was
70, Crombie to Bryce Oct. 1900 B.2
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now almost entirely drawn from the lower orders. The 
old issues were gone. In the place of struggles for 
free trade mid free institutions were the rising demands 
of social reform and working class politics. As a result, 
political controversy in Scotland, by 1900, had become 
almost indistinquishable from that of England. In 1880, 
matters could turn on -thincrs specifically Scottish but 
twenty years later, "Scottish politics" had been reduced 
to disputes between Scots over issues identical in 
Birmingham or Glasgow,
For Liberalism, the 1890's were at once a period of 
steady disintegration and of fundamental re-orientation.
Between the crash of 1086 and tie resurgent triumph of 
1906 the intellectual essence of the partv was recast, in 
the midst of these moveit>ents it is not surprising that 
many of the years in between display an appearance of 
enomous and desperate confusion. Laiïels, terminology 
and identifications were all thrown onen to the wind as 
old and new, insurgent and relic fought for the spoils of 
the future. In Scotland, the particular strength of the Roseber- 
yites, the weariness of Lib-Labism, tlie enduring influ­
ence of the old middle class radicals, the strencth of 
national feeling and the depth of emergent talent such 
ae C-B and Sir Robert Reid lent a particularly powerful 
cast to this whirl of confused alarms and excursions.
26X
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Liberalism in 
Scotland after the Phaki election of 1900 was tliat the 
party should have survived as well as it did, While loss 
of majority status was a tremendous psychological blow^ 
the overall pattern of results, given the circumstances, 
was not all tiiat discouraging. In the face of a cam­
paign of vilification well beyond any O'F the Home Rule 
battles, compounded by the stab in the back of the Irish 
schools question, the Liberals had managed to generally 
hold their own outside of tlie Clyde and the Highlands where 
special factors dominated. That thev manacred to accom­
plish this without the benefit of an accented leadership 
or even much in the way of party unitv speaks well of 
their residual strenath. What the party lacked was a 
'calling', a new sense purpose and direction, and a 
leader to sew the party together behind it. It was not 
to be long before a Scotsman, Carapbe 11 -Lannerman would 
voice the cry of 'methods of barbarian’ to begin the 
long road back. But for Scotland, even in the flush of 
the triumph of 1906, and a cabinet filled with her sons, 
the age of independent Scottish political life was nearly 
over, drowned in the flood tide of the new politics.
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An Overview
TJie two decades that passed between 1880 and 1900 
marked a period of profound change for tie L:Dieral Party of 
Scotland, Although LilDoralism in the United Kingdom, as a 
v7hole, was being forced to alter in character and direction as 
it left the era of Gladstone behind, transformation was 
even more fundamental for tie Scottish Partv, The chief 
reason for this Wcis tie unique status which it had held up 
until 1880„ Scottish Liberalism, in tie Victorian Age, had 
been the embodiment of a national political voice, a voice 
which took in the full breadth of Scottish society and was 
based on feelings oC hi rtor-" and. national character that 
gave it a distinctive and. in..lO'’'onaent xriition wiÜiin tiie 
great alliance tiat caiie tone tier to "or". u.fitisn Liberalism,
For decades, Liberalisn was to rcn rcise.nt .Scotland's 
pride of nationhood based on those thincs vniich bound Scots 
together with fellow Scots. The result was a national rather 
than nationalist creed; a creed for a nation ./ith pride of 
place in an age of progress rather than an oppressed people 
struggling to be free. This harmonious marriacre between 
party and nation began to fail not through any slackening 
of a sense of nationhood but rather because the focus of 
political life moved away from issues which had brought 
Scots together on a national bas.1 s and drifting, slowly 
and uncertainly towards new concerns that would divide the 
Scottish people along class and social lines,
263
Between 1880 and 1900 the Liberal Party ceased to be the 
national party of Scotland. At the same time, tlie British 
Liberal party was losing its role as the natural party of 
government, a role which'it had held since the time of Peel. 
However, this latter change was a far less traumatic one 
because, unlike the change in Scotland, it did not go to 
the essential nature of the Party, The decline of Liberalism 
in Scotland is easily measured in numerical terms, whether 
j)y seats or by popular vote through the dispiriting crises 
of Church, Ireland and Ennire. However, the real blow was 
psychological, the loss of tixe easy old Eissumptions of 
national icAentification, 'Jlwi Party of l.;üù, in its reduced 
circumstances, was nuch more of a ooliticaj. fignting 
machine, more normal in one s._n.se than tie olf. Victorian 
party wiUi its ha%'/ ant con‘"or tab le c.iaracter. Arguably,
the change ',/a.s fo.r th.e Lietter. There can be no doubt
that tiie individual talent v/ithin the party of 1900 v;as 
grea^feuperior to that qF twenty vears i^efore, '-die in- 
fusion of talent in the great cabinet of 190.9 tiiat came 
from those thinned Liberal ranks of the turn of tiie 
century is the best evidence of that.
While the Liberal Partv itself was losing its unique
claim to tlie loyalties of Scottish voters, it is arguable 
that idle Scots never really abandoned a predilietion for 
a party of national expression, preferably one of Liberal 
cast, Toryism never really took root even in the years of 
greatest Liberal decline. The great battle of 1886 seemed 
to leave the Conservative Party as an onlooker as two
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brands of Liberalism fought for tlie favour of the nation, 
IVhile Toryism was to progressively increase disposition 
witliin the unionist alliance, Scotland remained one of 
the very few areas of vear^ r considerable Liberal Unionist 
strengtli. Most invoortantlv, in 1906, once divisive issues 
such as Ireland and Soutfi Africa were set aside, Scotland 
turned in an overwhelming tide back to the Liberals and 
maintained that level of support through 1910 into the 
First World War.
For Scottish uilitics taken as a whole, this era vields 
one stead- and ,'j:inounca '^ trenT, Thi : ras the decline of
speciHcall' Sccttis ', i ruva ^ aid their ro^lacenent b- 
cue s t i on s t’ i t t r a as c g a'd c - ’ 1 1. n a i on a 1 ' 'cr.n- ' i e s o " th e 
Uni tec i I'inodom T::,o c isc^ tatJ t s'/a-'ont oi'r-iito Iff 5 stands 
out cis tlie last great issue to consi.rie Scottish, aolitical 
life on a purely Scottish basis. Ironically, it was to 
serve to lay the groundwork for tlie ultimate division of 
the old 'national' party of Scotland.
A later issue, Scottish homo Rule ,;as probably the 
last important Scottish issue to enter into Scottish 
politics until its rebirth in recent times, For a brief 
spell it enjoyed great currency but it always seemed to 
lack a real cutting edge. Moreover, its oricin was to 
be found in the emergence of tlie Irish crisis and its 
importance v/as dependent on the progress of that crisis, 
Scottish Home Rule attracted considerable support by
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linking the major issue of the day to the natural 
nationalist feelings of the Scots but it never gained 
any compelling power of its own.
The Scots probably did take distinctive positions 
witli regard to the leading political questions of tlie 
time, Ireland and Empire, It is difficult to find any 
real strain of sympathy in the Scotland of tlie day for 
the Irish cause apart from a fesiv individuals. No real 
bonds were ever forged between the Irish and the Scots 
despite a shared position of minority status in the face 
of the 'predominant partner'. Vîhile other factors did 
contribute, without doubt, the greatest obstacle was 
religion reinforced by the Scottish ties to Ulster.
In the case of Imperialism, while it may well have had 
a particularly strong impact in Scotland, it is difficult 
to judge with any certainty on tlie basis of the evidence 
available. However, it seems fair to say that even if the 
Scots were as caught up in tlie Imperial tide as the English, 
they did so from different causes and modivations. History, 
pride and practicality probably counted for more than any 
mere ideological or emotional surge. Tlie particular con­
centration of the Liberal Imperialists in Scotland was 
probably due more to tlie personal relations of the Lothian 
elite than to any conditions in the countacy.
The decline of the party in the late 19th Century 
was marked by a contrary and paradoxical rise in the 
personal power and influence of leading members of the
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Scottish party within the councils of tlie British party.
Until 1880, few Scots had made any significant impact 
at Westminster even in the heyday of Victorian 
Liberalism and massive Scottish representation. Yet 
the Cabinet of 1905, led by a fullfolooded Scot, was 
originally overloaded with genuine Scottish talent.
One reason for the rise of Rosebery, Campbell-Bannerman 
and their fellows was the political shift in Scotland to* 
wards a division into a Unionist West and a Liberal East.
The East of Scotland became one of the few regions of 
safe Liberal strength in Britain and, unlike most other 
centres of residual party strengtli it was essentially 
non-urban and moderate to conservative in instinct. The 
Liberalism of the East was traditional, the legacy of a 
personal attachment to Gladstone and its control rested 
with men drawn from a traditional ruling group with naturally 
conservative instincts. Secure in its fiefdom, that elite 
consolidated its strength by filling its ranks with congenial 
talent by being able to offer secure political futures - a 
rare commodity in the Liberal Party of the time.
This was still an age of politics of the elite, be it of 
the right or the left. Consequently Liberals in the search 
for credibility and respectability still tended to seek 
leadership from the ranks of the social elite. Lib-labism, 
with its infusions of new talent from the lower ranks v;as 
still in its embryonic stage, still lacking the confidence 
to demand or take any real share of power and authority.
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Consequently, this grouping of elite Liberalism on tîie 
East Coast of Scotland could and did move naturally to 
the top of the old party with its tliinned-out ranks.
Hie result was that by 1900, tlie Scottish Liberals 
had lost their national ascendancy iu Scotland but had moved 
to a position of leadership in the British Liberal Party 
previously unattained and were soon to rise to even greater 
heights. Tlie Eastern Scottish leadership not only had 
talîon full command of the Scottish Party but were now 
extending that control to tlie British party.
It should also be noted that the tightened circumstances 
of the party seemed to draw it together into a tight 
'clubbish' - family unit. The strong core of those drawn 
from the social elite seemed to create a natural centre of 
cohesiveness. Those outside this core could and did or­
ganize obstreperous campaigns and groupings which challenged 
the 'safe' path preferred by the East of Scotland leadership, 
Hoi^ ever, at no time did any of those activities ever amount 
to much more than an irritant let alone meant any serious 
challenge to the ultimate control of the party. All of the 
groups and factions of the party were bound together in a 
strangely cohesive structure tliat may well have depended 
greatly on a shared sense of nationality to overcome any 
serious ideological differences. Scottish Liberals did 
not shun the company of their English brethren, indeed many 
of them wore eagerly working their way up in those circles
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too, fout they did seem to hold out a special loyalty 
for the smaller and more personal world of Scottish 
politics. During these years, the concept of a Scottish 
caucus and a Scottish party had a very real meaning that 
went well beyond mere organizational structures and 
which would be unknown today. Moreover, the sheer weight 
of talent and influence in the structure gave this world 
a sense of importance that took it far away from any 
mere relegation to a 'Celtic Fringe',
Scottish political life at this time did not divide 
into parties of tiie 'haves' and 'have-nots'. The peculiar 
circumstances of Scottish politics and society created a 
more complex result. After 1836, Scottish Liberalism 
found itself caught in the paradox of being increasingly 
dependent on working class votes to sustain it, while 
finding itself weakest in tlie west of Scotland where 
urbanization was tlie greatest and where the new working 
class radicalism was being born. The traditional party of 
'reform' and the 'left' found itself overwheImingly dominant 
in the conservative East while struggling to survive in 
those areas where the new class politics should have made 
it strongest. The weakness of the West lay in a combination 
of traditional Tory strength, greater social polarization 
on the part of the upper ranks, the effect of religious 
loyalties and prejudices amongst the lower classes and 
the weakness and increasing obsolescence of the old 
Liberal leaderslrLp in the region. As a result, in the
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traditional conflict in the Scottish party between a 
conservative East and a radical West, the balance shifted 
considerably to the former. In the meantime, the ana­
chronistic 'radicals' of the West were allowing a growing 
and increasingly dangerous gap to open up between the 
Liberal Party and the new movements that were springing 
up out of the ferment of tlie Clyde Valley. It is notable 
that the supposedly more oonservative Liberals of the 
East, like C-B and the Roseberyites were often more open 
to the influence of the new social politics than the 
Liberals of the West who stood in the very heart of 
the urban areas which provided the source of tliose 
issues.
In Scotland, however, the tilt of Liberal power and 
control to the conservative East was creating long-term 
problems. The emasculation of the West, leaving it 
dominated by a class of out of date old Victorian 'radicals' 
unsympathetic to and uncomprehending of the new political 
forces boiling up aloout them was a certain recipe for 
trouble. Ultimately, the result was the creation of a 
menacing gap between a party dependent, in the long run, 
on working class support and the aspirations of those 
working class voters. By the time of the First World War, 
the Scottish Liberals were to be the most 'traditionally' 
Liberal section of the party and the most fiercely hostile 
to any accommodation with Labour. In the wake of the 
war, the consequences of this would be disastrous. It
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may well be the final irony that the seeds of that 
'catastrophe' were planted in the course of the sv/elling 
success of individual Scottish LU^erals in the last years 
of tlie 19 til Contursr.
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